New GAO Reports and Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
1. Biosurveillance: DHS Should Reevaluate Mission Need and Alternatives before Proceeding with BioWatch Generation-3 Acquisition. GAO-12-810, September 10.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648025.pdf
2. Securities Investor Protection Corporation: Customer Outcomes in the Madoff Liquidation Proceeding. GAO-12-991, September 13.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648238.pdf
3. Public Financial Management: Improvements Needed in USAID’s and Treasury’s Monitoring and Evaluation Efforts. GAO-12-920, September 13.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648222.pdf
4. Slot-Controlled Airports: FAA’s Rules Could Be Improved to Enhance Competition and Use of Available Capacity. GAO-12-902, September 13.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648218.pdf
5. Trade Adjustment Assistance: Commerce Program Has Helped Manufacturing and Services Firms, but Measures, Data, and Funding Formula Could Improve. GAO-12-930, September 13.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648212.pdf
Trade Adjustment Assistance: Results of GAO’s Survey of Participant Firms in the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program (GAO-12-935SP, September 2012), an E-supplement to GAO-12-930. GAO-12-935SP, September 13.
7. Industrial Base: U.S. Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Manufacturers Face Period of Uncertainty as DOD Purchases Decline and Foreign Sales Potential Remains Unknown. GAO-12-859, September 13.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648266.pdf
8. Community Banks and Credit Unions: Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act Depends Largely on Future Rule Makings. GAO-12-881, September 13.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648209.pdf
9. Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996: Status of Treasury’s Centralized Efforts to Collect Delinquent Federal Nontax Debt. GAO-12-870R, September 13.
10. Financial Stability: New Council and Research Office Should Strengthen the Accountability and Transparency of Their Decisions. GAO-12-886, September 11.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648065.pdf
1. Spectrum Management: Federal Government’s Use of Spectrum and Preliminary Information on Spectrum Sharing, by Mark L. Goldstein, director, physical infrastructure issues, before the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, House Committee on Energy and Commerce. GAO-12-1018T, September 13.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648205.pdf
2. Biosurveillance: Observations on BioWatch Generation-3 and Other Federal Efforts, by William O. Jenkins, Jr., director, homeland security and justice, before the Subcommittees on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications and Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, House Homeland Security Committee. GAO-12-994T, September 13.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648267.pdf
Source: Insurance Information Institute
This report, by Robert Hartwig, president of the Insurance Information Institute, and Claire Wilkinson, analyzes the evolving nature of international terrorism. For property/casualty insurers and reinsurers, the impact of the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, was substantial, producing insured losses of about $32.5 billion, or $40.0 billion in 2011 dollars. Following the attack, insurers moved to exclude coverage. Only when the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) was enacted by Congress in November 2002 did coverage for terrorist attacks resume. Since its initial enactment in 2002 the terrorism risk insurance program has been revised and extended twice. The report, replete with charts, includes sections on: how insurers treat terrorism risk today; estimating potential terrorism losses; the cyber terrorism threat; the structure and coverage of the terrorism risk insurance program; aviation insurance for terrorism risks; and liability factors. The report concludes that over a decade later, 9/11 remains the worst terrorist act in terms of fatalities and insured property losses. A number of converging factors point to the fact that, while the risk is changing, terrorism is an evolving and ongoing threat for the foreseeable future. Failure to focus on and prepare for this threat will come at an enormous cost to the millions of individuals and businesses who rely on insurance contracts to offset the overall economic impact of a terrorist attack. For property/casualty insurers, the increasing share of losses that they would have to fund in the event of a major terrorist attack on U.S. soil suggests that now is the time to take stock of their terrorism exposures.
New GAO Reports and Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
1. Anthrax: DHS Faces Challenges in Validating Methods for Sample Collections and Analysis. GAO-12-488, July 31.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593194.pdf
2. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Security of Radiological Sources at U.S. Medical Facilities. GAO-12-925, September 10.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647930.pdf
Podcast – http://www.gao.gov/multimedia/podcasts/647950
3. Federal Real Property Security: Interagency Security Committee Should Implement a Lessons-Learned Process. GAO-12-901, September 10.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647947.pdf
4. Veterans’ Reemployment Rights: Department of Labor and Office of Special Counsel Need to Take Additional Steps to Ensure Demonstration Project Data Integrity. GAO-12-860R, September 10.
1. Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Is Taking Action to Better Manage Its Chemical Security Program, but It Is Too Early to Assess Results, by Cathleen A. Berrick, managing director, homeland security and justice, before the Subcommittee on the Environment and the Economy, House Committee on Energy and Commerce. GAO-12-567T, September 11.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648067.pdf
2. Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime Transportation Security Act, by Stephen L. Caldwell, director, homeland Security and justice, before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. GAO-12-1009T, September 11.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648000.pdf
3. Aviation Security: 9/11 Anniversary Observations on TSA’s Progress and Challenges in Strengthening Aviation Security, by Stephen M. Lord, director, homeland security and justice issues, before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-1024T, September 11.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647995.pdf
World Oil Transit Chokepoints
Source: Energy Information Administration
Chokepoints are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes, some so narrow that restrictions are placed on the size of the vessel that can navigate through them. They are a critical part of global energy security due to the high volume of oil traded through their narrow straits.
In 2011, total world oil production amounted to approximately 87 million barrels per day (bbl/d), and over one-half was moved by tankers on fixed maritime routes. By volume of oil transit, the Strait of Hormuz, leading out of the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Malacca, linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans, are two of the world’s most strategic chokepoints.
The international energy market is dependent upon reliable transport. The blockage of a chokepoint, even temporarily, can lead to substantial increases in total energy costs. In addition, chokepoints leave oil tankers vulnerable to theft from pirates, terrorist attacks, and political unrest in the form of wars or hostilities as well as shipping accidents that can lead to disastrous oil spills. The seven straits highlighted in this brief serve as major trade routes for global oil transportation, and disruptions to shipments would affect oil prices and add thousands of miles of transit in an alternative direction, if even available.
Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background and Issues for Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of irregular warfare (IW) and counterterrorism (CT) activities. Among the most readily visible of the Navy’s recent IW operations have been those carried out by Navy sailors serving ashore in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Many of the Navy’s contributions to IW operations around the world are made by Navy individual augmentees (IAs)—individual Navy sailors assigned to various DOD operations.
The May 1-2, 2011, U.S. military operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed Osama bin Laden reportedly was carried out by a team of 23 Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs (an acronym standing for Sea, Air, and Land). The SEALs reportedly belonged to an elite unit known unofficially as Seal Team 6 and officially as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU).
The Navy established the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) informally in October 2005 and formally in January 2006. NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a number of Navy organizations that have a role in IW operations. The Navy established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office in July 2008, published a vision statement for irregular warfare in January 2010, and established “a community of interest” to develop and advance ideas, collaboration, and advocacy related to IW in December 2010.
The Navy’s riverine force is intended to supplement the riverine capabilities of the Navy’s SEALs and relieve Marines who had been conducting maritime security operations in ports and waterways in Iraq.
The Global Maritime Partnership is a U.S. Navy initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, for the purpose of ensuring global maritime security against common threats.
The Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) are Navy ships, such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that have deployed to the Caribbean and to waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions, particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries and for increasing the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations. The Navy’s IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of Navy IW activities and how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.
Source: Home Office
The Home Office is responsible for ensuring the 2012 Olympic Games is safe and secure. Find out about our plans for Olympic security and other work to make the Games a success.
New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts: An Assessment of the Current Terrorist Threat
Source: RAND Corporation
Testimony presented before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on July 11, 2012.
New GAO Reports and Testimony
Source: Government Accountability Office
1. Bankruptcy: Agencies Continue Rulemakings for Clarifying Specific Provisions of Orderly Liquidation Authority. GAO-12-735, July 12.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592317.pdf
2. Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for Determining Civilian Position Requirements. GAO-12-800, July 12.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592372.pdf
3. Trade Adjustment Assistance: USDA Has Enhanced Technical Assistance for Farmers and Fishermen, but Steps Are Needed to Better Evaluate Program Effectiveness. GAO-12-731, July 12.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592321.pdf
4. Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund: Transparency of Balances and Controls over Equitable Sharing Should Be Improved. GAO-12-736, July 12.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592350.pdf
5. Justice Grant Programs: DOJ Should Do More to Reduce the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication and Enhance Program Assessment. GAO-12-517, July 12.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592360.pdf
1. Counterterrorism: U.S. Agencies Face Challenges Countering the Use of Improvised Explosive Devices in the Afghanistan/Pakistan Region, by Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., director, international affairs and trade, before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-907T, July 12.
Source: National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
With the electric-utility sector focusing on cybersecurity protections, State public service commissioners must remain vigilant and ask effective questions as regulated utilities make critical investments, a new paper from the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners concludes.
Although a cyber attack has never interrupted utility services in the U.S., State commissioners will need to work with regulated utilities and ensure they are taking prudent steps and making sound investments for installing cybersecurity protections, the primer said. While not directly responsible for installing these protections, State regulators should continue being proactive in monitoring utility progress.
“It may fall to regulators to ask questions of utilities to determine if there are [cybersecurity] gaps and facilitate action,” the NARUC primer said. “This may be the key role for commissions in cybersecurity. Commissioners do not need to become cyber industry authorities or enforcers, but asking a utility a question may motivate the development of a well-founded answer.”
Improving the Public’s Awareness and Reporting of Suspicious Activity : Key Research Findings from Literature Review, Household Surveys, Focus Groups and Interviews
Improving the Public’s Awareness and Reporting of Suspicious Activity : Key Research Findings from Literature Review, Household Surveys, Focus Groups and Interviews (PDF)
Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency (via International Association of Chiefs of Police)
The results of this research add new insights into the motivators and barriers of why individuals do or do not report suspicious activity, as well as the technology and resources that can be used to help encourage suspicious activity reporting. With this information, law enforcement and community partners can better develop and adapt strategies to improve community outreach and education efforts that enhance the public’s awareness and reporting of suspicious activity.
Based on data and insights from this research, IACP and FEMA created A Resource Guide to Improve Your Community’s Awareness and Reporting of Suspicious Activity: For Law Enforcement and Community Partners. The resource guide offers recommendations for local outreach campaigns, explains how to effectively develop and disseminate messages in order to help the public better understand their role in reporting suspicious activity, and helps law enforcement agencies and community partners to understand, navigate, and use the many resources available to help build and sustain local initiatives. A copy of the resource guide can be downloaded from www.theiacp.org or www.ready.gov/terrorism.
Community members have long been one of law enforcement’s best sources of information on what is out of place or suspicious in their communities. Through effective motivation and education, community members can become even more active partners with law enforcement, ultimately keeping our communities stronger and safer from the threats of terrorism.
Source: Hungarian Journal of English and American Studies
The shocking attacks on the United States by al-Qaeda terrorists on September 11, 2001 changed the course of history. It was a cataclysmic event, like the assassination of President Kennedy or the attack on Pearl Harbor: everyone can recall exactly what they were doing when they got the news or first saw the footage on CNN. An eventful ten years have passed since then. Americans became painfully aware that they were not untouchable anymore: the myth of Fortress America collapsed in an hour of mayhem. The US launched a war on terror, attacked Afghanistan and Iraq, and warned Iran and North Korea. The Bush administration gradually lost its support, and Republicans were voted out of power in favor of America’s first black president, Barack Obama in 2008. Subsequent attacks on the US were prevented, but her allies (especially Britain and Spain) proved less fortunate. Al-Qaeda was reduced to a regional, Middle Eastern terrorist organization, but anti-American sentiments continue to flourish all around the world. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden were liquidated, but both incidents raised just as many questions about America’s alliances as they answered. At home, a “9/11 truth movement” emerged, and conspiracy theories about the attacks continue to abound. Much to the amazement of the outside observer, many Americans tend to believe in fantastic and elaborate conspiracy theories1 rather than the official findings of the 9/11 Commission, whose final report was published in 2004. What follows are: 1) a historian’s take on America’s rise as a European colonizer in the Middle East; 2) an explanation of how the US subsequently became the target of Middle Eastern terrorism; 3) an evaluation of anti-Americanism and well-founded criticism leveled at the United States; 4) a review of the nature and scope of 9/11 conspiracy theories; and 5) an overview of what happened in the past ten years.
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years.
In February 2006, the Navy presented to Congress a goal of achieving and maintaining a fleet of 313 ships, consisting of certain types and quantities of ships. On March 28, 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) submitted to Congress an FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan that includes a new goal for a fleet of about 310-316 ships. The Navy is conducting a force structure assessment, to be completed later this year, that could lead to a refinement of this 310- 316-ship plan.
The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget requests funding for the procurement of 10 new battle force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 310-316 ship goal). The 10 ships include one Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier; two Virginia-class attack submarines, two DDG-51 class Aegis destroyers, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). These ships are all funded through the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account.
The FY2013-FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan contains a total of 41 ships—14 ships, or about 25%, less than the 55 ships in the FY2012 five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding plan, and 16 ships less, or about 28%, less than the 57 ships that were planned for FY2013-FY2017 under the FY2012 budget. Of the 16 ships no longer planned for FY2013-FY2017, nine were eliminated from the Navy’s shipbuilding plan and seven were deferred to years beyond FY2017. The nine ships that were eliminated were eight Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) and one TAGOS ocean surveillance ship. The seven ships deferred beyond FY2017 were one Virginia-class attack submarine, two LCSs, one LSD(X) amphibious ship, and three TAO(X) oilers. The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget also proposes the early retirement of seven Aegis cruisers and the placement into Reduced Operating Status (ROS) of two LSD-type amphibious ships.
The Navy’s FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan, which was submitted to Congress on March 28, 2012 (more than a month after the submission of the FY2013 budget on February 13, 2012), does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the Navy’s 310-316 ship goal over the long run. The Navy projects that the fleet would remain below 310 ships during the entire 30-year period, and experience shortfalls at various points in ballistic missile submarines, cruisers-destroyers, attack submarines, and amphibious ships. The projected cruiser-destroyer and attack submarine shortfalls are smaller than they were projected to be under the FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan, due in part to a reduction in the cruiser-destroyer force-level goal and the insertion of additional destroyers and attack submarines into the FY2013 30-year plan.
CBO is currently preparing its estimate of the cost of the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan. In its June 2011 report on the cost of the FY2012 30-year plan, CBO estimated that the plan would cost an average of $18.0 billion per year in constant FY2011 dollars to implement, or about 16% more than the Navy estimated. CBO’s estimate was about 7% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the first 10 years of the plan, about 10% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the second 10 years of the plan, and about 31% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the final 10 years of the plan.
See also: Navy Ship Names: Background For Congress (PDF)
See also: The Navy Biofuel Initiative Under the Defense Production Act (PDF)
See also: Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background and Issues for Congress (PDF)
New GAO Reports and Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
1. Combating Terrorism: State Should Enhance Its Performance Measures for Assessing Efforts in Pakistan to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices. GAO-12-614, May 15.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590870.pdf
2. Veterans’ Pension Benefits: Improvements Needed to Ensure Only Qualified Veterans and Survivors Receive Benefits. GAO-12-540, May 15.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590848.pdf
3. Force Structure: Improved Cost Information and Analysis Needed to Guide Overseas Military Posture Decisions. GAO-12-711, June 6.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591399.pdf
1. Afghanistan: USAID Oversight of Assistance Funds and Programs, by John P. Hutton, director, acquisition and sourcing management, and Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., director, international affairs and trade, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Foreign Affairs. GAO-12-802T, June 6.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591394.pdf
2. Commercial Space Launch Act: Preliminary Information on Issues to Consider for Reauthorization, by Alicia Puente Cackley, director, financial markets and community investment, before the Subcommittee on Space, and Aeronautics, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. GAO-12-767T, June 6.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591392.pdf
3. Disaster Recovery: Selected Themes for Effective Long-Term Recovery, by Stanley J. Czerwinski, director, strategic issues, before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-813T, June 6.
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591389.pdf
4. Veterans’ Pension Benefits: Improvements Needed to Ensure Only Qualified Veterans Receive Benefits, by Daniel Bertoni, director, eduction, workforce, and income security issues, before the Senate Special Committee on Aging. GAO-12-784T, June 6.
Latin America: Terrorism Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via University of North Texas Digital Library)
U.S. attention to terrorism in Latin America intensified in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, with an increase in bilateral and regional cooperation. Over the past several years, policymakers have been concerned about Iran’s increasing activities in Latin America, particularly its relations with Venezuela, although there has been disagreement over the extent and significance of Iran’s relations with the region. In the 112th Congress, several initiatives have been introduced related to terrorism issues in the Western Hemisphere regarding Mexico, Venezuela, and the activities of Iran and Hezbollah, and several oversight hearings have been held.
The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of irregular warfare (IW) and counterterrorism (CT) activities. Among the most readily visible of the Navy’s recent IW operations have been those carried out by Navy sailors serving ashore in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of the Navy’s contributions to IW operations around the world are made by Navy individual augmentees (IAs)—individual Navy sailors assigned to various DOD operations.The May 1-2, 2011, U.S. military operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed Osama bin Laden reportedly was carried out by a team of 23 Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs (an acronym standing for Sea, Air, and Land). The SEALs reportedly belonged to an elite unit known unofficially as Seal Team 6 and officially as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU).The Navy established the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) informally in October 2005 and formally in January 2006. NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a number of Navy organizations that have a role in IW operations. The Navy established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office in July 2008, published a vision statement for irregular warfare in January 2010, and established “a community of interest” to develop and advance ideas, collaboration, and advocacy related to IW in December 2010.The Navy’s riverine force is intended to supplement the riverine capabilities of the Navy’s SEALs and relieve Marines who had been conducting maritime security operations in ports and waterways in Iraq.The Global Maritime Partnership is a U.S. Navy initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, for the purpose of ensuring global maritime security against common threats.The Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) are Navy ships, such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that have deployed to the Caribbean and to waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions, particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries and for increasing the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations.The Navy’s IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of Navy IW activities and how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.
The detainee provisions passed as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012, P.L. 112-81, affirm that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), P.L. 107-40, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, authorizes the detention of persons captured in connection with hostilities. The act provides for the first time a statutory definition of covered persons whose detention is authorized pursuant to the AUMF. During debate of the provision, significant attention focused on the applicability of this detention authority to U.S. citizens and other persons within the United States. The Senate adopted an amendment to clarify that the provision was not intended to affect any existing law or authorities relating to the detention of U.S. citizens or lawful resident aliens, or any other persons captured or arrested in the United States. This report analyzes the existing law and authority to detain U.S. persons, including American citizens and resident aliens, as well as other persons within the United States who are suspected of being members, agents, or associates of Al Qaeda or possibly other terrorist organizations as “enemy combatants.”The Supreme Court in 2004 affirmed the President’s power to detain “enemy combatants,” including those who are U.S. citizens, as part of the necessary force authorized by Congress after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a plurality held that a U.S. citizen allegedly captured during combat in Afghanistan and incarcerated at a Navy brig in South Carolina is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision maker regarding the government’s reasons for detaining him. On the same day, the Court in Rumsfeld v. Padilla overturned a lower court’s grant of habeas corpus to another U.S. citizen in military custody in South Carolina on jurisdictional grounds, leaving undecided whether the authority to detain also applies to U.S. citizens arrested in the United States by civilian authorities. Lower courts that have addressed the issue of wartime detention within the United States have reached conflicting conclusions. While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ultimately confirmed the detention authority in principle in two separate cases (one of which was subsequently vacated), the government avoided taking the argument to the Supreme Court by indicting the accused detainees for federal crimes, making their habeas appeals moot and leaving the law generally unsettled.This report provides a background to the legal issues presented, followed by a brief introduction to the law of war pertinent to the detention of different categories of individuals. An overview of U.S. practice during wartime to detain persons deemed dangerous to the national security is presented. The report concludes by discussing Congress’s role in prescribing rules for wartime detention as well as legislative proposals in the 112 th Congress to address the detention of U.S. persons (H.R. 3676, H.R. 3785, H.R. 3702, S. 2003, H.R. 4092, H.R. 4192, S. 2175).
Al-Qaida’s fatal terrorism under Osama bin LadenSource: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (University of Maryland)
May 2, 2012, marks the first anniversary of the death of al-Qaida founder Osama bin Laden. Under his leadership, the terrorist organization was responsible for thousands of deaths and injuries. This report summarizes the terrorist activity of al-Qaida and its network of affiliates.
The data presented here are drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD contains information on more than 98,000 terrorist incidents that have occurred around the world from 1970 to 2010. For more information about the GTD, visit www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
+ Full Report (PDF)
Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century – Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy
Deterrence remains a primary doctrine for dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. In this book, Thérèse Delpech calls for a renewed intellectual effort to address the relevance of the traditional concepts of first strike, escalation, extended deterrence, and other Cold War–era strategies in today’s complex world of additional superpowers (e.g., China), smaller nuclear powers (e.g., Pakistan and North Korea), and nonstate actors (e.g., terrorists), as well as the extension of defense and security analysis to new domains, such as outer space and cyberspace. The author draws upon the lessons of the bipolar Cold War era to illustrate new concepts of deterrence that properly account for the variety of nuclear actors, the proliferation of missiles and thermonuclear weapons, and the radical ideologies that all are part of the nuclear scene today.
+ Full Document (PDF)
UK — Individual Disengagement from Al Qa’ida-Influenced Terrorist Groups: A Rapid Evidence Assessment to Inform Policy and Practice in Preventing Terrorism
The project looks at why and how individuals stop being violent and what can we learn from other areas that has relevance for Prevent, including whether there are intervention practices we can learn from.