Archive
India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region
India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region
Source: RAND Corporation
India and Pakistan have very different visions for Afghanistan, and they seek to advance highly disparate interests through their respective engagements in the country. Pakistan views Afghanistan primarily as an environment in which to pursue its rivalry with India. India pursues domestic priorities (such as reining in anti-Indian terrorism, accessing Central Asian energy resources, and increasing trade) that require Afghanistan to experience stability and economic growth. Thus, whereas Pakistan seeks to fashion an Afghan state that would detract from regional security, India would enhance Afghanistan’s stability, security, economic growth, and regional integration. Afghanistan would welcome greater involvement from India, though it will need to accommodate the interests of multiple other external powers as well. India has a range of options for engaging Afghanistan, from continuing current activities to increasing economic and commercial ties, deploying forces to protect Indian facilities, continuing or expanding training for Afghan forces, or deploying combat troops for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions. To avoid antagonizing Pakistan, India is likely to increase economic and commercial engagement while maintaining, or perhaps augmenting, military training, though it will continue to conduct such training inside India. Increased Indian engagement in Afghanistan, particularly enhanced Indian assistance to Afghan security forces, will advance long-term U.S. objectives in central and south Asia. As the United States prepares to withdraw its combat forces from Afghanistan in 2014, it should therefore encourage India to fill the potential vacuum by adopting an increasingly assertive political, economic, and security strategy that includes increased security assistance.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimony
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Bankruptcy: Agencies Continue Rulemakings for Clarifying Specific Provisions of Orderly Liquidation Authority. GAO-12-735, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-735
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592317.pdf
2. Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for Determining Civilian Position Requirements. GAO-12-800, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-800
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592372.pdf
3. Trade Adjustment Assistance: USDA Has Enhanced Technical Assistance for Farmers and Fishermen, but Steps Are Needed to Better Evaluate Program Effectiveness. GAO-12-731, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-731
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592321.pdf
4. Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund: Transparency of Balances and Controls over Equitable Sharing Should Be Improved. GAO-12-736, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-736
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592350.pdf
5. Justice Grant Programs: DOJ Should Do More to Reduce the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication and Enhance Program Assessment. GAO-12-517, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-517
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592360.pdf
6. Human Capital: HHS and EPA Can Improve Practices Under Special Hiring Authorities. GAO-12-692, July 9.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-692
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592200.pdf
+ Testimony
1. Counterterrorism: U.S. Agencies Face Challenges Countering the Use of Improvised Explosive Devices in the Afghanistan/Pakistan Region, by Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., director, international affairs and trade, before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-907T, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-907T
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Combating Terrorism: State Should Enhance Its Performance Measures for Assessing Efforts in Pakistan to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices. GAO-12-614, May 15.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-614
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590870.pdf
2. Veterans’ Pension Benefits: Improvements Needed to Ensure Only Qualified Veterans and Survivors Receive Benefits. GAO-12-540, May 15.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-540
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590848.pdf
3. Force Structure: Improved Cost Information and Analysis Needed to Guide Overseas Military Posture Decisions. GAO-12-711, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-711
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591399.pdf
+ Testimonies
1. Afghanistan: USAID Oversight of Assistance Funds and Programs, by John P. Hutton, director, acquisition and sourcing management, and Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., director, international affairs and trade, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Foreign Affairs. GAO-12-802T, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-802T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591394.pdf
2. Commercial Space Launch Act: Preliminary Information on Issues to Consider for Reauthorization, by Alicia Puente Cackley, director, financial markets and community investment, before the Subcommittee on Space, and Aeronautics, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. GAO-12-767T, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-767T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591392.pdf
3. Disaster Recovery: Selected Themes for Effective Long-Term Recovery, by Stanley J. Czerwinski, director, strategic issues, before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-813T, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-813T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591389.pdf
4. Veterans’ Pension Benefits: Improvements Needed to Ensure Only Qualified Veterans Receive Benefits, by Daniel Bertoni, director, eduction, workforce, and income security issues, before the Senate Special Committee on Aging. GAO-12-784T, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-784T
How Deeply Held Are Anti-American Attitudes among Pakistani Youth? Evidence Using Experimental Variation in Information
This paper investigates how attitudes toward the United States are affected by the provision of information. We use an experimentally generated panel of attitudes, obtained by providing urban Pakistanis with fact-based statements describing the United States in either a positive or negative light. Anti-American sentiment is high and heterogenous in our sample at the baseline. We find that revised attitudes are, on average, significantly different from baseline attitudes, indicating that providing information had a meaningful effect on U.S. favorability. Observed revisions are a consequence of both the salience of already known information and information acquisition that leads to a convergence in attitudes across respondents with different priors. This analysis provides evidence that (i) public opinions are not purely a cultural phenomenon and are malleable, and (ii) the tendency of respondents to ignore information not aligned with their priors can be overcome. Our findings make the case for dissemination of accurate information about various aspects of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship in order to improve opinion toward the United States.
+ Full Paper (PDF)
CRS — Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps could enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan’s current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its “minimum credible deterrent” is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan.
Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A. Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclearrelated technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan’s security situation in recent years.
However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. This report will be updated.
This report updates a previous version published November 30, 2011.
CRS — Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2012
Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2012 (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Chart, with footnotes.
CRS — Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements
Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The 112th Congress continues to debate levels of U.S. assistance to Pakistan in light of signs that Pakistan may not be a fully willing and effective U.S. partner, and that official Pakistani elements continue to support Afghan insurgent forces. During a period of economic and budget crises in the United States, Obama Administration officials and some senior Members of Congress have voiced concerns about the efficacy of continuing the flow of billions of U.S. aid dollars into Pakistan, with some in Congress urging more stringent conditions on, or even curtailment of, such aid. At issue is whether Pakistan’s civilian government and security services are using the aid as intended domestically while actively supporting U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and combat regional insurgent and terrorist elements. Existing aid restrictions and the certification process required for greater accountability on the part of Pakistan are thus under scrutiny.
A number of current laws restrict or place conditions on certain aid to Pakistan, such as Economic Support Funds and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF). Others require the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of State to certify that Pakistan meets specific criteria to receive U.S. aid. Examples include that the implementing agency is qualified to manage the funds; that the Pakistani government has agreed to clear, achievable goals; that it is meeting human rights criteria; and that the country is making progress in achieving U.S. aid objectives, and is cooperating with the United States in combating terrorist networks and securing its nuclear weapons. In addition, reporting requirements include a quarterly report on the specific uses of PCF; an annual report on Pakistan’s cooperation regarding efforts to dismantle nuclear weapons- related supplier networks and combat terrorist groups (to allow security-related aid and arms transfers to Pakistan from 2011 to 2014); a report to explain certification of U.S. aid to Pakistan; and an annual report from the President confirming that providing aid to Pakistan is in the U.S. national interest and that Pakistan has made substantial efforts to adhere to international counternarcotics agreements. Waivers in current law exist: one allows aid restrictions to be waived for human health and welfare risks; three authorize waiving aid restrictions if the President determines that it is in U.S. national security interests to do so.
Legislation before the 112th Congress on U.S. aid to Pakistan goes beyond current law. The conference report for the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (H.R. 1540), issued on December 12, 2011, includes provisions to withhold 60% of any FY2012 appropriations for PCF unless the Secretary of Defense reports to Congress a strategy for the use of such funds and the metrics for determining their effectiveness, and a strategy to enhance Pakistani efforts to counter improvised explosive devices. Among other pending bills are those that would totally eliminate aid to Pakistan “under any provision of law,” and provide no waivers or certification requirements; one that would eliminate all aid unless new certification regarding the Pakistani government’s knowledge of Osama bin Laden is provided; one that would eliminate all aid except for aid that would ensure the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons; and one that would prohibit all non-security aid. Increased reporting and certification requirements are included in many of the bills currently before Congress, as well.This report provides a comprehensive list of existing laws and pending legislation containing conditions, limitations, and reporting requirements for U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan. It will track the debate on this topic and resulting changes. For a broader discussion of U.S. aid to Pakistan, see CRS Report R41856, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance. For discussion of the current state of U.S.-Pakistan relations, see CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary. Both are updated regularly.
CRS — Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary (10/20/11)
Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
This report summarizes important recent developments in Pakistan and in Pakistan-U.S. relations. Obama Administration engagement with Pakistan has been seriously disrupted by recent events. A brief analysis of the current state of Pakistan-U.S. relations illuminates the main areas of contention and uncertainty. Vital U.S. interests related to links between Pakistan and indigenous American terrorism, Islamist militancy in Pakistan and Islamabad’s policies toward the Afghan insurgency, Pakistan’s relations with historic rival India, nuclear weapons proliferation and security, and the troubled status of Pakistan’s domestic setting are reviewed. Ongoing human rights concerns and U.S. foreign assistance programs for Pakistan are briefly summarized, and the report closes with an analysis of current U.S.-Pakistan relations.
In the post-9/11 period, assisting in the creation of a more stable, democratic, and prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy has been among the most important U.S. foreign policy efforts. Global and South Asian regional terrorism, and a nearly decade-long effort to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan are viewed as top-tier concerns. Pakistan’s apparently accelerated nuclear weapons program and the long-standing dispute with India over Kashmir continue to threaten regional stability. Pakistan is identified as a base for numerous U.S.- designated terrorist groups and, by some accounts, most of the world’s jihadist terrorist plots have some connection to Pakistan-based elements.
While Obama Administration officials and most senior congressional leaders have continued to recognize Pakistan as a crucial partner in U.S.-led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, long-held doubts about Islamabad’s commitment to core U.S. interests have deepened considerably in 2011. Most independent analysts view the Pakistani military and intelligence services as too willing to distinguish among Islamist extremist groups, maintaining links to some as a means of forwarding Pakistani’s perceived security interests. Top U.S. officials have offered public expressions of acute concerns about Islamabad’s ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan insurgent and anti-India militants operating from Pakistani territory. The May 2011 revelation that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had enjoyed apparently years-long and relatively comfortable refuge inside Pakistan led to intensive U.S. government scrutiny of the now deeply troubled bilateral relationship, and sparked much congressional questioning of the wisdom of existing U.S. foreign assistance programs to a government and nation that may not have the intention and/or capacity to be an effective U.S. partner. Pakistan is among the leading recipients of U.S. aid both in FY2011 and in the post-9/11 period, having been appropriated about $22 billion in assistance and military reimbursements since 2001. With anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories rife among ordinary Pakistanis, persistent economic travails and a precarious political setting combine to present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers.
This report will be updated periodically. For broader discussion, see CRS Report R41307, Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
Letter from the President regarding a Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan
Letter from the President regarding a Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan
Source: White House
In response to section 1117 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32) (the “Act”), and in order to keep the Congress fully informed, I am providing the attached report related to Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the fourth report submitted under section 1117 of the Act and follows the April 2011 submission.
This report covers the period from January 1, 2011, through June 30, 2011. To the extent possible, the report also provides an assessment through August 31, 2011. Events continue to evolve since that time, for example in our relationship with Pakistan, but these developments fall outside the scope of this report. As I noted in my remarks on the way forward in Afghanistan on June 22, we have seen great progress in our fight against al-Qa’ida; we have reversed the Taliban’s momentum in Afghanistan; and we continue to see progress in training the Afghan National Security Forces. This will allow us in the coming year to fully recover the 33,000 U.S. troop surge I announced at West Point in December 2009. Beyond that change, we continue to implement the strategy and do not believe further modifications or adjustments to the metrics, resources, or authorities are required at this time. Huge challenges remain, and this is the beginning — but not the end — of our effort to wind down this war.
+ Full Report (via Council on Foreign Relations)
New Report Calls for ‘21st Century Agenda for Pakistan’
New Report Calls for ‘21st Century Agenda for Pakistan’
Source: New America Foundation
Today an expert study group co-sponsored by the New America Foundation and the National War College released their findings on U.S-Pakistan relations. The group, comprised of both American and Pakistani policy specialists, came together to devise practical ways to advance the U.S.-Pakistan relationship at a time when relations between the two countries are arguably at their most strained.
Peter Bergen, Michael J. Mazarr and additional members of the study group will discuss the findings at an 11 a.m briefing today at the New America Foundation.
The report states:
“In this post-Arab Spring, post-Osama bin Laden moment, military responses to radicalism have proven their limits, large-scale aid programs are becoming untenable, and the “leverage” of bilateral aid relationships has shown itself unable to produce sustainable changes in mindset. Pakistan, and its international partners including the United States, require a fresh approach that moves beyond security issues as the touchstone for policy, that lays out a vision for a more prosperous future, and that empowers civilian, democratic governments at all levels to become more effective.
“The strategic concept we propose to meet these goals is a collaborative agenda for Pakistan to take its place as a major power in a modernizing South Asia. This is a 21st century agenda for Pakistan, one based on progress, growth, trade, entrepreneurial energy, and popular involvement in democratic governance. It is a vision of an advancing, influential Pakistan standing at a vibrant crossroads of trade, diplomacy and geopolitics, at a time when the human capacities, natural resources, and mineral wealth of South Asia are destined to become increasingly important to global economic developments.”
CRS — Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues (Updated)
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps could enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan’s current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its “minimum credible deterrent” is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan.
Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs.
Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A. Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclearrelated technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan’s security situation in recent years.
However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. This report will be updated.
This report updates a previous version published July 20, 2011.
The 2010 Pakistan Flood and Russian Heat Wave: Teleconnection of Hydrometeorologic Extremes
The 2010 Pakistan Flood and Russian Heat Wave: Teleconnection of Hydrometeorologic Extremes (PDF)
Source: Journal of Hydrometeorology
In this paper, we present preliminary results showing that the two record setting extreme events during 2010 summer, i.e., the Russian heat wave/wild fires and Pakistan flood were physically connected. We find that the Russian heat wave was associated with the development of an extraordinary strong and prolonged extratropical atmospheric blocking event, and excitation of a large-scale atmospheric Rossby wavetrain spanning western Russia, Kazakhstan, and northwestern China/Tibetan Plateau region. The southward penetration of upper level vorticity perturbations in the leading trough of the Rossby wave was instrumental in triggering anomalously heavy rain events over northern Pakistan and vicinity in mid-to-late July. Also shown are evidences that the Russian heat wave was amplified by a positive feedback through changes in surface energy fluxes between the atmospheric blocking pattern and an underlying extensive land region with below- normal soil moisture. The Pakistan heavy rain events were amplified and sustained by strong anomalous southeasterly flow along the Himalayas foothills and abundant moisture transport from the Bay of Bengal in connection with the northward propagation of the monsoonal intraseasonal oscillation.
CRS — Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance (Updated 07/28/2011)
Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
The 112th Congress is focused on cost-cutting measures to reduce the budget deficit. How it deals with the second-ranking U.S. aid recipient, Pakistan—which is important to U.S. national security interests but that some say lacks accountability—will be key.
Pakistan has been among the leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance both historically and in FY2010, and most experts list the country among the most strategically important for U.S. policy makers. Recent major developments—including the killing of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden in Pakistan—have put strains on bilateral relations, making uncertain the future direction of U.S. aid to Pakistan. For many lawmakers, the issue will be how to balance considerations about Pakistan’s strategic importance to the United States with the pervasive and mounting distrust in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and with budget deficit-reduction pressures.
U.S. assistance to Pakistan has fluctuated considerably over the past 60 years. In the wake of 9/11, however, aid to Pakistan has continually risen as the Bush and Obama Administrations have characterized Pakistan as a U.S. partner in the Afghanistan war, in the fight against terrorism, and in efforts to stabilize the region. Since 1948, the United States has pledged more than $30 billion in direct aid, about half for military assistance. Two-thirds of this total was appropriated in the post-9/11 era from FY2002 to FY2010. Some question the gains from the aid, saying there is a lack of accountability and reform by the Pakistani government, and any goodwill generated by it is offset by widespread anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani people.
In September 2009, Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (EPPA, also known as the “Kerry-Lugar-Berman” or “KLB” bill for its main sponsors). This became P.L. 111-73 and authorizes the President to provide $1.5 billion in annual bilateral economic aid to Pakistan from FY2010 through FY2014. The law requires certification for release of security- related aid; such conditionality is an ongoing and contentious issue. Also in 2009, Congress established two new funds—the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) within the Defense Department appropriations and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) within the State-Foreign Operations Appropriations—to build Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities.
Within the FY2010 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 111-212), Congress provided $349 million in military and economic assistance to Pakistan, $5 million more than the Administration’s request. When “coalition support fund” military reimbursements are included, the U.S. provided a total of $4.5 billion for Pakistan for FY2010 alone, making it the second-highest recipient after Afghanistan. In addition to these ongoing programs, in mid-2010 the United States pledged an additional $592 million in emergency and recovery aid, plus more than $95 million of in-kind aid after extensive flooding resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis that affected an estimated 20 million Pakistanis. In October 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the Administration’s intention to increase U.S. Foreign Military Financing for Pakistan to $2 billion over a five year period, a $100 million annual increase from the current level. This would have to go through the congressional appropriation and authorization process.
This report will be updated as congressional actions on aid to Pakistan unfold in the 112th Congress. For broader discussion of U.S.-Pakistan relations, see CRS Report R41307, Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments, and CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary.
Remittances in Pakistan – Why have they gone up, and why aren’t they coming down?
Remittances in Pakistan – Why have they gone up, and why aren’t they coming down?
Source: International Monetary Fund
The flow of workers’ remittances to Pakistan has more than quadrupled in the last eight years and it shows no sign of slowing down, despite the economic downturn in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other important host countries for Pakistani workers. This paper analyses the forces that have driven remittance flows to Pakistan in recent years. The main conclusions are: (i) the growth in the inflow of workers’ remittances to Pakistan is in large part due to an increase in worker migration; (ii) higher skill levels of migrating workers have helped to boost remittances; (iii) other imporant determinants of remittances to Pakistan are agriculture output and the relative yield on investments in the host and home countries.
+ Full Paper (PDF)
State Department Travel Warning: Pakistan
State Department Travel Warning: Pakistan
Source: U.S. Department of State
August 08, 2011
The State Department warns U.S. citizens of the risks of travel to Pakistan. This Travel Warning replaces the Travel Warning for Pakistan dated February 2, 2011, to update information on security incidents and remind U.S. citizens of ongoing security concerns in Pakistan.
The presence of al-Qaida, Taliban elements, and indigenous militant sectarian groups poses a potential danger to U.S. citizens throughout Pakistan. Terrorists and their sympathizers regularly attack civilian, government, and foreign targets, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. The Government of Pakistan has heightened security measures, particularly in the major cities. Threat reporting indicates terrorist groups continue to seek opportunities to attack locations where U.S. citizens and Westerners are known to congregate or visit, such as shopping areas, hotels, clubs and restaurants, places of worship, schools, or outdoor recreation events. Terrorists have disguised themselves as Pakistani security personnel to gain access to targeted areas. Some media reports have recently falsely identified U.S. diplomats – and to a lesser extent U.S. and other Western journalists and workers for non-governmental organizations (NGOs)– as being intelligence operatives or private security personnel.
Since January 2010, terrorists have executed coordinated attacks with multiple operatives using portable weaponry such as guns, grenades, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and suicide vests or car bombs in Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi, and Rawalpindi. Recent attacks included armed assaults on heavily guarded sites such as the naval air base in Karachi, the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar, police offices in Lahore and Karachi, military installations in Lahore, religious shrines including the Data Darbar shrine in Lahore and the Baba Farid Ganj Shakar shrine in southern Punjab, religious processions in Lahore, a hospital in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and a food distribution center in Bajaur Agency.
U.S. citizens have been victims of attacks in the last few years. On May 20, 2011, a U.S. consulate general vehicle in Peshawar was attacked, killing one person and injuring a dozen, including two U.S. employees of the mission. On April 5, 2010, terrorists carried out a complex attack on the U.S. Consulate General in Peshawar, with several Pakistani security and military personnel killed or wounded. On February 3, 2010, ten persons, including three U.S. military personnel, were killed and 70 injured in a suicide bombing at a new girls’ school in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The October 2009 attack on the World Food Program headquarters resulted in serious injury of a U.S. citizen. On November 12, 2008, a U.S. citizen contractor and his driver in Peshawar were shot and killed in their car. In September 2008, over 50 people, including three U.S. citizens, were killed and hundreds injured when a suicide bomber set off a truck filled with explosives outside a major international hotel in Islamabad. In August 2008, gunmen stopped and shot at the vehicle of a U.S. diplomat in Peshawar. In March 2008, a restaurant frequented by Westerners in Islamabad was bombed, killing a patron and seriously injuring several others, including four U.S. diplomats. On March 2, 2006, a U.S. diplomat, a Consulate General employee, and three others were killed and 52 people wounded when a suicide bomber detonated a car packed with explosives alongside the U.S. Consulate General in Karachi.
Visits by U.S. government personnel to Peshawar, Karachi and Lahore are limited, and movements by U.S. government personnel assigned to the Consulates General in those cities are severely restricted. U.S. officials in Islamabad are instructed to restrict the frequency and to minimize the duration of trips to public markets, restaurants, and other locations. Only a limited number of official visitors are placed in hotels, and for limited stays. Depending on ongoing security assessments, the U.S. Embassy places areas such as hotels, markets, and/or restaurants off limits to official personnel. U.S. citizens in Pakistan are strongly urged to avoid hotels that do not apply stringent security measures and to maintain good situational awareness, particularly when visiting locations frequented by Westerners.
CRS — Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps could enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan’s current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its “minimum credible deterrent” is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan.
Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear- related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan’s security situation in recent years.
However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. This report will be updated.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Correspondence (PDF)
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Drinking Water: Unreliable State Data Limit EPA’s Ability to Target Enforcement Priorities and Communicate Water Systems’ Performance. GAO-11-381, June 17.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-381
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d11381high.pdf
2. Mortgage Reform: Potential Impacts of Provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act on Homebuyers and the Mortgage Market. GAO-11-656, July 19.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-656
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d11656high.pdf
Podcast - http://www.gao.gov/podcast/watchdog_episode_66.html
3. Bankruptcy: Complex Financial Institutions and International Coordination Pose Challenges. GAO-11-707, July 19.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-707
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d11707high.pdf
4. VA and DOD Health Care: First Federal Health Care Center Established, but Implementation Concerns Need to Be Addressed. GAO-11-570, July 19.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-570
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d11570high.pdf
5. Space Research: Content and Coordination of Space Science and Technology Strategy Need to Be More Robust. GAO-11-722, July 19.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-722
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d11722high.pdf
+ Correspondence
1. Pakistan Assistance: Relatively Little of the $3 Billion in Requested Assistance Is Subject to State’s Certification of Pakistan’s Progress on Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Issues. GAO-11-786R, July 19.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-786R
The Militant Pipeline: Between the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region and the West
The Militant Pipeline: Between the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region and the West
Source: New America Foundation
A decade after 9/11, despite growing concerns over Yemen, Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and swaths of the country’s northwest arguably remain al Qaeda ’s main safe haven, and the area from which it can hatch its most dangerous plots against the West.[i] Al Qaeda’s presence in these areas has long threatened international security. It was in Peshawar in Pakistan’s northwest that al Qaeda was founded in 1988, and ever since Pakistan’s border region with Afghanistan has been a gateway for recruits joining the terrorist network and its affiliates, and an area in which its senior figures have felt comfortable planning operations, including the 9/11 attacks. After being driven out of Afghanistan, it was on the Pakistani side of the border that al Qaeda built up a new safe haven.[ii] And while bin Laden went to ground in Abbottabad in the settled areas of Pakistan some 70 miles north of Islamabad where he was killed on May 2, 2011, many of his key lieutenants remain in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
Recent years have seen increased numbers of Westerners travelling to the region for paramilitary training, with 100 to 150 suspected of making the trip in 2009 and reports of recruits continuing to stream in during 2010 and 2011, according to Western counterterrorism officials.[iii] While many went there because the area is the principal point of entry to join the fighting in Afghanistan, the presence of al Qaeda, and its sustained ability to train recruits and persuade them to launch attacks in the West, continue to make the FATA what President Obama called in 2009 “the most dangerous place in the world.”
+ Full Document (PDF)
Research Cites 225,000 Lives Lost and US$4 Trillion in Spending on Post-9/11 Wars
Research Cites 225,000 Lives Lost and US$4 Trillion in Spending on Post-9/11 Wars
Source: Watson Institute for International Studies (Brown University)
Nearly 10 years after the declaration of the War on Terror, the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan have killed at least 225,000 people, including men and women in uniform, contractors, and civilians. The wars will cost Americans between $3.2 and $4 trillion, including medical care and disability for current and future war veterans, according to a new report by the Eisenhower Research Project at the Watson Institute. If these wars continue, they are on track to require at least another $450 billion in Pentagon spending by 2020.
The Costs of War report by this major multi-university research project reveals costs that are far higher than recognized. Its findings are being released at a critical juncture. As Project Co-Director and Institute Professor Catherine Lutz puts it: “Knowing the actual costs of war is essential as the public, Congress, and the President consider the drawdown of troops in Afghanistan and other issues including the deficit, security, public investments, and reconstruction.”
The project has posted its extensive findings, graphically illustrated, at costsofwar.org, to spur public debate about America at war.
The Costs of War report, compiled by more than 20 economists, anthropologists, lawyers, humanitarian personnel, and political scientists, is the first comprehensive analysis of this decade of war and its costs – human and economic, direct and indirect, U.S. and international, and often uncounted or undercounted.
CRS — Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance (Updated — 6/7/2011)
Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The 112th Congress is focused on cost cutting measures to reduce the budget deficit. How it deals with the second ranking U.S. aid recipient, Pakistan—which is important to U.S. national security interests but that some say lacks accountability—will be key.
Pakistan has been among the leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance both historically and in FY2010, and most experts list the country among the most strategically important for U.S. policy makers. Recent major developments—including the killing of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden in Pakistan—have put strains on bilateral relations, making uncertain the future direction of U.S. aid to Pakistan. For many lawmakers, the issue will be how to balance considerations about Pakistan’s strategic importance to the United States with the pervasive and mounting distrust in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and with budget deficit-reduction pressures.
U.S. assistance to Pakistan has fluctuated considerably over the past 60 years. In the wake of 9/11, however, aid to Pakistan has continually risen as the Bush and Obama Administrations have characterized Pakistan as a U.S. partner in the Afghanistan war, in the fight against terrorism, and in efforts to stabilize the region. Since 1948, the United States has pledged more than $30 billion in direct aid; about half for military assistance. Two-thirds of this total was appropriated in the post-9/11 era from FY2002 to FY2010. Some question the gains from the aid, saying there is a lack of accountability and reform by the Pakistani government, and any goodwill generated by it is offset by widespread anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani people.
In September 2009, Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (EPPA, also know as the “Kerry-Lugar-Berman” or “KLB” bill for its main sponsors). This became P.L. 111-73 and authorizes the President to provide $1.5 billion in annual bilateral economic aid to Pakistan from FY2010 through FY2014. The law requires certification for release of security- related aid; such conditionality is an ongoing and contentious issue. Also in 2009, Congress established two new funds—the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) within the Defense Department appropriations and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) within the State-Foreign Operations Appropriations—to build Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities.
Within the FY2010 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 111-212), Congress provided $349 million in military and economic assistance to Pakistan, $5 million more than the Administration’s request. When “coalition support fund” military reimbursements are included, the U.S. provided a total of $4.5 billion for Pakistan for FY2010 alone, making it the second-highest recipient after Afghanistan. In addition to these ongoing programs, in mid-2010 the U.S. pledged an additional $592 million in emergency and recovery aid, plus more than $95 million of in-kind aid after extensive flooding resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis that affected an estimated 20 million Pakistanis. In October 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the Administration’s intention to increase U.S. Foreign Military Financing for Pakistan to $2 billion over a five year period, a $100 million annual increase from the current level. This would have to go through the congressional appropriation and authorization process.
This report will be updated as congressional actions on aid to Pakistan unfold in the 112th Congress. For broader discussion of U.S.-Pakistan relations, see CRS Report R41307, Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments, and CRS CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary.
