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The Rise of Diabetes Prevalence in the Arab Region

May 31, 2012 Comments off
Source:  Open Journal of Epidemiology
Introduction:
Arab populations have many similarities and dissimilarities. They share culture, language and religion but they are also subject to economic, political and social differences. The purpose of this study is to understand the causes of the rising trend of diabetes prevalence in order to suggest efficient actions susceptible to reduce the burden of diabetes in the Arab world.
Method:
We use principal component analysis to illustrate similarities and differences between Arab countries according to four variables: 1) the prevalence of diabetes, 2) impaired glucose tolerance (IGT), 3) diabetes related deaths and 4) diabetes related expenditure per person. A linear regression is also used to study the correlation between human development index and diabetes prevalence.
Results:
Arab countries are mainly classified into three groups according to the diabetes comparative prevalence (high, medium and low) but other differences are seen in terms of diabetes-related mortality and diabetes related expenditure per person. We also investigate the correlation between the human development index (HDI) and diabetes comparative prevalence (R = 0.81).
Conclusion:
The alarming rising trend of diabetes prevalence in the Arab region constitutes a real challenge for heath decision makers. In order to alleviate the burden of diabetes, preventive strategies are needed, based essentially on sensitization for a more healthy diet with regular exercise but health authorities are also asked to provide populations with heath- care and early diagnosis to avoid the high burden caused by complications of diabetes.

CRS — Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses

April 10, 2012 Comments off

Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)

The Obama Administration identifies Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests. This perception is generated by suspicions of Iran’s intentions for its nuclear program— heightened by a November 8, 2011, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report—as well as by Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East and in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of helping Syria’s leadership try to defeat a growing popular opposition movement, and of taking advantage of Shiite majority unrest against the Sunni-led, pro-U.S. government of Bahrain. Tensions have been particularly elevated since Iran’s late December 2011 threat to try to choke off much of the world’s oil supplies by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz—a reaction to the imposition of significant sanctions against Iran’s vital exports of oil.

The sense of imminent crisis with Iran—much of which has been brought on by Israeli threats to buck U.S. advice by acting militarily against Iran’s nuclear program—follows three years in which the Obama Administration has assembled a broad international coalition to pressure Iran through economic sanctions—while also offering sustained engagement with Iran.

None of the pressure has, to date, altered Iran’s pursuit of its nuclear program: Iran attended December 2010 and January 2011 talks with the six powers negotiating with Iran, but no progress was reported at any of these meetings. However, since the beginning of 2012, as significant multilateral sanctions have been added on Iran’s oil exports—including an oil purchase embargo by the European Union to go into full effect by July 1, 2012—there are growing indications that the regime feels economic pressure. Iran’s leaders have responded not only with threats to commerce in the Strait of Hormuz, but also stated a willingness to enter into new nuclear talks without preconditions. At the same time, it has begun uranium enrichment at a deep underground facility near Qom. The Administration uses indicators such as Iran’s economic deterioration and its willingness to engage in new talks as evidence that policy is starting to work and should be given more time before any consideration of U.S. or other country military options.

The Administration also perceives that the legitimacy and popularity of Iran’s regime is in decline, although not to the point where the perceived threat from Iran is likely to end in the near future. The regime has sought to parry the perception that it is increasingly isolated—a perception that might color the outcome of March 2, 2012, parliamentary elections. In advance of the vote, the regime arrested activists whom they suspect might try to spark unrest during the election campaign—a fear heightened by the boycott of the poll by reformist groups. Over the past two years, the United States has increased public criticism of Iran’s human rights record, an effort broadly supported in the international community. Some in the 112th Congress, aside from supporting additional economic sanctions against Iran, believe the United States should provide additional vocal and material support to the democracy movement in Iran, despite the relative quiescence of the opposition “Green Movement” since early 2010. The Administration argues that it has supported the opposition through civil society and other programs, and by using recent authorities to sanction Iranian officials who suppress human rights in Iran and help Syria repress human rights. For further information, including pending Iran sanctions legislation, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions; and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr.

CRS — Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses

April 3, 2012 Comments off

Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)

The issue of Iran and its nuclear program has emerged as a top priority for the Obama Administration. The sense of impending crisis is generated by growing suspicions in the international community that Iran’s nuclear program is not for purely peaceful purposes, and the determination of the government of Israel, in particular, that it might take unilateral military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities if its progress is not soon halted. The United States also sees a threat to U.S. interests posed by Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East and in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. officials accuse Iran of helping Syria’s leadership try to defeat a growing popular opposition movement and of taking advantage of Shiite majority unrest against the Sunni-led, pro-U.S. government of Bahrain. Tensions have been particularly elevated since Iran’s late-December 2011 threat to try to choke off much of the world’s oil supplies by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz—a reaction to the imposition of significant sanctions against Iran’s vital exports of oil.

The heightened tensions follow three years in which the Obama Administration has assembled a broad international coalition to pressure Iran through economic sanctions while also offering sustained engagement with Iran if it verifiably assures the international community that its nuclear program is peaceful. None of the pressure has, to date, altered Iran’s pursuit of its nuclear program: Iran attended December 2010 and January 2011 talks with the six powers negotiating with Iran, but no progress was reported at any of these meetings. In early 2012, Iran began uranium enrichment at a deep underground facility near Qom to a level of 20% enrichment. However, since the beginning of 2012, as significant multilateral sanctions have been added on Iran’s oil exports—including an oil purchase embargo by the European Union to go into full effect by July 1, 2012—there are growing indications that the regime feels economic pressure. Iran’s leaders have responded not only with threats to commerce in the Strait of Hormuz, but an acceptance of new nuclear talks without preconditions. The Administration uses indicators such as Iran’s economic deterioration and its willingness to engage in new talks as evidence that policy is starting to work and should be given more time before any consideration of U.S. or other country military options.

The Administration also perceives that the legitimacy and popularity of Iran’s regime is in decline, although not to the point where the regime’s grip on power is threatened. The regime has sought to use the international pressure to rally the public to its side, playing on nationalist sentiment to encourage high turnout in the March 2, 2012, parliamentary elections. The boycott of the poll by reformist groups rendered the election a contest between factions supporting either President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i. Khamene’i supporters were elected overwhelmingly, helping the Supreme Leader solidify his control over day-to-day governance. Over the past two years, the United States has increased public criticism of Iran’s human rights record, an effort broadly supported in the international community. Some in the 112th Congress, aside from supporting additional economic sanctions against Iran, believe the United States should provide additional political support to the democracy movement in Iran, despite the relative quiescence of the opposition since early 2010. The Administration argues that it has supported the opposition through civil society and other programs, and by using recent authorities to sanction Iranian officials who suppress human rights in Iran and help Syria repress human rights. For further information, including pending Iran sanctions legislation, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr.

CRS — Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities

April 3, 2012 Comments off

Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)

Several published reports indicate that top Israeli decisionmakers now are seriously considering whether to order a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and if so, when. Twice in Israel’s history, it has conducted air strikes aimed at halting or delaying what Israeli policymakers believed to be efforts to acquire nuclear weapons by a Middle Eastern state—destroying Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and a facility the Israelis identified as a reactor under construction in Syria in 2007. Today, Israeli officials generally view the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as an unacceptable threat to Israeli security—with some viewing it as an existential threat.

This report analyzes key factors that may influence current Israeli political decisions relating to a possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. These include, but are not limited to, the views of and relationships among Israeli leaders; the views of the Israeli public; U.S., regional, and international stances and responses as perceived and anticipated by Israel; Israeli estimates of the potential effectiveness and risks of a possible strike; and responses Israeli leaders anticipate from Iran and Iranian-allied actors—including Hezbollah and Hamas—regionally and internationally.

For Congress, the potential impact—short- and long-term—of an Israeli decision regarding Iran and its implementation is a critical issue of concern. By all accounts, such an attack could have considerable regional and global security, political, and economic repercussions, not least for the United States, Israel, and their bilateral relationship. It is unclear what the ultimate effect of a strike would be on the likelihood of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. The current Israeli government, President Barack Obama, and many Members of Congress have shared concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. They appear to have a range of views on how best to address those shared concerns. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful, civilian energy purposes, and U.S. intelligence assessments say that Iran has not made a decision to build nuclear weapons. However, Iran continues to enrich uranium in militarily hardened sites and questions remain about its nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions.
Short- and long-term questions for Members of Congress to consider regarding a possible Israeli decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities militarily might include, but are not limited to, the following:

  • How might an Israeli strike affect options and debate regarding short-term and long-term U.S. relations and security cooperation with, and foreign assistance to, Israel and other regional countries?
  • Would an Israeli strike be considered self-defense? Why or why not? What would be the legal and policy implications either way?
  • How might a strike affect the implementation of existing sanctions legislation on Iran or options and debate over new legislation on the subject?
  • How might Congress consult with the Obama Administration on and provide oversight with respect to various political and military options?

This report has many aspects that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim to independently confirm any sources cited within this report that attribute specific positions or views to various U.S. and Israeli officials.

Using US Strategic Reserves to Moderate Potential Oil Price Increases from Sanctions on Iran

March 19, 2012 Comments off

Using US Strategic Reserves to Moderate Potential Oil Price Increases from Sanctions on Iran
Source: Peterson Institute for International Economics

The new, draconian sanctions introduced by the United States and the European Union to prevent Iran from earning money from its crude oil exports could pose a serious economic threat to oil-importing countries that also trade heavily with the US and EU economies. Nations such as China, South Korea, and Japan, which obtain significant amount of oil from Iran while enjoying large trade surpluses with the United States, are justifiably anxious. These countries and others worry that by pushing Iran from the global crude market, the new US and EU sanctions will disrupt oil markets, increase crude prices, and further slow global economic growth, which, at a minimum, would cut their export revenues. Saudi Arabia and other members of the Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have indicated they would replace oil previously purchased from Iran, but these offers have done little to allay the apprehensions.

Verleger suggests a way to put real pressure on Iran while moderating or eliminating economic fallout for the US and EU economies and those of their trading partners: selling oil from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), which now holds far more oil than required by treaty obligations—more than 280 million surplus barrels. This strategic use of the SPR will increase the effectiveness of sanctions on Iran and ease the adjustment difficulties that confront US allies. The sales might also reduce any price pressure caused by removal of light Iranian crude from the market.

+ Full Paper (PDF)

CRS — Iran Sanctions

March 13, 2012 Comments off
Source:  Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The international coalition that is imposing progressively strict economic sanctions on Iran is broadening and deepening, with increasingly significant effect on Iran’s economy. The objective, not achieved to date, remains to try to compel Iran to verifiably confine its nuclear program to purely peaceful uses. As 2012 begins, Iran sees newly-imposed multilateral sanctions against its oil exports as a severe threat – to the point where Iran is threatening to risk armed conflict. Iran also has indicated receptivity to new nuclear talks in the hopes of reversing or slowing the implementation of the oil export-related sanctions. The energy sector provides nearly 70% of Iran’s government revenues. Iran’s alarm stems from the potential loss of oil sales as a result of:
• A decision by the European Union on January 23, 2012, to wind down purchases of Iranian crude oil by July 1, 2012. EU countries buy about 20% of Iran’s oil exports. This action took into consideration an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran’s possible efforts to design a nuclear explosive device, and diplomatic and financial rifts with Britain, which caused the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran on November 30, 2011.
• Decisions by other Iranian oil purchasers, particularly Japan and South Korea, to reduce purchases of Iranian oil. Those decisions are intended to comply with a provision of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81, signed December 31, 2011) that prevents the opening of U.S. accounts by foreign banks that conduct transactions with Iran’s Central Bank—unless the parent country reduces substantially its purchases of Iranian oil.
• The willingness of other oil producers with spare capacity, particularly Saudi Arabia, a strategic rival, to sell additional oil to countries cutting Iranian oil buys.
• This confluence of policies has already begun to reduce Iran’s oil sales and might reduce them by as much as 40% (1 million barrels per day reduction out of 2.5 million barrels per day of sales). Iran is widely assessed as unable to economically sustain that level of lost oil sales.
The signs of economic pressure on Iran are multiplying. The value of Iran’s rial has dropped precipitously since December 2011. Iranian leaders have admitted that Iran is virtually cut off from the international banking system and is increasingly trading through barter arrangements rather than hard currency exchange. The pullout from Iran by major international firms have slowed Iran’s efforts to modernize its energy sector and other sectors, rendering Iran unable to increase its oil production above 4.1 million barrels per day. Still, Iran has small amounts of natural gas exports; it had none at all before Iran opened its fields to foreign investment in 1996. Iran’s overall ability to limit the effects of sanctions has, until now, been aided by relatively high oil prices—prices that tend to increase as Iran threatens conflict in the Persian Gulf region. Iran also has used various innovations to work around some of the growing international restrictions. The United States and its partners are attempting to implement the 2012 sanctions so as not to raise world oil prices any further.
In the 112 th Congress, legislation, such as S. 1048, H.R. 1905, and a Senate Banking Committee bill reported out on February 2, 2012, would enhance both the economic sanctions and human rights-related provisions of CISADA and other laws. For a broader analysis of policy on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.

“We Are Ordered to Crush You”: Expanding Repression of Dissent in Iran

March 12, 2012 Comments off

“We Are Ordered to Crush You”: Expanding Repression of Dissent in Iran
Source: Amnesty International

The net of repression is widening in Iran. The authorities are arresting filmmakers, bloggers, human rights defenders, women’s rights activists, lawyers, students, journalists, political activists, religious and ethnic minorities — simply for speaking out against the government or expressing views with which the authorities do not agree. This report shows the lengths to which the Iranian authorities are prepared to go to isolate people in Iran from the rest of the world, and to try to hide information on human rights violations.

+ Full Report (PDF)

Treasury Issues Guidance Concerning National Defense Authorization Act Sanctions on Iran

February 16, 2012 Comments off

Treasury Issues Guidance Concerning National Defense Authorization Act Sanctions on Iran
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury

Today the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued guidance concerning the implementation of section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

The guidance clarifies a number of issues related to the implementation of the NDAA provision as it relates to foreign governments, financial institutions, and other interested parties. Among other topics, the guidance addresses the scope of institutions that may be subject to sanctions under the NDAA, the nature of the transactions that are covered, and how the Administration will approach the determination of what qualifies as a “significant reduction” in a country’s purchases of crude oil from Iran.

Executive Order 13599 delegates to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, authority to determine whether a foreign financial institution has engaged in significant transactions of the type that trigger sanctions under the Act. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence, is delegated authority to determine whether any country has significantly reduced the volume of its crude oil purchases from Iran.

+ Questions Regarding the NDAA (Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012)

CRS — Iran Sanctions

February 7, 2012 Comments off

Iran Sanctions (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)

There is broad international support for imposing progressively strict economic sanctions on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably confine its nuclear program to purely peaceful uses. During 2011, there was broad agreement that sanctions had not hurt Iran’s economy to the point at which the Iranian leadership feels pressured to accommodate core Western goals on Iran’s nuclear program. However, as 2012 begins, Iran is indicating it perceives new U.S. and other sanctions affecting its vital oil export lifeline as a severe threat – to the point where Iran might threaten armed conflict in the Strait of Hormuz. It also has offered new nuclear talks in the hopes of heading off some of the oil export- related sanctions under consideration. The energy sector provides nearly 70% of Iran’s government revenues.

The signs of effectiveness of sanctions mounted throughout 2011. The value of Iran’s rial has dropped dramatically over the past two years. Iranian leaders have admitted that Iran is virtually cut off from the international banking system. There have been a stream of announcements by major international firms since early 2010 that they are exiting or declining to undertake further work in the Iranian market, particularly the energy sector, taking with them often irreplaceable expertise. Partly as a result, Iran’s oil production has remained relatively steady at about 4.1 million barrels per day, defying Iranian efforts to increase production. Iran has small amounts of natural gas exports; it had none at all before Iran opened its fields to foreign investment in 1996. Even before the United States and several other countries moved to cut off Iran’s Central Bank in late 2011, several countries, particularly India, had delayed billions of dollars in oil payments for Iran because payments mechanisms had been disrupted by sanctions. However, Iran’s overall ability to limit the effects of sanctions has been aided by relatively high oil prices – prices that tend to increase as Iran threatens conflict in the Persian Gulf region.

What has caused sanctions to start to affect Iranian calculations has been the broadening of international support for and compliance with them. Using the authorities of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, adopted June 9, 2010, measures adopted since mid-2010 by the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and several other countries target the key energy and financial sectors of Iran. These measures complement the numerous U.S. laws and regulations that have long sought to try to pressure Iran, particularly the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)—a 1996 U.S. law that mandates U.S. penalties against foreign companies that invest in Iran’s energy sector. The application of that law was broadened by the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195) as well as by Executive Order 13590 issued November 21, 2011. The issuing of that Order was accompanied by a Treasury Department determination, under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act, that the Iranian financial system constitutes an entity of primary money laundering concern. These measures have been joined by several other countries, who took into consideration an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran’s possible efforts to design a nuclear explosive device, and diplomatic and financial rifts with Britain, which caused the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran on November 30, 2011.

In the 112th Congress, legislation, such as S. 1048 and H.R. 1905, would enhance both the economic sanctions and human rights-related provisions of CISADA and other laws. A provision of the FY2012 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1540) sanctions foreign banks that do business with Iran’s Central Bank. For a broader analysis of policy on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.

Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

February 1, 2012 Comments off

Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (PDF)
Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence (James R. Clapper)

This statement provides extensive detail about numerous state and nonstate actors, crosscutting political, economic, and military developments and transnational trends, all of which constitute our nation‟s strategic and tactical landscape. Although I believe that counterterrorism, counterproliferation, cybersecurity, and counterintelligence are at the immediate forefront of our security concerns, it is virtually impossible to rank—in terms of long-term importance—the numerous, potential threats to US national security. The United States no longer faces—as in the Cold War—one dominant threat. Rather, it is the multiplicity and interconnectedness of potential threats—and the actors behind them—that constitute our biggest challenge. Indeed, even the four categories noted above are also inextricably linked, reflecting a quickly changing international environment of rising new powers, rapid diffusion of power to nonstate actors and ever greater access by individuals and small groups to lethal technologies. We in the Intelligence Community believe it is our duty to work together as an integrated team to understand and master this complexity. By providing better strategic and tactical intelligence, we can partner more effectively with other Government officials at home and abroad to protect our vital national interests.

Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry

January 11, 2012 Comments off

Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry
Source: RAND Corporation
From press release:

While Israel and Iran once were de facto allies, the two nations have come to view each other as direct rivals for power and influence in the Middle East, increasing the risk for a possible military conflict, according to a new RAND Corporation study.

“The Iranian regime views Israel as a regional competitor bent on undermining its revolutionary system,” said Dalia Dassa Kaye, co-author of the study and a senior political scientist with RAND, a nonprofit research organization. “Israel, on the other hand, views Iran as its main security challenge, posing serious strategic and ideological challenges to the Jewish state, particularly as Iran continues its pursuit of nuclear capabilities.”

In order to prevent the current rivalry from escalating toward conflict, the study suggests U.S. leaders should continue to bolster security cooperation and intelligence-sharing with Israel, making such efforts visible to the Israeli public, while quietly counseling against unilateral action and continuing to focus on steps to further isolate, penalize and weaken Iran’s capacity to project power and influence throughout the region.

The United States should engage in activities that increase understanding about how a deterrence relationship between Israel and Iran may evolve, and encourage direct communication between Israelis and Iranians through informal diplomatic channels. The United States also should continue both engagement and sanction policies that may affect the internal debate in Iran on nuclear weaponization.

Despite the current animosity, Israel and Iran have not always been rivals, nor are they natural competitors, researchers say. Arab governments tend to regard both nations with suspicion, and Israel and Iran do not have territorial disputes or compete economically. The two nations cooperated together for years before and after Iran’s 1979 revolution, based on shared geopolitical interests.

Only in the last decade have the countries begun to see each other as rivals. As late as the 1990s, Israel’s security establishment did not consider Iran as its predominant security challenge. However, Iran’s expanding missile capabilities, nuclear advances and the rise of fundamentalist leaders with vitriolic anti-Israel rhetoric have fueled anxiety. This is particularly the case as Israel perceives Iranian influence on the rise.

CRS — Iran Sanctions (12/2/11)

January 3, 2012 Comments off

Iran Sanctions (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)

There is broad international support for imposing progressively strict economic sanctions on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably confine its nuclear program to purely peaceful uses. Many U.S. and international officials appear to agree that the sanctions have not, to date, hurt Iran’s economy to the point at which the Iranian leadership feels pressured to accommodate core Western goals on Iran’s nuclear program. As of September 2011, Iran’s leaders have stated interest in new proposals that could form the basis of revived nuclear talks, although prospects for new talks have been set back by diplomatic rifts between Iran and several European countries in November 2011.

Whether or not core goals have yet been accomplished, the United States and its allies appear to agree that sanctions might yet succeed and that pressure should be added to further weaken Iran’s energy sector and isolate Iran from the international financial system. The energy sector provides nearly 70% of government revenues. Iran’s large trading community needs financing to buy goods from the West and sell them inside Iran. There have been a stream of announcements by major international firms since early 2010 that they are exiting or declining to undertake further work in the Iranian market, particularly the energy sector, taking with them often irreplaceable expertise. Partly as a result, Iran’s oil production has remained relatively steady at about 4.1 million barrels per day, defying Iranian efforts to increase production. Iran has small amounts of natural gas exports; it had none at all before Iran opened its fields to foreign investment in 1996. Several countries, particularly India, have delayed billions of dollars in oil payments for Iran because payments mechanisms have been disrupted by sanctions. However, Iran’s overall ability to limit the effects of sanctions has been aided by relatively high oil prices in 2011.

What has generated U.S. optimism about the eventual success of sanctions has been the broadening of international support for and compliance with them. Using the authorities of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, adopted June 9, 2010, measures adopted since mid-2010 by the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and several other countries target the key energy and financial sectors of Iran. These measures complement the numerous U.S. laws and regulations that have long sought to try to pressure Iran, particularly the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)—a 1996 U.S. law that mandates U.S. penalties against foreign companies that invest in Iran’s energy sector. The application of that law was broadened by the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195) as well as by Executive Order 13590 issued November 21, 2011. The issuing of that Order was accompanied by a Treasury Department warning, under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act, that conducting transactions with the Iranian financial system constitutes a risk of facilitating Iranian proliferation and terrorism financing activity.

The prospects for additional international sanctions have been heightened in late 2011 by U.S. revelations in October 2011 of a purported Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran’s possible efforts to design a nuclear explosive device, and diplomatic and financial rifts with Britain, which caused the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran on November 30, 2011. In the 112th Congress, legislation, such as S. 1048 and H.R. 1905, would enhance both the economic sanctions and human rights-related provisions of CISADA and other laws. An amendment to a Senate FY2012 defense authorization bill would sanction foreign banks that do business with Iran’s Central Bank. Some countries and experts also seek a broad or partial embargo on Iran’s sale of oil, to reinforce the sanctions effects discussed above. For a broader analysis of policy on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.

CRS — Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses (12/15/11)

December 27, 2011 Comments off

Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)

The Obama Administration identifies Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests. This perception is generated by suspicions of Iran’s intentions for its nuclear program – heightened by a November 8, 2011, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report – as well as by Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East and in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of helping Syria’s leadership try to defeat a growing popular opposition movement, and of taking advantage of Shiite majority unrest against the Sunni-led, pro-U.S. government of Bahrain. In October 2011, U.S. officials accused Iran of plotting to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States.

The Obama Administration initially offered Iran’s leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West in exchange for limits to its nuclear program. After observing a crackdown on peaceful protests in Iran in 2009, and failing to obtain Iran’s agreement to implement any nuclear compromise, the Administration has worked since early 2010 on a “two-track strategy” to increase economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran while maintaining offers of further engagement. Significant additional sanctions were imposed on Iran by the U.N. Security Council (Resolution 1929), as well as related “national measures” by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and other countries. Further measures intended to compel foreign firms to exit the Iranian market were contained in U.S. legislation passed in June 2010 (the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, P.L. 111-195). In concert, the Administration has stepped up arms sales to regional states that share the U.S. suspicions of Iran’s intentions.

Perhaps hoping to avoid additional sanctions, Iran attended December 2010 and January 2011 talks with the six powers negotiating with Iran, but no substantive progress was reported at any of these meetings. The prospects for new talks seemed to increase in August 2011 as a result of Iran- Russia discussions of new formulas for compromise, supplemented by Iranian official statements suggesting potential acceptance of some widely discussed international proposals. However, no date for new talks was arranged and the November 2011 IAEA report reduced the prospect for new talks and increased international support for additional sanctions. This tend has been accelerated by a row between Iran and Britain that included the ransacking of Britain’s embassy in Tehran on November 29 by youths tacitly backed by Iran’s security forces—an action that has furthered Tehran’s isolation.

In 2011, in the context of the popular uprisings throughout the Middle East, and perhaps addressing criticism that it did not sufficiently support the popular uprising in Iran in 2009, the Administration has increased its public criticism of Iran’s human rights record. That effort has been broadly supported in the international community. Some in the 112th Congress, aside from supporting additional economic sanctions against Iran, believe the United States should provide additional vocal and material support to the democracy movement in Iran, despite its outward quiescence in most of 2011. The Administration argues that it has supported the opposition through civil society and other programs, and by using recent authorities to sanction Iranian officials who suppress human rights in Iran and help Syria repress human rights. For further information, including pending Iran sanctions legislation, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions; and CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status.

A Cyberworm that Knows No Boundaries

December 22, 2011 Comments off

A Cyberworm that Knows No Boundaries
Source:  RAND Corporation

Iran’s announcement that a computer worm called Stuxnet had infected computers that controlled one of its nuclear processing facilities marked a signal event in cyber attacks. Although such attacks were known to be theoretically possible, the incident proved that a cyberworm could successfully infiltrate a system and produce physical damage. Furthermore, the sophisticated nature of the worm and the resources that would have been required to design, produce, and implant it strongly suggest a state-sponsored effort. It has become clear that Stuxnet-like worms pose a serious threat even to infrastructure and computer systems that are not connected to the Internet. However, defending against such attacks is an increasingly complex prospect. The nature of cyberspace ensures that the attacker has the upper hand and can move about with impunity and relative anonymity. The sophistication of virulent malware has also made it difficult to detect whether an intrusion has occurred, and attackers have a wide range of means at their disposal to gain access to networks, even those that are closed. Finally, bureaucratic and legal barriers can hinder the ability to mount a successful defense. Under the current framework, different organizations have different responsibilities and different levels of authority when it comes to investigating or defending against intrusions, depending on the nature of the attack, its geographic origin, and the systems it targets. In addition, there is a need to protect critical government and private-sector infrastructure in a way that does not infringe on civil liberties or proprietary data. The authors argue that new legislation is needed to establish a more efficient assignment of responsibilities, and a revised legal code may be required to successfully defend against the ever-evolving cyber threat.

Country Analysis Brief: Iran

November 25, 2011 Comments off

Country Analysis Brief: Iran
Source: Energy Information Administration

Iran, a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC), ranks among the world’s top four holders of both proven oil and natural gas reserves. Iran is OPEC’s second-largest producer and exporter after Saudi Arabia, and in 2010 was the third-largest exporter of crude oil globally after Saudi Arabia and Russia. However, falling production and increases in domestic consumption have been squeezing the volumes of oil available for export in recent years.

 

Natural gas accounts for 54 percent of Iran’s total domestic energy consumption. Most of the remainder of energy consumption is attributable to oil, with marginal contributions from coal and hydropower. Iran will realize a boost in natural gas production from its offshore South Pars natural gas field in the Persian Gulf, an integral component of energy sector expansion plans. 

 

International sanctions enacted in the summer of 2010 have slowed progress across the energy sector, especially affecting upstream investment in both oil and natural gas projects. The United States, United Nations, the European Union, and a number of European and Asian countries have targeted the Iranian energy sector with sanctions of varying degrees of stringency. These have prompted a number of western energy companies to pull out of upstream projects. Sanctions have also impeded the import of refined product, prompting efforts to boost domestic production and curb rising demand in Iran.

Forecasting the Future of Iran: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Policy

November 21, 2011 Comments off

Forecasting the Future of Iran: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Policy
Source: RAND Corporation

Diplomatic relations between the US and Iran have been frozen since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The current overlaps in US and Iranian interests make the ongoing bilateral impasse ripe for reassessment, but while the potential to advance relations exists, progress will be measured by the development of several key political, economic, civil society, foreign policy, and national security issues in Iran. This study employs an expected utility model to predict how Iranian policy is developing on several of these key issues and explores US strategy and policy options for influencing their development.

+ Summary (PDF)
+ Full Document (PDF)

State Department Travel Warning: Iran

October 23, 2011 Comments off

State Department Travel Warning: Iran
Source: U.S. Department of State

The Department of State warns U.S. citizens to carefully consider the risks of travel to Iran. Dual national Iranian-American citizens may encounter difficulty in departing Iran. U.S. citizens should stay current with media coverage of local events and carefully consider nonessential travel. The Travel Warning for Iran issued October 8, 2010 has been reviewed and reissued without change.

Some elements in Iran remain hostile to the United States. As a result, U.S. citizens may be subject to harassment or arrest while traveling or residing in Iran. Since 2009, Iranian authorities have prevented the departure, in some cases for several months, of a number of Iranian-American citizens, including journalists and academics, who traveled to Iran for personal or professional reasons. Iranian authorities also have unjustly detained or imprisoned U.S. citizens on various charges, including espionage and posing a threat to national security. U.S. citizens of Iranian origin should consider the risk of being targeted by authorities before planning travel to Iran. Iranian authorities deny the U.S. Interests Section in Tehran access to imprisoned dual national Iranian-American citizens because Iranian authorities consider them to be solely Iranian citizens; access to U.S. citizens is often denied as well.

The Iranian government continues to repress some minority religious and ethnic groups, including Baha’i, Arabs, Kurds, Azeris, and others. Consequently, some areas within the country where these minorities reside, including the Baluchistan border area near Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Kurdish northwest of the country, and areas near the Iraqi border, remain unsafe. U.S. citizens who travel to Iran should exercise caution.

Full Text Complaint: 2 Men Charged in Alleged Plot to Assassinate Saudi Arabian Ambassador to U.S.

October 11, 2011 Comments off

Direct to Full Text Complaint (21 pages; PDF)

Summary/News Release

Two individuals have been charged in New York for their alleged participation in a plot directed by elements of the Iranian government to murder the Saudi Ambassador to the United States with explosives while the Ambassador was in the United States.

The charges were announced by Attorney General Eric Holder; FBI Director Robert S. Mueller; Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; and Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York.

A criminal complaint filed today in the Southern District of New York charges Manssor Arbabsiar, a 56-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen holding both Iranian and U.S. passports, and Gholam Shakuri, an Iran-based member of Iran’s Qods Force, which is a special operations unit of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that is said to sponsor and promote terrorist activities abroad.

Both defendants are charged with conspiracy to murder a foreign official; conspiracy to engage in foreign travel and use of interstate and foreign commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire; conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction (explosives); and conspiracy to commit an act of international terrorism transcending national boundaries.   Arbabsiar is further charged with an additional count of foreign travel and use of interstate and foreign commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire.

Shakuri remains at large. Arbabsiar was arrested on Sept. 29, 2011, at New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport and will make his initial appearance today before in federal court in Manhattan.   He faces a maximum potential sentence of life in prison if convicted of all the charges.

Summary/News Release

Direct to Full Text Complaint (21 pages; PDF)

CRS — Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses (Updated)

September 6, 2011 Comments off

Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)

The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by uncertainty about Iran’s intentions for its nuclear program but also by its materiel assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. As of mid-2011, U.S. officials are increasingly critical of what they say is stepped-up Iranian support for Iraqi Shiite militias that have attacked U.S. forces, who are scheduled to leave Iraq by the end of 2011.

To try to address the threat from Iran, the Obama Administration offered Iran’s leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West in exchange for limits to its nuclear program. However, after observing a crackdown on peaceful protests in Iran in 2009, and failing to obtain Iran’s agreement to implement an October 2009 tentative nuclear compromise, the Administration worked during 2010 and 2011 to increase economic and political pressure on Iran. Major sanctions were imposed on Iran by the U.N. Security Council (Resolution 1929), as well as related “national measures” by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and other countries. Additional measures designed to compel foreign firms to exit the Iranian market were contained in U.S. legislation passed in June 2010 (the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, P.L. 111-195).

Perhaps hoping to avoid additional sanctions, Iran attended December 6-7, 2010, talks in Geneva with the six powers negotiating with Iran. However, indicating that Iran had not fundamentally altered its position, no substantive progress was reported at that or at subsequent talks in Turkey on January 21-22, 2011. U.S. officials indicate that additional pressure could be forthcoming, although with no stipulated timeframe, while also stating that the “door is open” to further nuclear talks. Some in and outside the 112th Congress hold out no hope for further talks and believe that U.S. and international economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran should increase. Additional sanctions, according to this view, might yet succeed in forcing a change of Iran’s nuclear policy, and help widen an increasingly open power struggle between Iran’s Supreme Leader and its President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Administration has stepped up arms sales to regional states that share the U.S. suspicions of Iran’s intentions, but there does not appear to be consideration of U.S., Israeli, or Persian Gulf military action against Iran.

Subsequent to the failed January 2011 nuclear talks with Iran (and in the context of the popular uprisings throughout the Middle East in 2011), the Administration has increased its public support of the Iranian opposition “Green Movement.” Some in the 112th Congress believe the United States should do more to support the democracy movement in Iran in the context of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, but there are no indications the Administration plans to provide Iran’s opposition with direct, material support. While trying to crush its own dissident movement, the Iranian leadership has sought to protect its ally, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, from being overcome by protests. In line with long-standing policy of supporting regional Shiite movements, Iran may be helping Shiite factions in Bahrain that have participated in a broad but thus far unsuccessful uprising there. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions; and CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status.

See also: Iran Sanctions (PDF)

New From the GAO

August 3, 2011 Comments off

New GAO Correspondence (PDF)
Source: Government Accountability Office

Firms Reported in Open Sources as Having Commercial Activity in Iran’s Oil, Gas, and Petrochemical Sectors.  GAO-11-855R, August 3.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-855R

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