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Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk

September 21, 2012 Comments off

Source: RAND Corporation

Hedge funds are a dynamic part of the global financial system. Their managers engage in innovative investment strategies that can improve the performance of financial markets and facilitate the flow of capital from savers to users. Although hedge funds play a useful role in the financial system, there is concern that they can contribute to financial instability. The collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 raised awareness that hedge funds could be a source of risk to the entire financial system. Hedge funds also invested heavily in many of the financial instruments at the heart of the financial crisis of 2007–2008, and it is appropriate to ask whether they contributed to the crisis. This report explores the extent to which hedge funds create or contribute to systemic risk (that is, the risk of a major and rapid disruption in one or more of the core functions of the financial system caused by the initial failure of one or more financial firms or a segment of the financial system) and the role hedge funds played in the financial crisis, the consequences of the 1998 failure of LTCM, and whether and how the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 addresses the potential systemic risks posed by hedge funds.

Categories: business and economics, investments, RAND Corporation

New From the GAO

September 13, 2012 Comments off

New GAO Reports and Testimonies

Source: Government Accountability Office

+ Reports

1. Biosurveillance: DHS Should Reevaluate Mission Need and Alternatives before Proceeding with BioWatch Generation-3 Acquisition. GAO-12-810, September 10.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-810
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648025.pdf

2. Securities Investor Protection Corporation: Customer Outcomes in the Madoff Liquidation Proceeding. GAO-12-991, September 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-991
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648238.pdf

3. Public Financial Management: Improvements Needed in USAID’s and Treasury’s Monitoring and Evaluation Efforts. GAO-12-920, September 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-920
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648222.pdf

4. Slot-Controlled Airports: FAA’s Rules Could Be Improved to Enhance Competition and Use of Available Capacity. GAO-12-902, September 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-902
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648218.pdf

5. Trade Adjustment Assistance: Commerce Program Has Helped Manufacturing and Services Firms, but Measures, Data, and Funding Formula Could Improve. GAO-12-930, September 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-930
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648212.pdf

The Untold Story of Municipal Bond Defaults

August 17, 2012 Comments off

The Untold Story of Municipal Bond Defaults
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York

The $3.7 trillion U.S. municipal bond market is perhaps best known for its federal tax exemption on individuals and its low default rate relative to other fixed-income securities. These two features have resulted in household investors dominating the ranks of municipal bond holders. As shown below, individuals directly hold more than half, or $1.879 billion, of U.S. municipal debt; when $930 billion in mutual fund holdings is included, the household share rises to three-quarters. Although the low default history of municipal bonds has played a key role in luring investors to the market, frequently cited default rates published by the rating agencies do not tell the whole story about municipal bond defaults.

Categories: business and economics, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, government and politics, investments

Saving the Bed from the Fed

July 29, 2012 Comments off

Saving the Bed from the Fed
Source: Center for Hospitality Research, Cornell school of Hotel Administration

We estimate the reaction of the United States hotel and restaurant industries to the monetary policy actions of the U.S. Federal Reserve. We find that a portfolio of hotel industry stocks react strongly to unexpected changes in the federal funds target rate. Specifically, for a hypothetical surprise 25-basis-point rate cut, the value-weighted hotel industry stock portfolio registers a one-day gain of 245 basis points (or 2.45 percent). This response is 78-percent stronger than that of the overall equity market in the U.S. In addition, the price impact is stronger at times of policy reversals. On the other hand, the restaurant industry is not as responsive to unexpected changes in the monetary policy. To “save the bed from the Fed,” investors should first recognize the sensitivity of hotel stocks to changes in Fed policy and then engage in appropriate risk management activities, including hedging portfolio risk in the futures market.

Categories: business and economics, Center for Hospitality Research, Cornell School of Hotel Administration, hospitality and tourism, investments

New From the GAO

July 3, 2012 Comments off

New GAO Reports

Source: Government Accountability Office

1. Securities Regulation: Factors That May Affect Trends in Regulation A Offerings. GAO-12-839, July 3.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-839
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592114.pdf

2. Farm Programs: Direct Payments Should Be Reconsidered. GAO-12-640, July 3.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-640
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592106.pdf

Categories: business and economics, food and agriculture, Government Accountability Office, government and politics, investments, legal and law enforcement

CRS — Double-Dip Recession: Previous Experience and Current Prospect

June 26, 2012 Comments off

Double-Dip Recession: Previous Experience and Current Prospect (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)

Concerns have been expressed that growth in the United States may falter to the point where the U.S. economy again experiences recession. A double-dip or W-shaped recession occurs when the economy emerges from a recession, has a short period of growth, but then, still well short of a full recovery, falls back into recession. This prospect raises policy questions about the current level of economic stimulus and whether added stimulus may be needed. The pace of the recovery has been relatively slow and growth has recently decelerated. For the first year of the recovery, real GDP grew at an average rate of 3.3%, slow by the standard of earlier post-war recoveries, but fast enough to stop the rise of the unemployment rate at 10.1% in October 2010 and to cause it to fall to 9.5% by mid-2010. In the recovery’s second year, the rate of GDP growth slowed to an average rate of 1.6%, and the unemployment rate was only slightly lower at 9.1% by mid-2011. Growth remained weak during the recovery’s third year, advancing at an annual rate of 1.9%, and the unemployment rate had only improved to 8.2% by May 2012. Other indicators, such as weak consumer spending, falling house prices, reduced flows of credit, the prospect of fading fiscal stimulus, and the premature return of recession in the euro area are also worrisome.

Double-dip recessions are rare. There are only two modern examples of a double-dip recession for the United States: the recession of 1937-1938 and the recession of 1981-1982. They both had the common attribute of resulting from a change in economic policy. In the first case, recession was an unintended consequence of the policy change; in the second case, recession was an intended consequence. Historically, there has been what is termed a “snap back” relationship between the severity of the recession and the strength of the subsequent recovery. In other words, a sharp contraction followed by a robust recovery traces out a V-shaped pattern of growth. However, unlike earlier post-war recessions, the recent recession occurred with a financial crisis. Research suggests that a slow recovery with sustained high unemployment is the norm in the aftermath of a deep financial crisis.

The prelude to the economic crisis in the United States was characterized by excessive leverage (the use of debt to support spending) in households and financial institutions, generating an asset price bubble that eventually collapsed and left balance sheets severely damaged. The aftermath is likely to be a period of resetting asset values, deleveraging, and repairing balance sheets. This correction results in higher saving, weakened domestic demand, a slower than normal recovery, and persistent high unemployment, but not necessarily a double-dip recession.

Slower growth in the first half of 2011 was, in part, attributable to temporary factors, such as supply chain disruptions caused by the earthquake in Japan, recent floods and tornadoes in the South and Midwest, and the spike in many commodity prices, particularly oil. Nevertheless, recent economic indicators suggest that the recovery’s underlying momentum has also weakened. While not leading to projections of a double-dip recession, this weakening has prompted many economic forecasters to substantially reduce their near-term growth projections from those made in 2011.

This report discusses factors suggesting an increased risk of a double-dip recession. It also discusses other factors that suggest economic recovery will continue. It presents the U.S. historical experience with double-dip recessions. It examines the role of deleveraging by households and businesses in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis in shaping the likely pace of economic recovery. The report concludes with a look at current economic projections.

Categories: business and economics, Congressional Research Service, consumer issues, energy, housing and real estate, investments

CRS — The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB): A Legal Analysis

June 26, 2012 Comments off

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB): A Legal Analysis (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)

In the wake of the worst U.S. financial crisis since the Great Depression, Congress passed and the President signed into law sweeping reforms of the financial services regulatory system through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), P.L. 111- 203.

Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act is entitled the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFP Act). The CFP Act establishes the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB or Bureau) within the Federal Reserve System (FRS) with rulemaking, enforcement, and supervisory powers over many consumer financial products and services, as well as the entities that sell them. The CFP Act significantly enhances federal consumer protection regulatory authority over nondepository financial institutions, potentially subjecting them to analogous supervisory, examination, and enforcement standards that have been applicable to depository institutions in the past. The act also transfers to the Bureau much of the consumer compliance authority over larger depositories that previously had been held by banking regulators. Additionally, the Bureau acquired the authority to write rules to implement most federal consumer financial protection laws that previously was held by a number of other federal agencies.

Although the powers that the CFPB has at its disposal are largely the same or analogous to those that other federal regulators have held for decades, there is a great deal of uncertainty in how the new agency will exercise these broad and flexible authorities, especially in light of its almost exclusive focus on consumer protection. As a result, the CFP Act has proven to be one of the more controversial portions of the financial reform legislation.

The 112 th Congress is actively involved in conducting oversight of the implementation of the CFP Act. Additionally, the 112 th Congress has considered a number of bills that would significantly alter the structure of the Bureau. For example, H.R. 2434, the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2012, would make the CFPB’s primary funding subject to the traditional appropriations process, and H.R. 1315, the Consumer Financial Protection Safety and Soundness Improvement Act, would convert the CFPB’s leadership structure from a sole directorship to a commission and would allow the newly established Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to overturn CFPB-issued regulations with a simple majority vote, as opposed to the current super majority requirement. H.R. 2434 was reported favorably out of the House Committee on Appropriations, and H.R. 1315 was referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs after passing the full House by a vote of 241 to 173. Additionally, 44 Senators signed a letter to the President expressing support for the Bureau-related objectives of H.R. 2434 and H.R. 1315.

This report provides an overview of the regulatory structure of consumer finance under existing federal law before the Dodd-Frank Act went into effect and examines arguments for modifying the regime in order to more effectively regulate consumer financial markets. It then analyzes how the CFP Act changes that legal structure, with a focus on the Bureau’s organization; the entities and activities that fall (and do not fall) under the Bureau’s supervisory, enforcement, and rulemaking authorities; the Bureau’s general and specific rulemaking powers and procedures; and the Bureau’s funding.

Categories: banks and banking, business and economics, Congressional Research Service, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, consumer issues, government and politics, investments, legal and law enforcement

CRS — Employee Stock Options: Tax Treatment and Tax Issues

June 19, 2012 Comments off

Employee Stock Options: Tax Treatment and Tax Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)

The practice of granting a company’s employees options to purchase the company’s stock has become widespread among American businesses. Employee stock options have been praised as innovative compensation plans that help align the interests of the employees with those of the shareholders. They have also been condemned as schemes to enrich insiders and avoid company taxes.

The tax code recognizes two general types of employee options, “qualified” and nonqualified. Qualified (or “statutory”) options include “incentive stock options,” which are limited to $100,000 a year for any one employee, and “employee stock purchase plans,” which are limited to $25,000 a year for any employee. Employee stock purchase plans must be offered to all fulltime employees with at least two years of service; incentive stock options may be confined to officers and highly paid employees. Qualified options are not taxed to the employee when granted or exercised (under the regular tax); tax is imposed only when the stock is sold. If the stock is held one year from purchase and two years from the granting of the option, the gain is taxed as long-term capital gain. The employer is not allowed a deduction for these options. However, if the stock is not held the required time, the employee is taxed at ordinary income tax rates and the employer is allowed a deduction. The value of incentive stock options is included in minimum taxable income for the alternative minimum tax in the year of exercise; consequently, some taxpayers are liable for taxes on “phantom” gains from the exercise of incentive stock options. On October 3, 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343) was enacted. This law included provisions that provided abatement of any taxes still owed on “phantom” gains.

Nonqualified options may be granted in unlimited amounts; these are the options making the news as creating large fortunes for officers and employees. They are taxed when exercised and all restrictions on selling the stock have expired, based on the difference between the price paid for the stock and its market value at exercise. The company is allowed a deduction for the same amount in the year the employee includes it in income. They are subject to employment taxes also. Although taxes are postponed on nonqualified options until they are exercised, the deduction allowed the company is also postponed, so there is generally little if any tax advantage to these options.

The following seven key laws and regulations concerning stock options are described: Section 162(m)—“Excessive Remuneration,” Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Stock Option Disclosure Reforms, SEC’s 2003 Requirement of Approval of Compensation Plans, FASB Rule for Expensing Stock Options, American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (Section 409A), IRS Schedule M-3, and SEC’s 2006 Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules.

This report explains the “book-tax gap” as it relates to stock options and S. 2075 (Ending Excessive Corporate Deductions for Stock Options Act) introduced by Senator Carl Levin. U.S. businesses are subject to a dual reporting system. One set of rules applies when they report financial or “book” profits to the public. Another set of rules applies when they report taxable income to the Internal Revenue Service. The “book-tax” gap is the excess of reported financial accounting income over taxable income.

This report will be updated as issues develop and any new legislation is introduced.

Categories: business and economics, Congressional Research Service, government and politics, investments, labor, management, political process, taxation

CRS — SEC Climate Change Disclosure Guidance: An Overview and Congressional Concerns

June 5, 2012 Comments off

SEC Climate Change Disclosure Guidance: An Overview and Congressional Concerns (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)

Publicly traded companies are required to transparently disclose material business risks to investors through regular filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). On January 27, 2010, the SEC voted to publish Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, which clarifies how publicly traded corporations should apply existing SEC disclosure rules to certain mandatory financial filings with the SEC regarding the risk that climate change developments may have on their businesses. The Guidance has been controversial and has prompted legislation in the 112 th Congress to repeal it.

Proponents of the Guidance, including several union and public pension funds, have argued that it was necessary because a consensus has been established on the reality of climate change and that, given the salience of climate change and the various related legislative and regulatory responses to it, the Guidance would help foster a better understanding of how the SEC’s existing disclosure requirements applied to it. Some that oppose the guidance, including several business interests, argue that the current state of the science and the law underlying the idea of global climate change remains uncertain; existing SEC disclosure rules are adequate with respect to corporate reporting on environmental change; and while certain interest groups had advocated for such climate change disclosure guidance, the climate change disclosure guidance’s usefulness for most investors is unclear.

In the 112th Congress, Senator John Barrasso and Representative Bill Posey introduced identical bills (S. 1393 and H.R. 2603, respectively) that would prohibit the enforcement of the SEC’s climate change disclosure guidance.

Since the Guidance went into effect on February 8, 2010, there have been several attempts to gauge its impact. A 2011 report from Ceres, a nonprofit coalition of institutional investors, environmental organizations, and other public interest groups, concluded that most corporate filers needed more experience at communicating the risks associated with climate change. Although it found that large public companies had improved their climate-change risk disclosures in recent years, the report concluded that there was more work to be done in this area.

A report from the law firm of Davis Polk & Wardwell found that the Guidance did not appear to have had as significant an impact on disclosure as some had expected; that new disclosures emerged involving potential changes in demand for products and services and increases in fuel prices; and that there was little disclosure of actual or potential reputational harm that might result from climate change.

A third study published for the American Bar Association found that many companies reported seeing little upside and even less downside in climate change disclosures. It also found that many companies reported few meaningful business opportunities resulting from climate change disclosures, which instead carried a potential for creating risks. In addition, many companies indicated that disclosing frequently uncertain climate change-related information was often a very speculative process and that there were few, if any, penalties from the SEC for nondisclosure of climate change matters. This perception was underscored by other observations that characterized the SEC’s level of enforcement in this area as negligible.

This report will be updated as events warrant.

Categories: business and economics, climate change, Congressional Research Service, governance, government and politics, insurance and risk, investments, legal and law enforcement

CRS — What Is Systemic Risk? Does It Apply to Recent JP Morgan Losses?

June 5, 2012 Comments off

What Is Systemic Risk? Does It Apply to Recent JP Morgan Losses? (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)

JP Morgan recently disclosed that it suffered significant losses in a unit that traded complex financial instruments. Congress will be examining the JP Morgan trades and oversight by JP Morgan’s regulators. Two of the questions that policymakers might ask are could the JP Morgan losses or similar trades trigger another financial crisis and how would the Volcker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Act have applied to the JP Morgan trades? This report explains general systemic risk analysis. It evaluates recent JP Morgan trades in light of our understanding of sources of systemic risk. If the sizes of the losses remain small, it appears extremely unlikely that JP Morgan’s reported losses in its asset liabilities management unit could trigger a financial crisis or systemic event.

Systemic risk refers to the possibility that the financial system as a whole might become unstable, rather than the health of individual market participants. Stable financial systems do not transmit or magnify shocks to the broader economy. A firm, person, government, financial utility, or policy might create systemic risk if (1) its failure causes other failures in a domino effect; (2) news about its assets signals that others with similar assets may also be distressed, called contagion; (3) it contributes to fire sales during price declines; or (4) its absence prevents other firms from using an essential service, called critical functions.

There are a number of policy responses to systemic risk. Greater transparency can prevent uncertainty from magnifying panics and permit regulators to monitor the system as a whole. Lenders of last resort can prevent markets from becoming illiquid or healthy firms from being cut off from credit. Deposit guarantors can reduce the incentives for a firm’s counterparties to run. Prudential regulations and capital requirements can reduce the chance of firm failure and the costs of the failures that nonetheless occur. However, policies to address systemic risk can create risks of their own, such as moral hazard, in which firms that believe they will be rescued take additional risks.

Although the reported JP Morgan trading losses are too small to be a significant threat to current financial stability, they do illustrate a potential source of systemic risk. When large firms trade in markets with low volume, they may have trouble liquidating their positions without affecting market prices. Under these conditions, their losses may be much greater than their riskmanagement models anticipated, if the models assumed normal conditions.

Although the reported JP Morgan trading losses are too small to be a significant threat to current financial stability, they do illustrate a potential source of systemic risk. When large firms trade in markets with low volume, they may have trouble liquidating their positions without affecting market prices. Under these conditions, their losses may be much greater than their riskmanagement models anticipated, if the models assumed normal conditions.

Categories: business and economics, Congressional Research Service, government and politics, investments, legal and law enforcement

Individual Retirement Account Balances, Contributions, and Rollovers, 2010: The EBRI IRA Database

June 3, 2012 Comments off

Individual Retirement Account Balances, Contributions, and Rollovers, 2010: The EBRI IRA Database

Source: Employee Benefits Research Institute

Executive Summary

In 2010, IRA owners were more likely to be male, especially those whose accounts originated from a rollover or were a SEP/SIMPLE. Among all IRA owners in the database, nearly one-half (45.8 percent) were ages 45–64.
The average and median IRA account balance in 2010 was $67,438 and $17,863, respectively, while the average and median IRA individual balance (all accounts from the same person combined) was $91,864 and $25,296.
Individuals with a traditional IRA originating from rollovers had the highest average and median balance of $123,426 and $38,138, respectively. Roth owners had the lowest average and median balance at $22,437 and $11,471. The average and median individual IRA balance increased with age through age 70.
The average amount contributed to an IRA in the database was $3,335 in 2010. The average contribution was highest for accounts owned by those ages 65–69, and more contributions were made to Roth accounts than to traditional accounts (both those originating from contributions and rollovers). However, the average contribution to a traditional account was higher, at $3,517, compared with $3,240 to a Roth account. Yet, a higher overall amount was contributed to Roths ($2.3 billion for Roths compared with $1.3 billion for traditional accounts).
Focusing on those owning traditional or Roth IRAs, 9.3 percent of the accounts received contributions, and 12.1 percent of the individuals owning these IRA types contributed to them in 2010. Among traditional IRA owners, 5.2 percent contributed, while 24.0 percent of those owning a Roth contributed to it during 2010.
Of those individuals contributing to an IRA, 43.5 percent contributed the maximum amount. Of those contributing to a traditional IRA, 48.7 percent maxed out their contribution, while 39.3 percent did so with a Roth.
The average and median account balances increased from $54,863 and $15,756 respectively in 2008 to $67,438 and $17,863 in 2010. This represents an increase of 22.9 percent in the average account balance and 13.4 percent in the median balance. The total individual balances also increased for both the average (32.2 percent) and the median (26.2 percent).
The average and median rollover amounts were $69,012 and $17,614 respectively, compared with the average contribution of $3,335.

Categories: business and economics, Employee Benefit Research Institute, investments, labor, retirement

New From the GAO

May 30, 2012 Comments off

New GAO Reports and Press Release
Source: Government Accountability Office

+ Reports

1. Securities Regulation: Opportunities Exist to Improve SEC’s Oversight of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. GAO-12-625, May 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-625
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591220.pdf
Podcast - http://www.gao.gov/multimedia/podcasts/591197

2. VA Administrative Investigations: Improvements Needed in Collecting and Sharing Information. GAO-12-483, April 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-483
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590547.pdf

3. Tribal Law and Order Act: None of the Surveyed Tribes Reported Exercising the New Sentencing Authority, and the Department of Justice Could Clarify Tribal Eligibility for Certain Grant Funds. GAO-12-658R, May 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-658R

4. Indigent Defense: Surveys of Grant Recipients, Select Tribes, and Indigent Defense Providers, an E-supplement to GAO-12-569. GAO-12-661SP, May 2012.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-661SP

5. GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for project schedules. GAO-12-120G, May 2012.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G

+ Press Release

1. How Long Will This Project Really Take? GAO Issues Draft Schedule Assessment Guide; Second Volume in Series to Help Manage Government Projects, May 30.
http://www.gao.gov/press/schedule_assessment_2012may30.htm

Categories: business and economics, Government Accountability Office, government and politics, investments, legal and law enforcement, management, Native Americans, veterans

2012 Investment Company Fact Book

May 11, 2012 Comments off

2012 Investment Company Fact Book (PDF)

Source: Investment Company Institute

ICI’s annual compilation—our fifty-second edition—reports on retirement assets, characteristics of mutual fund owners, use of index funds, and other trends.

Categories: Investment Company Institute, investments, retirement

CRS — The STOCK Act, Insider Trading, and Public Financial Reporting by Federal Officials

May 10, 2012 Comments off

The STOCK Act, Insider Trading, and Public Financial Reporting by Federal Officials (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)

The STOCK Act (Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012), which was signed into law on April 4, 2012, affirms and makes explicit the fact that there is no exemption from the “insider trading” laws and regulations for Members of Congress, congressional employees, or any federal officials. The law states that all federal officials have an express “duty” of trust and confidentiality with respect to nonpublic, material information which they may receive in the course of their official duties, and a duty not to use such information to make a private profit. The act also requires expedited public disclosure of covered “financial transactions” by all officials in the executive and legislative branches of the federal government who are covered by the public reporting provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as amended. The act requires not only annual public reporting of such transactions, but also public reporting within 30 days of receipt of a notice of a covered financial transaction, however, in no event more than 45 days after such transaction. All public financial disclosure statements filed under the Ethics in Government Act in the legislative and executive branches will eventually be made in electronic form, and will be posted on the Internet where they may be publicly searched, sorted, and, if a log-in protocol is followed, downloaded from official government websites.

Categories: business and economics, Congressional Research Service, ethics, government and politics, investments, legal and law enforcement

Older Entries

Full Text Reports…

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Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk

New From the GAO

The Untold Story of Municipal Bond Defaults

Saving the Bed from the Fed

New From the GAO

CRS — Double-Dip Recession: Previous Experience and Current Prospect

CRS — The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB): A Legal Analysis

CRS — Employee Stock Options: Tax Treatment and Tax Issues

CRS — SEC Climate Change Disclosure Guidance: An Overview and Congressional Concerns

CRS — What Is Systemic Risk? Does It Apply to Recent JP Morgan Losses?

Individual Retirement Account Balances, Contributions, and Rollovers, 2010: The EBRI IRA Database

New From the GAO

2012 Investment Company Fact Book

CRS — The STOCK Act, Insider Trading, and Public Financial Reporting by Federal Officials

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