Archive
CRS — Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background and Issues for Congress
Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background and Issues for Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of irregular warfare (IW) and counterterrorism (CT) activities. Among the most readily visible of the Navy’s recent IW operations have been those carried out by Navy sailors serving ashore in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Many of the Navy’s contributions to IW operations around the world are made by Navy individual augmentees (IAs)—individual Navy sailors assigned to various DOD operations.
The May 1-2, 2011, U.S. military operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed Osama bin Laden reportedly was carried out by a team of 23 Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs (an acronym standing for Sea, Air, and Land). The SEALs reportedly belonged to an elite unit known unofficially as Seal Team 6 and officially as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU).
The Navy established the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) informally in October 2005 and formally in January 2006. NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a number of Navy organizations that have a role in IW operations. The Navy established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office in July 2008, published a vision statement for irregular warfare in January 2010, and established “a community of interest” to develop and advance ideas, collaboration, and advocacy related to IW in December 2010.
The Navy’s riverine force is intended to supplement the riverine capabilities of the Navy’s SEALs and relieve Marines who had been conducting maritime security operations in ports and waterways in Iraq.
The Global Maritime Partnership is a U.S. Navy initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, for the purpose of ensuring global maritime security against common threats.
The Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) are Navy ships, such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that have deployed to the Caribbean and to waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions, particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries and for increasing the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations. The Navy’s IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of Navy IW activities and how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.
New From the GAO
New and Reissued GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Report
1. International Taxation: Information on Foreign-Owned but Essentially U.S.-Based Corporate Groups Is Limited. GAO-12-794, July 16.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-794
+ Reissued
1. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing Knowledge Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy. GAO-12-822, July 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-822
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593049.pdf
Japan’s Defense Policy: The View From Washington, DC
Japan’s Defense Policy: The View From Washington, DC
Source: Brookings Institution
When it comes to Japan’s defense, the Japanese political system and the Japan Self-Defense Force independently decide the national policies as they are ultimately responsible for the country’s safety and security. However, due to the crucial nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance to Japan’s overall security, it is impractical not to take into account American thinking. As a result, it is important to better understand where and how American thinking on Japanese security is influenced.
The scope of this research goes beyond the official statements of the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government. The author sought to explore the role that experts and think tanks play in American discourse and opinion of Japanese security. This included extensive research of American media reports on Japanese security issues as well as interviews of key American experts and opinion leaders on Japan, mostly located in and around Washington, DC.
This project is therefore unique and novel in its approach to this key topic in Japan and the U.S. A number of Japanese reports have been published in the past about American experts’ views towards Japan, yet few incorporate both a survey of media and interviews with key current figures or focus exclusively on Japanese defense. Moreover, such viewpoints and thoughts are always changing; therefore, it is meaningful to spot the current status at such a crucial time of change, both in the U.S. and Japan, not to mention the wider Asia-Pacific region.
India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region
India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region
Source: RAND Corporation
India and Pakistan have very different visions for Afghanistan, and they seek to advance highly disparate interests through their respective engagements in the country. Pakistan views Afghanistan primarily as an environment in which to pursue its rivalry with India. India pursues domestic priorities (such as reining in anti-Indian terrorism, accessing Central Asian energy resources, and increasing trade) that require Afghanistan to experience stability and economic growth. Thus, whereas Pakistan seeks to fashion an Afghan state that would detract from regional security, India would enhance Afghanistan’s stability, security, economic growth, and regional integration. Afghanistan would welcome greater involvement from India, though it will need to accommodate the interests of multiple other external powers as well. India has a range of options for engaging Afghanistan, from continuing current activities to increasing economic and commercial ties, deploying forces to protect Indian facilities, continuing or expanding training for Afghan forces, or deploying combat troops for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions. To avoid antagonizing Pakistan, India is likely to increase economic and commercial engagement while maintaining, or perhaps augmenting, military training, though it will continue to conduct such training inside India. Increased Indian engagement in Afghanistan, particularly enhanced Indian assistance to Afghan security forces, will advance long-term U.S. objectives in central and south Asia. As the United States prepares to withdraw its combat forces from Afghanistan in 2014, it should therefore encourage India to fill the potential vacuum by adopting an increasingly assertive political, economic, and security strategy that includes increased security assistance.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
1. Counternarcotics Assistance: U.S. Agencies Have Allotted Billions in Andean Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of Results. GAO-12-824, July 10.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-824
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592244.pdf
2. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: More States Counting Third Party Maintenance of Effort Spending. GAO-12-929R, July 23.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-929R
The Health of Male Veterans and Nonveterans Aged 25–64: United States, 2007–2010
The Health of Male Veterans and Nonveterans Aged 25–64: United States, 2007–2010
Source: National Center for Health Statistics
A snapshot view of the health of nonelderly veterans reveals a mixed picture of their health and functioning. Overall, veterans aged 25–64 appear to be in poorer health than nonveterans, although not all differences in health are significant for all age groups. When age differences are examined, only veterans aged 45–54 are significantly more likely than nonveterans to report fair or poor health and serious psychological distress. Other health disadvantages for veterans (e.g., the prevalence of two or more chronic conditions) appear at age 45 and over. Differences in work limitations between veterans and nonveterans are seen beginning at age 35. However, the measures presented here do not reveal major health differences between male veterans and nonveterans aged 25–34.
The health differences that appear at older ages suggest that the effects of military service on health may appear later in life. Veterans also differ from nonveterans in some sociodemographic characteristics, and these characteristics may be related to observed differences in their health and functioning. Veterans are more likely to have health insurance, which may influence their access to health care and the likelihood of being diagnosed with various conditions.
The health measures presented here are not inclusive of all possible differences in health and functioning. Specifically, the measure of mental health in this report, although associated with anxiety disorders and depression, identifies only people with the most severe psychological distress (4–6). Other measures of mental health that capture a wider range of mental disorders might show more differences between veterans and nonveterans.
The sampling universe of NHIS does not include homeless people or the institutionalized population (e.g., people in long-term care facilities or in prison), which excludes some severely ill people (veterans and nonveterans) from our analysis. Addressing the problem of homelessness among veterans is a priority of the Veterans Administration (7).
This analysis is also limited in that it excludes certain other groups. The suffering of younger veterans returning from overseas with significant injuries and stress-related disorders is the focus of increased public attention. However, the number of veterans aged 18–24 included in NHIS was not large enough to support estimates for this age group. Although the percentage of women serving in the military has been steadily increasing, the relatively small numbers of female veterans also precluded their inclusion in this report.
An Evaluation of Privatized Military Family Housing: Lessons Learned
An Evaluation of Privatized Military Family Housing: Lessons Learned (PDF)
Source: Naval Postgraduate School
An analysis of previous efforts to privative military housing and of the current privatization initiative revealed that long-term success requires flexibility to manage the private developers’ and U.S. Government’s exposure to various types of risks. The objective of this report is to identify how the Department of Defense has applied the lessons of early privatization efforts to manage risks and to guarantee success of the current Military Housing Privatization Initiative. Reviews of government reports, surveys, presentations, journal articles, and Congressional testimony were used to trace the progression of these privatization programs in order to highlight key lessons learned and provide a holistic perspective of the evolution of the privatization of military housing.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
1. Defense Logistics: DOD Has Taken Actions to Improve Some Segments of the Materiel Distribution System. GAO-12-883R, August 3.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-883R
2. Patient Safety: HHS Has Taken Steps to Address Unsafe Injection Practices, but More Action Is Needed. GAO-12-712, July 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-712
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592405.pdf
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimony
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Federal Buildings Fund: Improved Transparency and Long-term Plan Needed to Clarify Capital Funding Priorities. GAO-12-646, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-646
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592378.pdf
2. Medicaid: Providers in Three States with Unpaid Federal Taxes Received Over $6 Billion in Medicaid Reimbursements. GAO-12-857, July 27.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-857
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593096.pdf
3. Ownership by Minority, Female, and Disadvantaged Firms in the Pipeline Industry. GAO-12-896R, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-896R
4. Federal Fleets: Overall Increase in Number of Vehicles Masks That Some Agencies Decreased Their Fleets. GAO-12-780, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-780
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593248.pdf
5. Cancellation of the Army’s Autonomous Navigation System. GAO-12-851R, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-851R
6. Iraq and Afghanistan: State and DOD Should Ensure Interagency Acquisitions Are Effectively Managed and Comply with Fiscal Law. GAO-12-750, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-750
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593262.pdf
7. Secure Communities: Criminal Alien Removals Increased, but Technology Planning Improvements Needed. GAO-12-708, July 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-708
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592416.pdf
+ Testimony
1. Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program: Vulnerability to Fraud and Abuse Remains, by Richard J. Hillman, managing director, forensic audits and investigative service, before the Subcommittees on Economic Opportunity and Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. GAO-12-967T, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-967T
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimony
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Influenza Pandemic: Agencies Report Progress in Plans to Protect Federal Workers but Oversight Could Be Improved. GAO-12-748, July 25.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-748
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592990.pdf
2. Medicare: CMS Needs an Approach and a Reliable Cost Estimate for Removing Social Security Numbers from Medicare Cards. GAO-12-831, August 1.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-831
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593216.pdf
3. Medicaid Expansion: States’ Implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. GAO-12-821, August 1.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-821
4. Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices: Multiple DOD Organizations are Developing Numerous Initiatives. GAO-12-861R, August 1.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-861R
5. Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program: Vulnerability to Fraud and Abuse Remains. GAO-12-697, August 1.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-697
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593237.pdf
6. Contingency Contracting: Agency Actions to Address Recommendations by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO-12-854R, August 1.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-854R
7. Ensuring Drug Quality in Global Health Programs. GAO-12-897R, August 1.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-897R
+ Related Product
Survey on States’ Implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (GAO-12-944SP, August 2012), an E-supplement to GAO-12-821. GAO-12-944SP, August 1.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-944SP
+ Testimony
1. Medicare: Action Needed to Remove Social Security Numbers from Medicare Cards, by Kathleen M. King, director, health care, and Daniel Bertoni, director, education, workforce, and income security issues, before the Subcommittees on Social Security and Health, House Committee on Ways and Means GAO-12-949T, August 1.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-949T
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimony
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Coast Guard: Legacy Vessels’ Declining Conditions Reinforce Need for More Realistic Operational Targets. GAO-12-741, July 31.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-741
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593162.pdf
2. Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA’s Reviews of Budget Estimates and Decisions on Resource Trade-Offs Need Strengthening. GAO-12-806, July 31.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-806
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593153.pdf
3. Strategic Weapons: Changes in the Nuclear Weapons Targeting Process Since 1991. GAO-12-786R, July 31.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-786R
+ Testimony
1. Privacy: Federal Law Should Be Updated to Address Changing Technology Landscape, by Gregory C. Wilshusen, director, information security issues, before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. GAO-12-961T, July 31.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-961T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593147.pdf
Can Russia Reform? Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives
Can Russia Reform? Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
These three papers represent the first panel of papers from SSI’s annual Russia conference that took place in September 2011. They assess the nature of Russia’s political system, economy, and armed forces and draw conclusions, even sharp and provocative ones, concerning the nature and trajectory of these institutions. The three papers presented here offer attempts to characterize first of all, the nature of the state; second, the prospects for economic reform within that state—perhaps the most pressing domestic issue and one with considerable spillover into defense and security agendas as well—in contemporary Russia; and third, the nature and lasting effects of the defense reform that began in 2008. The papers are forthright and pull no punches, though we certainly do not claim that they provide the last or definitive word on these subjects. The papers go straight to the heart of the most important questions concerning the nature of the state and the possibilities for its economic and military reform. As such, we hope that the papers presented here, and in subsequent volumes, provide insight and understanding to several critical questions pertaining to and/or affecting Russia, a country that deliberately tries to remain opaque to foreign observers despite its many changes. These papers aim to be a resource, to enlighten, to edify readers, and to stimulate the effort to understand and deal with one of the most important actors in international affairs today.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Thrift Savings Plan: Adding a Socially Responsible Index Fund Presents Challenges. GAO-12-664, June 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-664
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591880.pdf
2. Chief Acquisition Officers: Appointments Generally Conform to Legislative Requirements, but Agencies Need to Clearly Define Roles and Responsibilities. GAO-12-792, July 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-792
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593076.pdf
3. IMF: Planning for Use of Gold Sales Profits Under Way, but No Decision Made for Using a Portion of the Profits. GAO-12-766R, July 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-766R
4. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing Knowledge Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy. GAO-12-822, July 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-822
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593049.pdf
5. Veterans Paralympics Program: Improved Reporting Needed to Ensure Grant Accountability. GAO-12-703, July 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-703
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593041.pdf
6. Electronic Health Records: Number and Characteristics of Providers Awarded Medicare Incentive Payments for 2011. GAO-12-778R, July 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-778R
7. Food Safety: FDA’s Food Advisory and Recall Process Needs Strengthening. GAO-12-589, July 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-589
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593032.pdf
8. Refugee Resettlement: Greater Consultation with Community Stakeholders Could Strengthen Program. GAO-12-729, July 25.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-729
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592977.pdf
9. Management Report: Improvements Are Needed to Strengthen the American Battle Monuments Commission’s Internal Controls and Accounting Procedures. GAO-12-830R, July 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-830R
+ Testimonies
1. Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Is Taking Action to Better Manage Its Chemical Security Program, but It Is Too Early to Assess Results, by Stephen L. Caldwell, director, homeland security and justice, before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, House Committee on Appropriations. GAO-12-515T, July 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-515T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593021.pdf
2. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed Plans for Its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Challenges Remain in Deploying Equipment, by David C. Maurer, director, homeland security and justice, and Gene Aloise, director, natural resources and environment, before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-941T, July 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-941T
3. DOD Civilian Workforce: Observations on DOD’s Efforts to Plan for Civilian Workforce Requirements, by Brenda S. Farrell, director, defense capabilities and management, before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services. GAO-12-962T, July 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-962T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593010.pdf
The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest Members
The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest Members
There have long been debates about the sustainability of the transatlantic alliance and accusations amongst allies of unequal contributions to burden-sharing. But since countries on both sides of the Atlantic have begun introducing new – and often major – military spending cuts in response to the economic crisis, concerns about the future of transatlantic defense cooperation have become more pronounced.A growing number of senior officials are now publicly questioning the future of NATO. In June 2011, in the midst of NATO’s operation in Libya, Robert Gates, then US Defense Secretary, stated that Europe faced the prospect of “collective military irrelevance” and that unless the continent stemmed the deterioration of its armed forces, NATO faced a “dim, if not dismal future”. Ivo Daalder, the US Permanent Representative to NATO, and James Stavridis, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, have argued that “if defense spending continues to decline, NATO may not be able to replicate its success in Libya in another decade”. The alliance’s Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has warned that “if European defense spending cuts continue, Europe’s ability to be a stabilizing force even in its neighborhood will rapidly disappear”. While Norwegian Defense Minister Espen Barth Eide has claimed that “exercises have shown that NATO’s ability to conduct conventional military operations has markedly declined. […] Not only is NATO’s ability to defend its member states questionable, it might actually deteriorate further as financial pressures in Europe and the US force cuts in military spending”.In order to explore the validity of these claims, this report outlines trends in military spending across the EU since the onset of the economic crisis. It then analyzes the fallout of the downturn for the armed forces of NATO’s largest defense spenders – France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.
New From the GAO
New GAO Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
1. Federal Protective Service: Preliminary Results on Efforts to Assess Facility Risks and Oversee Contract Guards, by Mark L. Goldstein, director, physical infrastructure, before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-943T, July 24.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-943T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592884.pdf
2. Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS Needs to Take Actions to Strengthen Monitoring of Schools, by Rebecca Gambler, acting director, homeland security and justice, before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and Border Security, Senate Committee on the Judiciary. GAO-12-895T, July 24.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-895T
3. Afghanistan Security: Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces, by Charles Michael Johnson Jr., director, international affairs and trade, and Sharon L. Pickup, director, defense capabilities and management, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Armed Services Committee. GAO-12-951T, July 24.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-951T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592914.pdf
Healthcare Coverage and Disability Evaluation for Reserve Component Personnel: Research for the 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
Because Reserve Component (RC) members have been increasingly used in an operational capacity, among the policy issues being addressed by the 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) is compensation and benefits for the National Guard and Reserve. As part of the review, RAND was asked to analyze healthcare coverage and disability benefits for RC members, including participation in the TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS) program, the potential effects of national health reform on coverage rates, and disability evaluation outcomes for RC members. This report summarizes the results of RAND’s analysis. The author finds that 30 percent of RC members lack health insurance to cover care for non–service-related conditions. The TRS program offers the option of purchasing health insurance through the military on terms that are superior to typical employer benefits. Although program participation has increased, it remains low and TRS does not appear to be effectively targeting those most likely to be uninsured. TRS premiums are also lower than the premiums for the new options that will be available under health reform and the same as the penalty for not being insured. So health reform is likely to increase TRS enrollment. Finally, previously deployed RC members are referred to the Disability Evaluation System at a much lower rate than Active Component (AC) members, even for deployment-related conditions, but those who are referred receive dispositions (and thus benefits) similar to those for AC members. These findings suggest that the Department of Defense may want to consider ways to better coordinate TRS with other insurance options that will be available to RC members and that the identification of RC members who experience health consequences from deployment leading to disability merits further investigation.
Mineral resources and conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Mineral resources and conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Source: International Food Policy Research Institute
Civil wars inflict considerable costs on countries which may be trapped in vicious cycles of violence. To avoid these adverse events, scholars have attempted to identify the roots of civil wars. Valuable minerals have been listed among the main drivers of civil conflicts. Yet, despite the large body of literature, the evidence remains mixed. This paper provides a spatially nuanced view of the role of mineral resources in civil wars in the particular case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We estimate the impact of geolocated new mining concessions on the number of conflict events between January 1997 and December 2007. Instrumenting the variable of interest with historical concessions interacted with changes in mineral international prices, we unveil an ecological fallacy: Whereas concessions have no effect on the number of conflicts at the territory level (lowest administrative unit), they do foster violence at the district level (higher administrative unit). We develop a theoretical model wherein the incentives of armed groups to exploit and protect mineral resources explain our empirical findings. A spatial analysis of the effect of mining concessions on conflict backs our proposed theoretical explanation.
Evaluating Female Engagement Team Effectiveness in Afghanistan
Evaluating Female Engagement Team Effectiveness in Afghanistan (PDF)
One hallmark of the United States’ population-centric strategy in Afghanistan has been the development of specialized teams tasked with engaging local populations. One such team is the Female Engagement Team (FET), which the military first developed in 2009 to overcome cultural barriers to access Afghan females, a previously untouchable segment of the Afghan population. The job of the all-female teams is to engage local women, and at times men and children, in support of battle owners’ counterinsurgency objectives. The FET mission statement has undergone many modifications, but can currently be summarized as follows: influence the population through persistent and consistent interaction to create stability and security.For its relatively small size, the program has received an enormous amount of attention and praise. While the teams are frequently heralded as a success both in military circles and in the media, I contend that assertions that the FET program has been a success are problematic. The FET program has been promoted and defended as a critical element of population-centric counterinsurgency that separates the insurgency from the population on which it depends for support, but there has been no meaningful assessment from which one can make conclusions about the contribution of the teams as a COIN tool.Specifically, I argue that current assessment models for the FET program are insufficient in two respects. First, while the military has collected a significant amount of data on their independent variable—the activities FETs have done to engage the Afghan population—they have failed to gather in any systematic fashion data that connect the actions of the teams to the mechanisms of population-centric COIN through which they are believed to operate. In particular, the military has not convincingly shown that the outreach conducted by the teams influences women and their communities to stop enabling the insurgency and instead support coalition forces and the Government of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Second, the military has failed to establish a causal link between FETs and successful outcomes, most notably, a decrease in insurgency violence. In the absence of sound assessment on which to draw, proponents of the program have relied heavily upon untested assumptions, sometimes problematic, about the impact of FET engagements among the population, as well as the relevance of those engagements for meeting the goal of weakening the insurgency, to conclude that the program has been a success.
Predicting the Impact of the 2011 Conflict in Libya on Population Mental Health: PTSD and Depression Prevalence and Mental Health Service Requirements
Source: PLoS One
Background
Mental disorders are likely to be elevated in the Libyan population during the post-conflict period. We estimated cases of severe PTSD and depression and related health service requirements using modelling from existing epidemiological data and current recommended mental health service targets in low and middle income countries (LMIC’s).
Methods
Post-conflict prevalence estimates were derived from models based on a previously conducted systematic review and meta-regression analysis of mental health among populations living in conflict. Political terror ratings and intensity of exposure to traumatic events were used in predictive models. Prevalence of severe cases was applied to chosen populations along with uncertainty ranges. Six populations deemed to be affected by the conflict were chosen for modelling: Misrata (population of 444,812), Benghazi (pop. 674,094), Zintan (pop. 40,000), displaced people within Tripoli/Zlitan (pop. 49,000), displaced people within Misrata (pop. 25,000) and Ras Jdir camps (pop. 3,700). Proposed targets for service coverage, resource utilisation and full-time equivalent staffing for management of severe cases of major depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are based on a published model for LMIC’s.
Findings
Severe PTSD prevalence in populations exposed to a high level of political terror and traumatic events was estimated at 12.4% (95%CI 8.5–16.7) and was 19.8% (95%CI 14.0–26.3) for severe depression. Across all six populations (total population 1,236,600), the conflict could be associated with 123,200 (71,600–182,400) cases of severe PTSD and 228,100 (134,000–344,200) cases of severe depression; 50% of PTSD cases were estimated to co-occur with severe depression. Based upon service coverage targets, approximately 154 full-time equivalent staff would be required to respond to these cases sufficiently which is substantially below the current level of resource estimates for these regions.
Discussion
This is the first attempt to predict the mental health burden and consequent service response needs of such a conflict, and is crucially timed for Libya.
Managing Biofuels Portfolio Risk – The Role of Financial and Risk Analysis
Managing Biofuels Portfolio Risk – The Role of Financial and Risk Analysis
Source: Deloitte
The Department of Navy (DON), Department of Energy, and United States Department of Agriculture are together pursuing an ambitious program to support military requirements for viable and cost effective biofuels and to accelerate the growth of a national biofuels industry to address strategic energy security concerns. These three departments are stakeholders in a major program utilizing Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III authority to invest up to $510M in the nascent US biofuels industry. The investment, further leveraged by a one-for-one funding match by the private sector, could create a total portfolio in excess of $1B. The magnitude of this industry-shifting investment has attracted significant attention from the biofuels industry, investment community, law and policy makers and the US public.
