Archive
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Airport Noise Grants: FAA Needs to Better Ensure Project Eligibility and Improve Strategic Goal and Performance Measures. GAO-12-890, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-890
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648149.pdf
2. Asset Forfeiture Programs: Justice and Treasury Should Determine Costs and Benefits of Potential Consolidation. GAO-12-972, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-972
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648097.pdf
3. Aviation Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could Enhance Safety Risk Management. GAO-12-898, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-898
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648111.pdf
4. Bureau of Prisons: Growing Inmate Crowding Negatively Affects Inmates, Staff, and Infrastructure. GAO-12-743, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-743
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648124.pdf
5. Critical Infrastructure: DHS Needs to Refocus Its Efforts to Lead the Government Facilities Sector. GAO-12-852, August 20.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-852
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593580.pdf
6. Department of Homeland Security: Oversight and Coordination of Research and Development Should Be Strengthened. GAO-12-837, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-837
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648153.pdf
7. Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to Assess a Jurisdiction’s Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own. GAO-12-838, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-838
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648163.pdf
8. Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Are Taking Steps to Improve Data on Contracting but Need to Standardize Reporting. GAO-12-977R, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-977R
9. Military Training: DOD Met Annual Reporting Requirements and Improved Its Sustainable Ranges Report. GAO-12-879R, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-879R
10. Millennium Challenge Corporation: Results of Transportation Infrastructure Projects in Seven Countries. GAO-12-631, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-631
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648093.pdf
11. Nonproliferation: Agencies Could Improve Information Sharing and End-Use Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports. GAO-12-536, July 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-536
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593132.pdf
+ Testimonies
1. Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Oversight of Safety, Security, and Project Management, by Mark Gaffigan, managing director, natural resources and environment, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Energy and Commerce. GAO-12-912T, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-912T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592773.pdf
2. Next Generation Air Transportation System: FAA Faces Implementation Challenges, by Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., director, physical infrastructure issues, before the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. GAO-12-1011T, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1011T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648121.pdf
3. Operational Contract Support: Sustained DOD Leadership Needed to Better Prepare for Future Contingencies, by Timothy J. DiNapoli, acting director, acquisition and sourcing management, before the House Committee on Armed Services. GAO-12-1026T, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1026T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648106.pdf
The Second Demographic Transition in Israel: One for All?
The Second Demographic Transition in Israel: One for All?
Source: Demographic Research
This article explores family behaviours and attitudes in Israel over the last decades through the lens of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT). Israel is divided by religious affiliation, the level of religiosity, ethnic origin and timing of immigration. Although fertility transition to replacement level among certain societal groups has been previously shown, the question of how the transition unfolds in other domains remains open. The goal of this paper is to highlight the diversity of marital and fertility transitions and non-transitions among various groups of this heterogeneous society, and to compare Israel’s transitions to European ones. The data sources which are used are cross-national large scale surveys, national representative surveys, and Population Register data. The data were disaggregated by religion, religiousness and ethnic origin. Emancipative value change, postponement of marriage, alternative living arrangements and a growing variety of fertility regimes were analyzed. A full range of pre-transitional, transitional, and post-transitional elements was found among the groups. Such sign of the SDT as growing childlessness was not found, and the spread of other features as unmarried cohabitation and non-marital childbearing was found limited. Population composition effects were isolated. It was found that the level of religiosity and the country of origin are important factors which differentiate family behaviours and attitudes. The connection between value orientation of the groups within Israel and their family behaviours is discussed. The socio-structural and institutional constraints that might impede further progression of the Second Demographic Transition in Israel are also discussed. Further research directions are suggested.
The Second Demographic Transition in Israel: One for All?
The Second Demographic Transition in Israel: One for All?
This article explores family behaviours and attitudes in Israel over the last decades through the lens of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT). Israel is divided by religious affiliation, the level of religiosity, ethnic origin and timing of immigration. Although fertility transition to replacement level among certain societal groups has been previously shown, the question of how the transition unfolds in other domains remains open. The goal of this paper is to highlight the diversity of marital and fertility transitions and non-transitions among various groups of this heterogeneous society, and to compare Israel’s transitions to European ones. The data sources which are used are cross-national large scale surveys, national representative surveys, and Population Register data. The data were disaggregated by religion, religiousness and ethnic origin. Emancipative value change, postponement of marriage, alternative living arrangements and a growing variety of fertility regimes were analyzed. A full range of pre-transitional, transitional, and post-transitional elements was found among the groups. Such sign of the SDT as growing childlessness was not found, and the spread of other features as unmarried cohabitation and non-marital childbearing was found limited. Population composition effects were isolated. It was found that the level of religiosity and the country of origin are important factors which differentiate family behaviours and attitudes. The connection between value orientation of the groups within Israel and their family behaviours is discussed. The socio-structural and institutional constraints that might impede further progression of the Second Demographic Transition in Israel are also discussed. Further research directions are suggested.
Country Analysis Brief: Oman
Country Analysis Brief: Oman
Source: Energy Information Administration
Like most of its neighbors, Oman is dependent upon its oil sector for the majority of its export revenues and government spending. Oman possesses the largest oil reserves of any non-OPEC country in the Middle East and significant reserves of natural gas, of which it is a leading exporter regionally. While crude oil remains a significant yet declining part of its economy, Oman has made a concerted effort to diversify its economic base in face of its declining output. Under Sultan Qaboos bin Said’s “Vision 2020″ policy, Oman has made considerable investments and progress into developing gas resources, increasing gas production, and developing current and new oil fields.
Does food security matter for transition in Arab countries?
Does food security matter for transition in Arab countries?
Source: International Food Policy Research Institute
Expectations are high that transition in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen will bring about more freedom, justice, and economic opportunities. However, experiences from other world regions show that countries in transition are at high risk of entering conflicts, which often come at large economic, social and political costs. In order to identify options on how conflict may be prevented in Arab transition countries, this paper assesses the key global drivers of conflicts based on a dataset from 1960 to 2010 and improved cross-country regression techniques. Results show that unlike in other studies where per capita incomes, inequality, and poor governance, among other factors, emerge as the major determinants of conflict, food security at macro- and micro-levels emerges as the main cause of conflicts in the Arab world. This “Arab exceptionalism in conflict” suggests that improving food security is not only important for improving the lives of rural and urban people; it is also likely to be the key for a peaceful transition.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimony
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Federal Buildings Fund: Improved Transparency and Long-term Plan Needed to Clarify Capital Funding Priorities. GAO-12-646, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-646
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592378.pdf
2. Medicaid: Providers in Three States with Unpaid Federal Taxes Received Over $6 Billion in Medicaid Reimbursements. GAO-12-857, July 27.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-857
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593096.pdf
3. Ownership by Minority, Female, and Disadvantaged Firms in the Pipeline Industry. GAO-12-896R, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-896R
4. Federal Fleets: Overall Increase in Number of Vehicles Masks That Some Agencies Decreased Their Fleets. GAO-12-780, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-780
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593248.pdf
5. Cancellation of the Army’s Autonomous Navigation System. GAO-12-851R, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-851R
6. Iraq and Afghanistan: State and DOD Should Ensure Interagency Acquisitions Are Effectively Managed and Comply with Fiscal Law. GAO-12-750, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-750
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593262.pdf
7. Secure Communities: Criminal Alien Removals Increased, but Technology Planning Improvements Needed. GAO-12-708, July 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-708
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592416.pdf
+ Testimony
1. Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program: Vulnerability to Fraud and Abuse Remains, by Richard J. Hillman, managing director, forensic audits and investigative service, before the Subcommittees on Economic Opportunity and Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. GAO-12-967T, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-967T
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
1. Foreign Assistance: U.S. Assistance to the West Bank and Gaza for Fiscal Years 2010 And 2011. GAO-12-817R, July 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-817R
2. Defense Infrastructure: The Navy’s Use of Risk Management at Naval Stations Mayport and Norfolk. GAO-12-710R, July 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-710R
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimony
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Highway Projects: Some Federal and State Practices to Expedite Completion Show Promise. GAO-12-593, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-593
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591421.pdf
Related Product
Highway Projects: Survey of State Departments of Transportation (GAO-12-637SP, June 2012), an E-supplement to GAO-12-593. GAO-12-637SP, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-637SP
2. Iraq: U.S. Assistance to Iraq’s Minority Groups in Response to Congressional Directives. GAO-12-834, July 10.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-834
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592238.pdf
+ Testimony
1. Delphi Bankruptcy: Termination of Delphi Pension Plans, by A. Nicole Clowers, director, financial markets and community investment issues, before the Subcommittee on TARP, Financial Services and Bailouts of Public and Private Programs, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. GAO-12-909T, July 10.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-909T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592226.pdf
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Freedom of Information Act: Key Website Is Generally Reliable, but Action Is Needed to Ensure Completeness of Its Reports. GAO-12-754, June 28.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-754
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592011.pdf
2. Defense Management: Steps Taken to Better Manage Fuel Demand but Additional Information Sharing Mechanisms Are Needed. GAO-12-619, June 28.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-619
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592023.pdf
3. Internal Revenue Service: Status of GAO Financial Audit and Related Financial Management Recommendations. GAO-12-695, June 28.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-695
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592016.pdf
+ Testimonies
1. Mission Iraq: State and DOD Face Challenges in Finalizing Support and Security Capabilities, by Michael J. Courts, acting director, international affairs and trade, before the Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. GAO-12-856T, June 28.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-856T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591998.pdf
2. Residential Appraisals: Regulators Should Take Actions to Strengthen Appraisal Oversight, by William B. Shear, director, financial markets and community investment, before the Subcommittee on Insurance, Housing and Community Opportunity, House Committee on Financial Services. GAO-12-840T, June 28.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-840T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592001.pdf
3. Information Security: Cyber Threats Facilitate Ability to Commit Economic Espionage, by Gregory C. Wilshusen, director, information security issues, before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-876T, June 28.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-876T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592009.pdf
4. Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on the Organization and Management of the National Nuclear Security Administration, by Gene Aloise, director, natural resources and environment, before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, House Committee on Armed Services. GAO-12-867T, June 27.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-867T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591975.pdf
Presentation by the Comptroller General
1. Partnership and Collaboration: Meeting the Challenges Across All Levels of Government, by Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States, before the 19th Biennial Forum of Government Auditors, Alexandria Virginia. GAO-12-882CG, June 27.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-882CG
Terrorism and Anti-Americanism: 9/11 Ten Years After
Terrorism and Anti-Americanism: 9/11 Ten Years After (PDF)
Source: Hungarian Journal of English and American Studies
The shocking attacks on the United States by al-Qaeda terrorists on September 11, 2001 changed the course of history. It was a cataclysmic event, like the assassination of President Kennedy or the attack on Pearl Harbor: everyone can recall exactly what they were doing when they got the news or first saw the footage on CNN. An eventful ten years have passed since then. Americans became painfully aware that they were not untouchable anymore: the myth of Fortress America collapsed in an hour of mayhem. The US launched a war on terror, attacked Afghanistan and Iraq, and warned Iran and North Korea. The Bush administration gradually lost its support, and Republicans were voted out of power in favor of America’s first black president, Barack Obama in 2008. Subsequent attacks on the US were prevented, but her allies (especially Britain and Spain) proved less fortunate. Al-Qaeda was reduced to a regional, Middle Eastern terrorist organization, but anti-American sentiments continue to flourish all around the world. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden were liquidated, but both incidents raised just as many questions about America’s alliances as they answered. At home, a “9/11 truth movement” emerged, and conspiracy theories about the attacks continue to abound. Much to the amazement of the outside observer, many Americans tend to believe in fantastic and elaborate conspiracy theories1 rather than the official findings of the 9/11 Commission, whose final report was published in 2004. What follows are: 1) a historian’s take on America’s rise as a European colonizer in the Middle East; 2) an explanation of how the US subsequently became the target of Middle Eastern terrorism; 3) an evaluation of anti-Americanism and well-founded criticism leveled at the United States; 4) a review of the nature and scope of 9/11 conspiracy theories; and 5) an overview of what happened in the past ten years.
The Rise of Diabetes Prevalence in the Arab Region
Introduction:Arab populations have many similarities and dissimilarities. They share culture, language and religion but they are also subject to economic, political and social differences. The purpose of this study is to understand the causes of the rising trend of diabetes prevalence in order to suggest efficient actions susceptible to reduce the burden of diabetes in the Arab world.Method:We use principal component analysis to illustrate similarities and differences between Arab countries according to four variables: 1) the prevalence of diabetes, 2) impaired glucose tolerance (IGT), 3) diabetes related deaths and 4) diabetes related expenditure per person. A linear regression is also used to study the correlation between human development index and diabetes prevalence.Results:Arab countries are mainly classified into three groups according to the diabetes comparative prevalence (high, medium and low) but other differences are seen in terms of diabetes-related mortality and diabetes related expenditure per person. We also investigate the correlation between the human development index (HDI) and diabetes comparative prevalence (R = 0.81).Conclusion:The alarming rising trend of diabetes prevalence in the Arab region constitutes a real challenge for heath decision makers. In order to alleviate the burden of diabetes, preventive strategies are needed, based essentially on sensitization for a more healthy diet with regular exercise but health authorities are also asked to provide populations with heath- care and early diagnosis to avoid the high burden caused by complications of diabetes.
Unveiling the Revolutionaries: Cyberactivism and Women’s Role in the Arab Uprisings
This research introduces several of the key figures leading the revolutionary convulsions in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, and Yemen, and explores how young women used social media and cyberactivism to help shape the “Arab Spring” and its aftermath. The engagement of women with social media has coincided with a shift in the political landscape of the Middle East, and it is unlikely that they will ever retreat from the new arenas they have carved out for themselves. Throughout the region, women have taken to the streets in unprecedented numbers, translating digital advocacy and organization into physical mobilization and occupation of public spaces in a dialectic of online and offline activism that is particular to this era. They have used citizen journalism and social networking to counter the state-dominated media in their countries and influence mainstream media around the world. In the process, they are reconfiguring the public sphere in their countries, as well as the expectations of the public about the role women can and should play in the political lives of their countries.
From Tunis to Tunis: Considering the Planks of U.S. International Cyber Policy, 2005-2011
How have U.S. policies on the governance of the Internet and cyberspace evolved between the 2005 World Summit of the Information Society (WSIS) in Tunisia and the massive, cyber-fueled uprisings in the Middle East of 2011? The paper develops a framework of possible actions regarding Internet or cyber governance to produce contexts for the timeline of significant policy statements by U.S. government officials and agencies on the topic. In the resulting narrative, Internet governance policy rises from a relatively marginal issue for the foreign policy establishment to a significant component of U.S. grand strategy. Because it covers a brief time period and focuses on a single actor (the United States), this narrative provides input as to how and how rapidly Internet politics and policies have become integral to international affairs.
CRS — Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy (PDF)
Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The uprising that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, following the revolt that overthrew Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak three days earlier, began a political crisis that defies resolution. The ongoing unrest demonstrates that the grievances of the Shiite majority over the distribution of power and economic opportunities were not satisfied by the efforts instituted during 1999-2010, or since the uprising began. The bulk of the Shiite majority in Bahrain says it demands a constitutional monarchy in which an elected parliament produces the government, but the Sunni minority believes the Shiites want nothing less than outright rule.
In March 2011, Bahrain’s government rejected U.S. advice by inviting direct security assistance from other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, declaring a state of emergency, forcefully suppressing demonstrations, and arresting dissident leaders and pro-opposition health care workers. Although the state of emergency ended on June 1, 2011, the continued imprisonment of dissidents contributed to the resulting failure of a “national dialogue,” held in July 2011, to reach consensus on more than a few modest political reforms. Hopes for resolution were raised by a pivotal report by a government-appointed “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI) on the unrest, released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the government’s actions against the unrest as well as the opposition’s responses to government proposals early in the crisis. The government asserts it has implemented many of the BICI recommendations—an assertion largely corroborated on March 20, 2012, by a national commission appointed to oversee implementation—and says it will institute the remainder. However, stalemate on more substantial political reforms has stoked continued demonstrations and dashed hopes that a solution is in sight. A proposed closer union with Saudi Arabia, announced May 14, 2012, will strengthen the Saudi ability to limit any Bahrain government compromise with the Shiites.
The Obama Administration has not called for a change of the Al Khalifa regime and has to some extent concurred with the Bahrain government view that Iran might take advantage of the Bahrain unrest, but the Administration has criticized the regime’s use of force against protesters and urged further political reform. The U.S. position on Bahrain has been criticized by those who believe the United States is downplaying regime abuses because the U.S. security relationship with the Al Khalifa regime is critical to U.S. efforts to contain Iran and secure the Persian Gulf more broadly. In exchange for a tacit security guarantee against Iran or other aggressors, Bahrain has provided key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years and by providing facilities for U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. officials are concerned that the instability in Bahrain could render U.S. use of the naval facilities untenable, but there are no moves to relocate it. Beyond the naval facility, the United States signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated Bahrain as a “major non-NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons systems. Partly to address criticism from human rights advocates and some Members of Congress, the Administration put on hold a significant proposed sale of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons. However, in mid-May 2012 the Administration announced a resumption of sales to Bahrain of arms that it can use to protect itself against Iran and support U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf. Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other GCC powers to resolve uprisings in Libya, yria, and Yemen.
Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain, having largely run out of crude oil reserves, is poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies. In September 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest has further strained Bahrain’s economy.
CRS — Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
The uprising that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, following the revolt that overthrew Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak three days earlier, began a political crisis that defies easy resolution. The unrest demonstrates that the grievances of the Shiite majority over the distribution of power and economic opportunities were not satisfied by the efforts during 1999-2010 to increase the role of the Shiite majority in governance. Bahraini Shiites say they demand a constitutional monarchy in which an elected parliament produces the government, but the Sunni minority believes the Shiites want nothing less than outright rule.In March 2011, Bahrain’s government rejected U.S. advice by inviting direct security assistance from other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, declaring a state of emergency, forcefully suppressing demonstrations, and arresting dissident leaders and pro-opposition health care workers. Although the state of emergency ended on June 1, 2011, the continued imprisonment of dissidents contributed to the resulting failure of a “national dialogue,” held in July 2011, to reach agreement on more than just a few political reform recommendations. Hopes for resolution were raised by a pivotal report by a government-appointed “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI) on the unrest, released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the government’s actions against the unrest as well as the opposition’s responses to government proposals early in the crisis. The government asserts it has implemented many of the BICI recommendations—an assertion largely corroborated on March 20, 2012, by a national commission appointed to oversee implementation—and says it will institute the remainder. However, stalemate on major political reforms has contributed to the continuation of significant demonstrations and dashed hopes that a complete solution is in sight.The Obama Administration has not called for a change of the Al Khalifa regime and has to some extent concurred with the Bahrain government view that Iran is likely to take advantage of the Bahrain unrest, but the Administration has criticized the regime’s use of force against protesters and urged further political reform. The U.S. position on Bahrain has been criticized by those who believe the United States is downplaying regime abuses because the U.S. security relationship with the Al Khalifa regime is critical to U.S. efforts to contain Iran and secure the Persian Gulf more broadly. In exchange for a tacit security guarantee against Iran or other aggressors, Bahrain has provided key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years and by providing facilities and small numbers of personnel for U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. officials are concerned that the instability in Bahrain could render U.S. use of the naval headquarters facilities untenable, but there are no evident moves to relocate it. Beyond the naval facility, the United States signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated Bahrain as a “major non-NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons systems. Partly to address criticism from human rights and some Members of Congress, the Administration has put on hold a significant proposed sale of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons. Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other GCC powers in initiatives to resolve uprisings in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain, having largely run out of crude oil reserves, is poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies. The country has tried to compensate through diversification, particularly with banking and some manufacturing. In September 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest in 2011 has further strained Bahrain’s economy.
It’s All In the Mix: Maximizing Return on Brand Investment
Marketers commonly assume that investment in branding and advertising will increase sales, profits and brand loyalty, but a recent Nielsen study suggests that marketing dollars spent do not necessarily mean revenue realized.The study, conducted in Asia Pacific, the Middle East and Africa, shows that products supported by above the line – that is, mass media – advertising cost an average of 16 percent more and command an average of 31 percent higher share of category spending. Still, some above-the-line investments can actually hurt profitability and brand value, and internet-based marketing and that which generates buzz among consumers can often be more valuable than traditional marketing models.In the quest for market share, companies often offer discounts as a short-term strategy. Price discounting is tempting as it typically yields a positive revenue return that is higher compared to other marketing activities. However, it is not a panacea. A study of 26 failing FMCG items revealed that 19 out of 20 items that used price discounting as a strategy to hold their market positions once their loyal buyer base had been eroded, exited the market within 16-20 weeks. Only 1 item managed to save its position with a relaunch. The remaining 6 items exited the market within 4 -8 weeks.Advertisers looking to spend on advertising and promotions should consider how they can consistently generate a positive, balanced return on investment (ROI). Using tangible metrics will help focus the investments and ensure maximum efficiency.
Free registration required to download full report.
Natural Gas and Israel’s Energy Future Near-Term Decisions from a Strategic Perspective
Natural Gas and Israel’s Energy Future: Near-Term Decisions from a Strategic Perspective
Source: RAND Corporation
Israel’s electric-power system needs new capacity to meet the demands of its growing economy. Israel must make major decisions on investing in new base-load generating capacity in the near future. Planners and policymakers need to consider likely future levels of demand, the costs and availability of sources of supply, security of supply, reliability, environmental effects, and land use. Decisions have to be made under conditions of deep uncertainty about what the future may have in store. This monograph discusses the opportunities and risks the government of Israel faces in shifting to a greater reliance on domestic and imported natural gas. The analysis seeks to help the Israeli government engage in managed change by choosing robust strategies that minimize potential consequences of relying more heavily on natural gas. It does so by applying to these assessments newly developed methods for strategic planning and decisionmaking under deep uncertainty. In particular, the study applies an innovative, quantitative robust decisionmaking (RDM) approach to the central question of how large a role natural gas should play in Israel’s energy balance. Rather than relying on the typical planning method of trying to develop plans around a small number of “most likely” scenarios, RDM helps planners discover strategies that are robust — i.e., strategies that perform well across a large range of plausible futures. Given that we cannot predict the future, we use RDM to examine the available alternatives and ask which would be best to choose.
Food security and storage in the Middle East and North Africa
In times of highly volatile commodity markets, governments often try to protect their populations from rapidly-rising food prices, which can be particularly harsh for the poor. A potential solution for food-deficit countries is to hold strategic reserves, which can be called on when international prices spike. But how large should strategic stockpiles be? This paper develops a dynamic storage model for wheat in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, where imported wheat dominates the average diet. The paper uses the model to analyze a strategy that sets aside wheat stockpiles, which can be used when needed to keep domestic prices below a targeted price. This paper shows that if the target is set high and reserves are adequate, the strategy can be effective and robust. Contrary to most interventions, strategic storage policies are counter-cyclical and, when the importing region is sufficiently large, a regional policy can smooth global prices. This paper shows that this is the case for the MENA region. Nevertheless, the policy is more costly than the pro-cyclical policy of a targeted intervention that directly offsets high prices with a subsidy similar to food stamps.
+ Full Paper (PDF)
CRS — Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The Obama Administration identifies Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests. This perception is generated by suspicions of Iran’s intentions for its nuclear program— heightened by a November 8, 2011, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report—as well as by Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East and in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of helping Syria’s leadership try to defeat a growing popular opposition movement, and of taking advantage of Shiite majority unrest against the Sunni-led, pro-U.S. government of Bahrain. Tensions have been particularly elevated since Iran’s late December 2011 threat to try to choke off much of the world’s oil supplies by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz—a reaction to the imposition of significant sanctions against Iran’s vital exports of oil.
The sense of imminent crisis with Iran—much of which has been brought on by Israeli threats to buck U.S. advice by acting militarily against Iran’s nuclear program—follows three years in which the Obama Administration has assembled a broad international coalition to pressure Iran through economic sanctions—while also offering sustained engagement with Iran.
None of the pressure has, to date, altered Iran’s pursuit of its nuclear program: Iran attended December 2010 and January 2011 talks with the six powers negotiating with Iran, but no progress was reported at any of these meetings. However, since the beginning of 2012, as significant multilateral sanctions have been added on Iran’s oil exports—including an oil purchase embargo by the European Union to go into full effect by July 1, 2012—there are growing indications that the regime feels economic pressure. Iran’s leaders have responded not only with threats to commerce in the Strait of Hormuz, but also stated a willingness to enter into new nuclear talks without preconditions. At the same time, it has begun uranium enrichment at a deep underground facility near Qom. The Administration uses indicators such as Iran’s economic deterioration and its willingness to engage in new talks as evidence that policy is starting to work and should be given more time before any consideration of U.S. or other country military options.
The Administration also perceives that the legitimacy and popularity of Iran’s regime is in decline, although not to the point where the perceived threat from Iran is likely to end in the near future. The regime has sought to parry the perception that it is increasingly isolated—a perception that might color the outcome of March 2, 2012, parliamentary elections. In advance of the vote, the regime arrested activists whom they suspect might try to spark unrest during the election campaign—a fear heightened by the boycott of the poll by reformist groups. Over the past two years, the United States has increased public criticism of Iran’s human rights record, an effort broadly supported in the international community. Some in the 112th Congress, aside from supporting additional economic sanctions against Iran, believe the United States should provide additional vocal and material support to the democracy movement in Iran, despite the relative quiescence of the opposition “Green Movement” since early 2010. The Administration argues that it has supported the opposition through civil society and other programs, and by using recent authorities to sanction Iranian officials who suppress human rights in Iran and help Syria repress human rights. For further information, including pending Iran sanctions legislation, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions; and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr.
Clear and Present Danger: Planning and New Venture Survival Amid Political and Civil Violence
Clear and Present Danger: Planning and New Venture Survival Amid Political and Civil Violence
Source: Harvard Business School
Strategy theory often takes for granted the role of state institutions in providing stable, predictable environments in which new firms are founded. Yet, many states around the world (such as Iraq, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo) lack political institutions of sufficient strength to ensure personal safety and public order, thereby creating environments where civil and political violence can ferment. This paper explores the impact of such violence on new venture processes. Results show that comprehensive planning was negatively correlated with venture survival in such environments. While there are implications for strategy theory, the study is also relevant to entrepreneurs and organizations promoting new venture planning in less-developed countries, particularly those experiencing political and civil turmoil. Currently, prospective entrepreneurs are taught the importance of business planning by both universities and non-governmental organizations that offer entrepreneurial training. But this study suggests that such training will have mixed effects on new venture survival, depending on the extent to which these entrepreneurs pursue ventures in violent and uncertain environments. In such contexts where governments fail to maintain public safety and order, these training programs may actually increase the likelihood of new venture failure. Key concepts include:
- This paper theorizes and tests how contexts characterized by weak political institutions and ensuing high levels of violence create uncertain and unpredictable environments that alter entrepreneurial behavior and disrupt resource flows and organizational routines, thereby increasing new venture failure rates.
- In contexts of high uncertainty as a result of violence, the benefits of comprehensive planning vanish as prior predictions become obsolete and even harmful to venture survival.
- Strategy theories often assume specific types of environments. But it is important to consider carefully the macro institutional factors.
+ Full Paper (PDF)
