Archive
Lessons from Afghanistan’s History for the Current Transition and Beyond
Lessons from Afghanistan’s History for the Current Transition and Beyond (PDF)
Source: U.S. Institute of Peace
Despite interesting patterns from the past and at least superficially striking parallels with the present, policies on Afghanistan have not been adequately informed by an understanding of the country’s history. Nor has the extensive academic literature on Afghan history been translated into policy; on the contrary, much that has been attempted in Afghanistan since late 2001 has been remarkably ahistorical. This report identifies broad historical patterns and distills relevant lessons that may be applicable to policies during the 2011 to 2014 transition and beyond.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Airport Noise Grants: FAA Needs to Better Ensure Project Eligibility and Improve Strategic Goal and Performance Measures. GAO-12-890, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-890
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648149.pdf
2. Asset Forfeiture Programs: Justice and Treasury Should Determine Costs and Benefits of Potential Consolidation. GAO-12-972, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-972
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648097.pdf
3. Aviation Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could Enhance Safety Risk Management. GAO-12-898, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-898
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648111.pdf
4. Bureau of Prisons: Growing Inmate Crowding Negatively Affects Inmates, Staff, and Infrastructure. GAO-12-743, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-743
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648124.pdf
5. Critical Infrastructure: DHS Needs to Refocus Its Efforts to Lead the Government Facilities Sector. GAO-12-852, August 20.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-852
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593580.pdf
6. Department of Homeland Security: Oversight and Coordination of Research and Development Should Be Strengthened. GAO-12-837, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-837
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648153.pdf
7. Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to Assess a Jurisdiction’s Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own. GAO-12-838, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-838
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648163.pdf
8. Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Are Taking Steps to Improve Data on Contracting but Need to Standardize Reporting. GAO-12-977R, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-977R
9. Military Training: DOD Met Annual Reporting Requirements and Improved Its Sustainable Ranges Report. GAO-12-879R, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-879R
10. Millennium Challenge Corporation: Results of Transportation Infrastructure Projects in Seven Countries. GAO-12-631, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-631
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648093.pdf
11. Nonproliferation: Agencies Could Improve Information Sharing and End-Use Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports. GAO-12-536, July 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-536
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593132.pdf
+ Testimonies
1. Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Oversight of Safety, Security, and Project Management, by Mark Gaffigan, managing director, natural resources and environment, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Energy and Commerce. GAO-12-912T, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-912T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592773.pdf
2. Next Generation Air Transportation System: FAA Faces Implementation Challenges, by Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., director, physical infrastructure issues, before the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. GAO-12-1011T, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1011T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648121.pdf
3. Operational Contract Support: Sustained DOD Leadership Needed to Better Prepare for Future Contingencies, by Timothy J. DiNapoli, acting director, acquisition and sourcing management, before the House Committee on Armed Services. GAO-12-1026T, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1026T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648106.pdf
Disjointed Ways, Disunified Means: Learning from America’s Struggle to Build an Afghan Nation
Disjointed Ways, Disunified Means: Learning from America’s Struggle to Build an Afghan Nation
Remarkably ambitious in its audacity and scope, NATO’s irregular warfare and nation-building mission in Afghanistan has struggled to meet its nonmilitary objectives by most tangible measures. Put directly, the Alliance and its partners have fallen short of achieving the results needed to create a stable, secure, democratic, and self-sustaining Afghan nation, a particularly daunting proposition given Afghanistan’s history and culture, the region’s contemporary circumstances, and the fact that no such country has existed there before. Furthermore, given the central nature of U.S. contributions to this NATO mission, these shortfalls also serve as an indicator of a serious American problem as well. Specifically, inconsistencies and a lack of coherence in the U.S. Government’s strategic planning processes and products, as well as fundamental flaws in the U.S. Government’s structures and systems for coordinating and integrating the efforts of its various agencies, are largely responsible for this adverse and dangerous situation. This book explores these strategic and interagency shortfalls, while proposing potential reforms that would enable the United States to achieve the strategic coherence and genuine unity of effort that will be needed in an era of constrained resources and emerging new threats.
India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region
India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region
Source: RAND Corporation
India and Pakistan have very different visions for Afghanistan, and they seek to advance highly disparate interests through their respective engagements in the country. Pakistan views Afghanistan primarily as an environment in which to pursue its rivalry with India. India pursues domestic priorities (such as reining in anti-Indian terrorism, accessing Central Asian energy resources, and increasing trade) that require Afghanistan to experience stability and economic growth. Thus, whereas Pakistan seeks to fashion an Afghan state that would detract from regional security, India would enhance Afghanistan’s stability, security, economic growth, and regional integration. Afghanistan would welcome greater involvement from India, though it will need to accommodate the interests of multiple other external powers as well. India has a range of options for engaging Afghanistan, from continuing current activities to increasing economic and commercial ties, deploying forces to protect Indian facilities, continuing or expanding training for Afghan forces, or deploying combat troops for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions. To avoid antagonizing Pakistan, India is likely to increase economic and commercial engagement while maintaining, or perhaps augmenting, military training, though it will continue to conduct such training inside India. Increased Indian engagement in Afghanistan, particularly enhanced Indian assistance to Afghan security forces, will advance long-term U.S. objectives in central and south Asia. As the United States prepares to withdraw its combat forces from Afghanistan in 2014, it should therefore encourage India to fill the potential vacuum by adopting an increasingly assertive political, economic, and security strategy that includes increased security assistance.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimony
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Federal Buildings Fund: Improved Transparency and Long-term Plan Needed to Clarify Capital Funding Priorities. GAO-12-646, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-646
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592378.pdf
2. Medicaid: Providers in Three States with Unpaid Federal Taxes Received Over $6 Billion in Medicaid Reimbursements. GAO-12-857, July 27.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-857
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593096.pdf
3. Ownership by Minority, Female, and Disadvantaged Firms in the Pipeline Industry. GAO-12-896R, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-896R
4. Federal Fleets: Overall Increase in Number of Vehicles Masks That Some Agencies Decreased Their Fleets. GAO-12-780, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-780
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593248.pdf
5. Cancellation of the Army’s Autonomous Navigation System. GAO-12-851R, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-851R
6. Iraq and Afghanistan: State and DOD Should Ensure Interagency Acquisitions Are Effectively Managed and Comply with Fiscal Law. GAO-12-750, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-750
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593262.pdf
7. Secure Communities: Criminal Alien Removals Increased, but Technology Planning Improvements Needed. GAO-12-708, July 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-708
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592416.pdf
+ Testimony
1. Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program: Vulnerability to Fraud and Abuse Remains, by Richard J. Hillman, managing director, forensic audits and investigative service, before the Subcommittees on Economic Opportunity and Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. GAO-12-967T, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-967T
New From the GAO
New GAO Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
1. Federal Protective Service: Preliminary Results on Efforts to Assess Facility Risks and Oversee Contract Guards, by Mark L. Goldstein, director, physical infrastructure, before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-943T, July 24.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-943T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592884.pdf
2. Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS Needs to Take Actions to Strengthen Monitoring of Schools, by Rebecca Gambler, acting director, homeland security and justice, before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and Border Security, Senate Committee on the Judiciary. GAO-12-895T, July 24.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-895T
3. Afghanistan Security: Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces, by Charles Michael Johnson Jr., director, international affairs and trade, and Sharon L. Pickup, director, defense capabilities and management, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Armed Services Committee. GAO-12-951T, July 24.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-951T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592914.pdf
Evaluating Female Engagement Team Effectiveness in Afghanistan
Evaluating Female Engagement Team Effectiveness in Afghanistan (PDF)
One hallmark of the United States’ population-centric strategy in Afghanistan has been the development of specialized teams tasked with engaging local populations. One such team is the Female Engagement Team (FET), which the military first developed in 2009 to overcome cultural barriers to access Afghan females, a previously untouchable segment of the Afghan population. The job of the all-female teams is to engage local women, and at times men and children, in support of battle owners’ counterinsurgency objectives. The FET mission statement has undergone many modifications, but can currently be summarized as follows: influence the population through persistent and consistent interaction to create stability and security.For its relatively small size, the program has received an enormous amount of attention and praise. While the teams are frequently heralded as a success both in military circles and in the media, I contend that assertions that the FET program has been a success are problematic. The FET program has been promoted and defended as a critical element of population-centric counterinsurgency that separates the insurgency from the population on which it depends for support, but there has been no meaningful assessment from which one can make conclusions about the contribution of the teams as a COIN tool.Specifically, I argue that current assessment models for the FET program are insufficient in two respects. First, while the military has collected a significant amount of data on their independent variable—the activities FETs have done to engage the Afghan population—they have failed to gather in any systematic fashion data that connect the actions of the teams to the mechanisms of population-centric COIN through which they are believed to operate. In particular, the military has not convincingly shown that the outreach conducted by the teams influences women and their communities to stop enabling the insurgency and instead support coalition forces and the Government of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Second, the military has failed to establish a causal link between FETs and successful outcomes, most notably, a decrease in insurgency violence. In the absence of sound assessment on which to draw, proponents of the program have relied heavily upon untested assumptions, sometimes problematic, about the impact of FET engagements among the population, as well as the relevance of those engagements for meeting the goal of weakening the insurgency, to conclude that the program has been a success.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimony
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Bankruptcy: Agencies Continue Rulemakings for Clarifying Specific Provisions of Orderly Liquidation Authority. GAO-12-735, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-735
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592317.pdf
2. Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for Determining Civilian Position Requirements. GAO-12-800, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-800
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592372.pdf
3. Trade Adjustment Assistance: USDA Has Enhanced Technical Assistance for Farmers and Fishermen, but Steps Are Needed to Better Evaluate Program Effectiveness. GAO-12-731, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-731
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592321.pdf
4. Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund: Transparency of Balances and Controls over Equitable Sharing Should Be Improved. GAO-12-736, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-736
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592350.pdf
5. Justice Grant Programs: DOJ Should Do More to Reduce the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication and Enhance Program Assessment. GAO-12-517, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-517
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592360.pdf
6. Human Capital: HHS and EPA Can Improve Practices Under Special Hiring Authorities. GAO-12-692, July 9.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-692
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592200.pdf
+ Testimony
1. Counterterrorism: U.S. Agencies Face Challenges Countering the Use of Improvised Explosive Devices in the Afghanistan/Pakistan Region, by Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., director, international affairs and trade, before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-907T, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-907T
CRS — In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress
In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
On May 1, 2012, President Obama gave a speech from Bagram Air Field in which he laid out U.S. government approaches for “winding down” the war in Afghanistan. While a number of observers have challenged the logical plausibility of a unilateral decision to “wind down” a war, the Administration’s commitment to decreasing U.S. involvement in the war in Afghanistan is clear.
As of mid-2012, many observers point to a coalescing vision of the way forward—shared by the governments of the United States, Afghanistan, and other international partners—that includes bringing the current campaign to a close by the end of 2014, and pursuing a political settlement among the parties in conflict, while extending U.S. and other international commitments to Afghanistan beyond 2014. In evaluating this emerging vision, some observers emphasize that the overall level of ambition has been lowered, while others stress that the timeline for international engagement has been extended. For the U.S. government, the broad strategic issues at stake in the war in Afghanistan continue to include:
- What fundamental national security interests does the United States have in Afghanistan and the region?
- What minimum conditions—political, economic, security—would need to pertain in Afghanistan in order for those U.S. interests to be protected?
- How appropriate are current and projected future U.S. approaches, until and after 2014, for helping Afghans establish those conditions?
- When and to what extent are Afghans likely to be able to sustain those conditions with relatively limited support from the international community?
- Ultimately, how important is this overall effort—given its likely timeline, risks, and costs—compared to other U.S. government priorities?
At this apparent turning point in both strategic thinking and activity on the ground, this short report considers issues that may be of interest to Congress as it considers the strength and duration of further U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, to 2014 and beyond.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Combating Terrorism: State Should Enhance Its Performance Measures for Assessing Efforts in Pakistan to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices. GAO-12-614, May 15.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-614
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590870.pdf
2. Veterans’ Pension Benefits: Improvements Needed to Ensure Only Qualified Veterans and Survivors Receive Benefits. GAO-12-540, May 15.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-540
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590848.pdf
3. Force Structure: Improved Cost Information and Analysis Needed to Guide Overseas Military Posture Decisions. GAO-12-711, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-711
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591399.pdf
+ Testimonies
1. Afghanistan: USAID Oversight of Assistance Funds and Programs, by John P. Hutton, director, acquisition and sourcing management, and Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., director, international affairs and trade, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Foreign Affairs. GAO-12-802T, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-802T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591394.pdf
2. Commercial Space Launch Act: Preliminary Information on Issues to Consider for Reauthorization, by Alicia Puente Cackley, director, financial markets and community investment, before the Subcommittee on Space, and Aeronautics, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. GAO-12-767T, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-767T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591392.pdf
3. Disaster Recovery: Selected Themes for Effective Long-Term Recovery, by Stanley J. Czerwinski, director, strategic issues, before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-813T, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-813T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591389.pdf
4. Veterans’ Pension Benefits: Improvements Needed to Ensure Only Qualified Veterans Receive Benefits, by Daniel Bertoni, director, eduction, workforce, and income security issues, before the Senate Special Committee on Aging. GAO-12-784T, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-784T
Improving Access to Mental Health Care and Psychosocial Support within a Fragile Context: A Case Study from Afghanistan
Summary Points+ After the fall of the Taliban, the rebuilding of the Afghan health care system, from scratch, provided opportunities to integrate mental health into basic health services through the use of funds that became available during this complex humanitarian emergency.+ Practice-oriented mental health trainings for general health workers and ongoing clinical supervision in the basic health care system led to substantially increased demand for and access to basic mental health care services.+ Treatment of mental disorders within the health care system needs to be accompanied by a community-based approach that focuses on psychosocial problems.+ Addressing service delivery needs in a fragile state has to be accompanied by capacity building and policy development in order to foster structural changes within the health care system.
Improving Access to Mental Health Care and Psychosocial Support within a Fragile Context: A Case Study from Afghanistan
Summary Points+ After the fall of the Taliban, the rebuilding of the Afghan health care system, from scratch, provided opportunities to integrate mental health into basic health services through the use of funds that became available during this complex humanitarian emergency.+ Practice-oriented mental health trainings for general health workers and ongoing clinical supervision in the basic health care system led to substantially increased demand for and access to basic mental health care services.+ Treatment of mental disorders within the health care system needs to be accompanied by a community-based approach that focuses on psychosocial problems.+ Addressing service delivery needs in a fragile state has to be accompanied by capacity building and policy development in order to foster structural changes within the health care system.
See: Community and health system approaches improves mental health in Afghanistan (EurekAlert!)
CRS — Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests(PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
U.S. policy toward the Central Asian states has aimed at facilitating their cooperation with U.S. and NATO stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and their efforts to combat terrorism, proliferation, and trafficking in arms, drugs, and persons. Other U.S. objectives have included promoting free markets, democratization, human rights, energy development, and the forging of East-West and Central Asia-South Asia trade links. Such policies aim to help the states become what various U.S. administrations have considered to be responsible members of the international community rather than to degenerate into xenophobic, extremist, and anti-Western regimes that contribute to wider regional conflict and instability.
Soon after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian “front-line” states offered over-flight and other support for coalition anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also endorsed coalition military action in Iraq. About two dozen Kazakhstani troops served in Iraq until late 2008. Uzbekistan rescinded U.S. basing rights in 2005 after the United States criticized the reported killing of civilians in the town of Andijon. In early 2009, Kyrgyzstan ordered a U.S. base in that country to close, allegedly because of Russian inducements and U.S. reluctance to meet Kyrgyz requests for greatly increased lease payments. An agreement on continued U.S. use of the Manas Transit Center was reached in June 2009. In recent years, most of the regional states also participate in the Northern Distribution Network for the transport of U.S. and NATO supplies into and out of Afghanistan.
Policymakers have tailored U.S. policy in Central Asia to the varying characteristics of these states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan have included securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear and biological weapons materials and facilities. U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and natural gas development in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and successive administrations have backed diverse export routes to the West for these resources. U.S. policy toward Kyrgyzstan has long included support for its civil society. In Tajikistan, the United States focuses on developmental assistance to bolster the fragile economy and address high poverty rates. U.S. relations with Uzbekistan—the most populous state in the heart of the region—were cool after 2005, but recently have improved.
Congress has been at the forefront in advocating increased U.S. ties with Central Asia, and in providing backing for the region for the transit of equipment and supplies for U.S.-led stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Congress has pursued these goals through hearings and legislation on humanitarian, economic, and democratization assistance, security issues, and human rights. During the 112 th Congress, the Members may review assistance for bolstering regional border and customs controls and other safeguards to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), combating trafficking in persons and drugs, encouraging regional integration with South Asia and Europe, advancing energy security, and countering terrorism. Support for these goals also has been viewed as contributing to stabilization and reconstruction operations by the United States and NATO in Afghanistan. For several years, Congress has placed conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan because of concerns about human rights abuses and lagging democratization. Congress will continue to consider how to balance these varied U.S. interests in the region.
CRS — Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians (Updated)
Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
This report collects statistics from a variety of sources on casualties sustained during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which began on October 7, 2001, and is ongoing. OEF actions take place primarily in Afghanistan; however, OEF casualties also includes American casualties in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen.
Casualty data of U.S. military forces are compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency’s press releases. Also included are statistics on those wounded but not killed. Statistics may be revised as circumstances are investigated and as records are processed through the U.S. military’s casualty system. More frequent updates are available at DOD’s website at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ under “Casualty Update.”
A detailed casualty summary of U.S. military forces that includes data on deaths by cause, as well as statistics on soldiers wounded in action, is available at the following DOD website: http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm.
NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) does not post casualty statistics of the military forces of partner countries on the ISAF website at http://www.isaf.nato.int/. ISAF press releases state that it is ISAF policy to defer to the relevant national authorities to provide notice of any fatality. For this reason, this report uses fatality data of coalition forces as compiled by CNN.com and posted online at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2004/oef.casualties/index.html.
Reporting on casualties of Afghans did not begin until 2007, and a variety of entities now report the casualties of civilians and security forces members. The United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) reports casualty data of Afghan civilians semiannually, and the U.S. Department of Defense occasionally includes civilian casualty figures within its reports on Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, http://www.aihrc.org/ 2010_eng/, and the Afghan Rights Monitor, http://www.arm.org.af/, are local watchdog organizations that periodically publish reports regarding civilian casualties. From July 2009 through April 2010, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) included statistics of casualties of members of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police in its quarterly reports to Congress. SIGAR has ceased this practice, and there is no other published compilation of these statistics. This report now derives casualty figures of Afghan soldiers and police from the press accounts of the Reuters “Factbox: Security Developments in Afghanistan” series, the Pajhwok Afghan News agency, the Afghan Islamic Press news agency, Daily Outlook Afghanistan from Kabul, and the AfPak Channel Daily Brief. These services attribute their reported information to officials of the NATO-led ISAF or local Afghan officials. The Afghan news agencies frequently include statements from representatives of the Taliban; however, any figures such spokesmen provide are not included in this report.
Because the estimates of Afghan casualties contained in this report are based on varying time periods and have been created using different methodologies, readers should exercise caution when using them and should look to them as guideposts rather than as statements of fact.
This report will be updated as needed.
Imported Human Rabies in a U.S. Army Soldier — New York, 2011
Imported Human Rabies in a U.S. Army Soldier — New York, 2011
Source: Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (CDC)
On August 19, 2011, a male U.S. Army soldier with progressive right arm and shoulder pain, nausea, vomiting, ataxia, anxiety, and dysphagia was admitted to an emergency department (ED) in New York for suspected rabies. Rabies virus antigens were detected in a nuchal skin biopsy, rabies virus antibodies in serum and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), and rabies viral RNA in saliva and CSF specimens by state and CDC rabies laboratories. An Afghanistan canine rabies virus variant was identified. The patient underwent an experimental treatment protocol (1) but died on August 31. The patient had described a dog bite while in Afghanistan. However, he had not received effective rabies postexposure prophylaxis (PEP). In total, 29 close contacts and health-care personnel (HCP) received PEP after contact with the patient. This case highlights the continued risks for rabies virus exposure during travel or deployment to rabies-enzootic countries, the need for global canine rabies elimination through vaccination, and the importance of following effective PEP protocols and ensuring global PEP availability.
CRS — Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The Obama Administration and several of its partner countries appear to be seeking to reduce U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan more rapidly than was previously envisioned, but without jeopardizing existing gains. Stated U.S. policy is to ensure that Afghanistan will not again become a base for terrorist attacks against the United States. Following policy reviews in 2009, the Obama Administration asserted that it was pursuing a well-resourced and integrated military- civilian strategy intended to pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan leadership from July 2011 until the end of 2014. During 2009-2010, 51,000 U.S. forces were added that brought U.S. troop numbers to 99,000, with partners providing about 42,000. On June 22, 2011, President Obama announced that the policy had accomplished most major U.S. goals and that a drawdown of 33,000 U.S. troops would take place by September 2012—the first 10,000 were withdrawn by the end of 2011 and the remainder of that number will leave by September 2012. The transition to Afghan leadership began, as planned, in July 2011, and Afghan forces are now in the lead in areas that include over 50% of all Afghans. On February 1, 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta indicated that U.S. military involvement would transition from combat to a training and advisory mission by mid-2013, a timeframe affirmed by President Obama in late March.
The Administration view is that, no matter the U.S. and allied drawdown schedule, security gains could be at risk from weak Afghan governance and insurgent safe haven in Pakistan, and that Afghanistan will still need direct security assistance after 2014. Afghan governance is perceived as particularly weak and corrupt, despite the holding of regular elections since 2004 and the establishment of several overlapping anti-corruption institutions. In order to frame the long-term security relationship, U.S. and Afghan officials are negotiating a “strategic partnership,” although differences over U.S. latitude to conduct operations still hold up completion of that pact.
As the transition proceeds, there is increasing emphasis on negotiating a settlement to the conflict. That process has advanced sporadically since 2010, and have not, to date, advanced to a discussion of specific proposals to settle the conflict. Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups worry about a potential settlement, fearing it might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights and ethnic power-sharing.
To promote long-term growth and prevent a severe economic downturn as international donors scale back their involvement in Afghanistan, U.S. officials also hope to draw on Afghanistan’s vast mineral and agricultural resources. Several major privately funded mining, agricultural, and even energy development programs have begun in the past few years, with more in various stages of consideration. U.S. officials also look to greater Afghanistan integration into regional trade and investment patterns—as part of a “New Silk Road (NSR)” economic strategy—to help compensate for the reduction in foreign economic involvement in Afghanistan. Still, Afghanistan will likely remain dependent on foreign aid until 2025. Through the end of FY2011, the United States has provided over $67 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $39 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. During FY2001-FY2011, the Afghan intervention has cost about $443 billion, including all costs. For FY2012, about $16 billion in aid (including train and equip) is to be provided, in addition to about $90 billion for U.S. military operations there, and $9.2 billion in aid is requested for FY2013. (See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman.)
See also: Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance (PDF)
Afghanistan’s Ethnic Groups Share a Y-Chromosomal Heritage Structured by Historical Events
Afghanistan’s Ethnic Groups Share a Y-Chromosomal Heritage Structured by Historical Events
Source: PLoS ONE
Afghanistan has held a strategic position throughout history. It has been inhabited since the Paleolithic and later became a crossroad for expanding civilizations and empires. Afghanistan’s location, history, and diverse ethnic groups present a unique opportunity to explore how nations and ethnic groups emerged, and how major cultural evolutions and technological developments in human history have influenced modern population structures. In this study we have analyzed, for the first time, the four major ethnic groups in present-day Afghanistan: Hazara, Pashtun, Tajik, and Uzbek, using 52 binary markers and 19 short tandem repeats on the non-recombinant segment of the Y-chromosome. A total of 204 Afghan samples were investigated along with more than 8,500 samples from surrounding populations important to Afghanistan’s history through migrations and conquests, including Iranians, Greeks, Indians, Middle Easterners, East Europeans, and East Asians. Our results suggest that all current Afghans largely share a heritage derived from a common unstructured ancestral population that could have emerged during the Neolithic revolution and the formation of the first farming communities. Our results also indicate that inter-Afghan differentiation started during the Bronze Age, probably driven by the formation of the first civilizations in the region. Later migrations and invasions into the region have been assimilated differentially among the ethnic groups, increasing inter-population genetic differences, and giving the Afghans a unique genetic diversity in Central Asia.
CRS — Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians
Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
This report collects statistics from a variety of sources on casualties sustained during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which began on October 7, 2001, and is ongoing. OEF actions take place primarily in Afghanistan; however, OEF casualties also includes American casualties in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen.
Casualty data of U.S. military forces are compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency’s press releases. Also included are statistics on those wounded but not killed. Statistics may be revised as circumstances are investigated and as records are processed through the U.S. military’s casualty system. More frequent updates are available at DOD’s website at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ under “Casualty Update.”
A detailed casualty summary of U.S. military forces that includes data on deaths by cause, as well as statistics on soldiers wounded in action, is available at the following DOD website: http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm. NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) does not post casualty statistics of the military forces of partner countries on the ISAF website at http://www.isaf.nato.int/. ISAF press releases state that it is ISAF policy to defer to the relevant national authorities to provide notice of any fatality. For this reason, this report uses fatality data of coalition forces as compiled by CNN.com and posted online at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2004/oef.casualties/index.html.
Reporting on casualties of Afghans did not begin until 2007, and a variety of entities now report the casualties of civilians and security forces members. The United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) reports casualty data of Afghan civilians semiannually, and the U.S. Department of Defense occasionally includes civilian casualty figures within its reports on Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, http://www.aihrc.org/ 2010_eng/, and the Afghan Rights Monitor, http://www.arm.org.af/, are local watchdog organizations that periodically publish reports regarding civilian casualties.
From July 2009 through April 2010, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) included statistics of casualties of members of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police in its quarterly reports to Congress. SIGAR has ceased this practice, and there is no other published compilation of these statistics. This report now derives casualty figures of Afghan soldiers and police from the press accounts of the Reuters “Factbox: Security Developments in Afghanistan” series, the Pajhwok Afghan News agency, the Afghan Islamic Press news agency, Daily Outlook Afghanistan from Kabul, and the AfPak Channel Daily Brief. These services attribute their reported information to officials of the NATO-led ISAF or local Afghan officials.
The Afghan news agencies frequently include statements from representatives of the Taliban; however, any figures such spokesmen provide are not included in this report. Because the estimates of Afghan casualties contained in this report are based on varying time periods and have been created using different methodologies, readers should exercise caution when using them and should look to them as guideposts rather than as statements of fact.
This report will be updated as needed.
CRS — Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized?
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized? (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The deadly attacks on Afghan civilians allegedly by a U.S. servicemember have raised questions regarding the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in place between the United States and Afghanistan that would govern whether Afghan law would apply in this circumstance. SOFAs are multilateral or bilateral agreements that generally establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in a foreign country and how domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction apply toward U.S. personnel in that country.
Formal requirements concerning form, content, length, or title of a SOFA do not exist. A SOFA may be written for a specific purpose or activity, or it may anticipate a longer-term relationship and provide for maximum flexibility and applicability. It is generally a stand-alone document concluded as an executive agreement. A SOFA may include many provisions, but the most common issue addressed is which country may exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. Other provisions that may be found in a SOFA include, but are not limited to, the wearing of uniforms, taxes and fees, carrying of weapons, use of radio frequencies, licenses, and customs regulations.
SOFAs are often included, along with other types of military agreements, as part of a comprehensive security arrangement with a particular country. A SOFA itself does not constitute a security arrangement; rather, it establishes the rights and privileges of U.S. personnel present in a country in support of the larger security arrangement. SOFAs may be entered based on authority found in previous treaties and congressional actions or as sole executive agreements. The United States is currently party to more than 100 agreements that may be considered SOFAs. A list of current agreements included at the end of this report is categorized in tables according to the underlying source of authority, if any, for each of the SOFAs.
In the case of Afghanistan, the SOFA, in force since 2003, provides that U.S. Department of Defense military and civilian personnel are to be accorded status equivalent to that of U.S. Embassy administrative and technical staff under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. Accordingly, U.S. personnel are immune from criminal prosecution by Afghan authorities and are immune from civil and administrative jurisdiction except with respect to acts performed outside the course of their duties. The Government of Afghanistan has further explicitly authorized the U.S. government to exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. Thus, under the existing SOFA, the United States would have jurisdiction over the prosecution of the servicemember who allegedly attacked the Afghan civilians.
CRS — Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
The Obama Administration and several of its partner countries appear to be seeking to wind down U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan more rapidly than was previously envisioned. Stated U.S. policy remains to ensure that Afghanistan will not again become a base for terrorist attacks against the United States. Following policy reviews in 2009, the Obama Administration asserted that it was pursuing a well-resourced and integrated military-civilian strategy intended to pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan leadership from July 2011 until the end of 2014. During 2009 and 2010, 51,000 U.S. forces were added, bringing U.S. troop numbers to a high of about 99,000, with partners providing about 42,000. On June 22, 2011, President Obama announced that the policy had accomplished most major U.S. goals and that a drawdown of 33,000 U.S. troops would take place by September 2012 – the first 10,000 were withdrawn by the end of 2011 and the remainder of that number will leave by September 2012. The transition to Afghan leadership began, as planned, in July 2011 in four cities and three full provinces; a second and larger tranche of areas to be transitioned was announced on November 27, 2011. On February 1, 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta indicated that U.S. military involvement would transition from combat to a training and advisory mission by mid-2013, although without specifying a further drawdown schedule through the end of 2014.The Administration view is that security gains achieved by the surge could be at risk from weak Afghan governance and insurgent safe haven in Pakistan, and that Afghanistan will still need direct security assistance after 2014. Afghan governance is perceived as particularly weak and corrupt, despite the holding of regular elections since 2004 and the establishment of several overlapping anti-corruption institutions. In order to frame the long-term security relationship, U.S. and Afghan officials are negotiating a “strategic partnership,” although differences over U.S. latitude to conduct operations have held up completion of that pact to date.As the transition proceeds, there is increasing emphasis on negotiating a settlement to the conflict. After a several-months pause in reconciliation efforts following the September 20, 2011, assassination of former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, a key figure in the reconciliation effort, in January 2012, the Taliban announced it would open a political office in Qatar for talks with U.S. representatives. The Afghan government said it would likely pursue separate talks with the group in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere. There are major concerns about Taliban intent in entering negotiations and, even if the movement does envision a settlement, Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups fear that reconciliation might produce compromises that erode human rights and ethnic power-sharing. Regional support is considered key to reconciliation, and U.S. officials maintain that all of Afghanistan’s neighbors, including Pakistan and Iran, should cease using Afghanistan to promote their own interests and instead help Afghanistan reemerge as a major regional trade route as part of a “New Silk Road (NSR)” economic integration strategy.U.S. officials also hope to draw on Afghanistan’s vast mineral and agricultural resources to promote long-term growth and prevent a severe economic downturn as international donors scale back their involvement in Afghanistan. Several major privately funded mining, agricultural, and even energy development programs have begun in the past few years, with more in various stages of consideration. Still, Afghanistan will likely remain dependent on foreign aid until 2025. Through the end of FY2011, the United States has provided over $67 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $39 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. During FY2001-FY2011, the Afghan intervention has cost about $443 billion, including all costs. For FY2012, about $16 billion in aid (including train and equip) is to be provided, in addition to about $90 billion for U.S. military operations there. (See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman.)
