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Disjointed Ways, Disunified Means: Learning from America’s Struggle to Build an Afghan Nation
Disjointed Ways, Disunified Means: Learning from America’s Struggle to Build an Afghan Nation
Remarkably ambitious in its audacity and scope, NATO’s irregular warfare and nation-building mission in Afghanistan has struggled to meet its nonmilitary objectives by most tangible measures. Put directly, the Alliance and its partners have fallen short of achieving the results needed to create a stable, secure, democratic, and self-sustaining Afghan nation, a particularly daunting proposition given Afghanistan’s history and culture, the region’s contemporary circumstances, and the fact that no such country has existed there before. Furthermore, given the central nature of U.S. contributions to this NATO mission, these shortfalls also serve as an indicator of a serious American problem as well. Specifically, inconsistencies and a lack of coherence in the U.S. Government’s strategic planning processes and products, as well as fundamental flaws in the U.S. Government’s structures and systems for coordinating and integrating the efforts of its various agencies, are largely responsible for this adverse and dangerous situation. This book explores these strategic and interagency shortfalls, while proposing potential reforms that would enable the United States to achieve the strategic coherence and genuine unity of effort that will be needed in an era of constrained resources and emerging new threats.
Can Russia Reform? Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives
Can Russia Reform? Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
These three papers represent the first panel of papers from SSI’s annual Russia conference that took place in September 2011. They assess the nature of Russia’s political system, economy, and armed forces and draw conclusions, even sharp and provocative ones, concerning the nature and trajectory of these institutions. The three papers presented here offer attempts to characterize first of all, the nature of the state; second, the prospects for economic reform within that state—perhaps the most pressing domestic issue and one with considerable spillover into defense and security agendas as well—in contemporary Russia; and third, the nature and lasting effects of the defense reform that began in 2008. The papers are forthright and pull no punches, though we certainly do not claim that they provide the last or definitive word on these subjects. The papers go straight to the heart of the most important questions concerning the nature of the state and the possibilities for its economic and military reform. As such, we hope that the papers presented here, and in subsequent volumes, provide insight and understanding to several critical questions pertaining to and/or affecting Russia, a country that deliberately tries to remain opaque to foreign observers despite its many changes. These papers aim to be a resource, to enlighten, to edify readers, and to stimulate the effort to understand and deal with one of the most important actors in international affairs today.
Commander’s Legal Handbook
Commander’s Legal Handbook (PDF)
Source: Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School (U.S. Army)
This Guide is designed to assist Commanders with legal situations by helping them to recognize and avoid issues, or to take immediate actions necessary to preserve the situation when legal issues arise.
Report of the 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
Report of the 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (PDF)
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
Since September 11, 2001, many demands have been placed on our nation’s men and women in uniform. Ten years of armed conflict have been marked with multiple combat deployments, shortened time between deployments, warriors returning with combat injuries that would have been fatal in earlier wars, and the National Guard and reserve playing a major role in the war effort. These and other factors have placed enormous stress on service members and their families. At the same time, the fiscal environment, dominated by a long recession, a slow recovery, and a rising federal budget deficit, is putting pressure on federal departments and agencies to apply resources more efficiently and effectively to accomplish their objectives. The Department of Defense (DOD) faces fiscal challenges on many fronts; among them is the rising cost of personnel.
It is within this context that the 11 th QRMC was chartered to examine whether compensation levels are sufficient to sustain recruitment and retention of the highcaliber men and women in uniform who serve our nation. As directed in its charter, t he 11 th QRMC examined four areas of the military compensation system:
- Pay incentives for critical career fields such as mental health professionals, linguists/translators, remotely piloted vehicle operators, and special operations personnel
- Compensation for service performed in a combat zone, combat operation, or hostile fire area, or while exposed to a hostile fire event
- Compensation benefits available to wounded warriors, caregivers, and survivors of fallen service members
- Compensation and benefits for the reserves and National Guard, consistent with their current and planned utilization
Additionally, the 11 th QRMC assessed the competitiveness of military compensation with the private sector—an understanding of which serves as a useful foundation for examining specific elements of the compensation system.
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Military compensation has outpaced civilian wages and salary growth since 2002. Military pay began to increase in 2000, owing to a pay adjustment that responded to recruiting and retention difficulties, and was intended to bring military compensation back in line with civilian pay. The pay adjustment was accompanied by a commitment to increase basic pay in step with the Employment Cost Index (a benchmark for civilian pay growth) plus one-half of one percentage point from 2002 through 2006—a policy that was ultimately extended through 2010. The increase in military compensation also reflects rapid growth in the housing allowance, which increased by 5.7 percent in 2007, 4.7 percent in 2008, and 5.0 percent in 2009.
In contrast, there has been no real growth in civilian wages and salaries over much of the past decade—in part, reflecting a recessionary economy. At the same time, the cost of benefits in the civilian sector grew until about 2004, and then began to fall, only to increase again starting in 2010—fueled largely by growth in the cost of health care.
In 2009, average RMC for enlisted members exceeded the median wage for civilians in each relevant comparison group—those with a high school diploma, those with some college, and those with an associate’s degree. Average RMC for the enlisted force corresponded to the 90 th percentile of wages for civilians from the combined comparison groups. For officers, average RMC exceeded wages for civilians with a bachelor’s or graduate-level degree. Average RMC for the officer force corresponded to the 83 rd percentile of wages for the combined civilian comparison groups.
A comparison between military and civilian wages does not, by itself, determine if military pay is at the optimal level. As previously noted, other factors are also at play including: recruiting and retention experiences and outlook; unemployment in the civilian economy; political factors, such as a wartime environment or risk of war; and the expected frequency and duration of overseas deployments. But the relative standing of military compensation provides context to help make decisions about RMC and other elements of the compensation system, such as those studied by the QRMC.
See also: Eleventh Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, Supporting Research Papers
See also: Individual supporting chapters, reference documents, and downloadable files
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) is pursuing a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of China’s armed forces to !ght and win “local wars under conditions of informatization,” or high-intensity, information-centric regional military operations of short duration. China’s leaders view modernization of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as an essential component of their strategy to take advantage of what they perceive to be a “window of strategic opportunity” to advance China’s national development during the !rst two decades of the 21st century. During this period, China’s leaders are placing a priority on fostering a positive external environment to provide the PRC with the strategic space to focus on economic growth and development. At the same time, Chinese leaders seek to maintain peace and stability along their country’s periphery, expand their diplomatic in%uence to facilitate access to markets, capital, and resources, and avoid direct confrontation with the United States and other countries. "is strategy has led to an expansion of China’s presence in regions all over the world, creating new and expanding economic and diplomatic interests.
As these interests have grown, and as China has assumed new roles and responsibilities in the international community, China’s military modernization is, to an increasing extent, focusing on investments in military capabilities that would enable China’s armed forces to conduct a wide range of missions, including those farther from China. Even as the PLA is contending with this growing array of missions, preparing for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait remains the principal focus and driver of much of China’s military investment. In this context, over the past year, the PLA continued to build the capabilities and develop the doctrine it considers necessary to deter Taiwan from declaring independence; to deter, delay, and deny e&ective U.S. intervention in a potential cross-Strait con%ict; and to defeat Taiwan forces in the event of hostilities.
To support the PLA’s expanding set of roles and missions, China’s leaders in 2011 sustained investment in advanced cruise missiles, short and medium range conventional ballistic missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, counterpace weapons, and military cyberspace capabilities which appear designed to enable anti-access/ area-denial (A2/AD) missions, or what PLA strategists refer to as “counter intervention operations.” "e PLA also continued to demonstrate improved capabilities in advanced !ghter aircraft, as evidenced by the inaugural %ight testing of the J-20 stealth !ghter; limited power projection, with the launch of China’s !rst aircraft carrier for sea trials; integrated air defenses; undersea warfare; nuclear deterrence and strategic strike; improved command and control; and more sophisticated training and exercises across China’s air, naval, and land forces.
Underscoring the extent to which China’s leaders are increasingly looking to the PLA to perform missions that go beyond China’s immediate territorial concerns, over the past year the PLA deployed assets to support non-combatant evacuation operations from Libya, extended its presence in the Gulf of Aden for a third year of counterpiracy operations, took on leadership roles in United Nations peace operations, and conducted medical exchanges and a service mission to Latin America and the Caribbean using the PLA Navy’s hospital ship.
During their January 2011 summit, President Barack Obama and China’s President Hu Jintao committed to work together to build a cooperative partnership based on mutual respect and mutual bene!t. Within that framework, the U.S. Department of Defense seeks to build a military-to-military relationship with China that is healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous. Strengthening the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship is a part of shaping China’s choices by encouraging it to cooperate with the United States and its allies and partners in the delivery of international public goods, including in such endeavors as counterpiracy, international peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. As the United States builds a stronger foundation for a military-tomilitary relationship with China, it also will continue to monitor China’s evolving military strategy, doctrine, and force development. In concert with Allies and partners, the United States will continue adapting its forces, posture, and operational concepts to maintain a stable and secure Asia-Paci!c security environment.
The Future of the Field Artillery
The Future of the Field Artillery
Source: U.S. Army War College
Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Field Artillery branch, more than any other branch in today’s Army, has been asked to conduct in-lieu-of missions rather than its core fire support mission during conduct of the war. The associated potential deterioration of core competencies could possibly have a major impact in future operations.
This U.S. Army War College student author examines:
— how long it would take to restore Field Artillery core competencies to support Major Combat Operations?;
— how the branch could perhaps be balanced in order to support current operations as well as prepare for future operations?;
— when should the branch be ready to conduct operations in either a hybrid or Major Combat Operation environment?; and
— how much lead time would be needed to ensure success in either operation?He offers recommendations to enhance the Army’s capabilities and capacity to address Field Artillery challenges.
Military Benefits — Action is Needed to Improve the Completeness and Accuracy of DEERS Beneficiary Data
We are providing this report for your information and use. The Defense Manpower Data Center lacked controls to identify when Real-time Automated Personnel Identification System personnel failed to maintain supporting documentation. Therefore, DoD lacked certainty that only eligible beneficiaries were enrolled in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System and issued military identification cards. The unsupported and inaccurate data adversely affected the integrity of the DoD process for issuing military identification cards. Further, ineligible beneficiaries could obtain unauthorized access to health care benefits and, conceivably, to Government facilities and other privileges.We considered comments from the Defense Human Resources Activity and the Defense Manpower Data Center when preparing this final report. Comments on the draft of this report conformed to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3 and left no unresolved issues. Therefore we do not require any additional comments.
Military Benefits — Action is Needed to Improve the Completeness and Accuracy of DEERS Beneficiary Data
We are providing this report for your information and use. The Defense Manpower Data Center lacked controls to identify when Real-time Automated Personnel Identification System personnel failed to maintain supporting documentation. Therefore, DoD lacked certainty that only eligible beneficiaries were enrolled in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System and issued military identification cards. The unsupported and inaccurate data adversely affected the integrity of the DoD process for issuing military identification cards. Further, ineligible beneficiaries could obtain unauthorized access to health care benefits and, conceivably, to Government facilities and other privileges.We considered comments from the Defense Human Resources Activity and the Defense Manpower Data Center when preparing this final report. Comments on the draft of this report conformed to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3 and left no unresolved issues. Therefore we do not require any additional comments.
United States Marine Corps Reserve First Term Attrition Characteristics
This thesis examines the effect of attrition on USMCR NPS marines who enlisted with a 6X2 contract in FY 1994–2005. Three cohorts were established to determine if the events of September 11, 2001 had any impact on attrition rates with this population. The Pre-9/11 cohort enlisted in FY 1994–1995 and was used as a control group. The Overlap-9/11 cohort enlisted in FY 1996–2001, had no expectation of deployment but many did deploy in support of the Global War on Terrorism. The Post-9/11 cohort enlisted in FY 2002–2005 after 9/11 with full expectation to deploy.The analysis included previous attrition studies, descriptive statistics, and two different probit regression models to determine the effects of various characteristics on attrition. The variables analyzed included deployment variables, demographics, education and aptitude variables, and regional areas.The thesis found a decrease in attrition from the Pre-9/11 cohort to the Post-9/11 cohort. This was most likely caused by an increasing unemployment rate and deployments overseas. Deployments to combat areas decreased the probability of attrition. The other variables remained constant throughout the cohorts with predicted results. Overall, attrition is lower after 9/11 but as the economy improves and deployments decrease, attrition could return to Pre-9/11 levels.
Chiefs Issue Strategic Direction to Combat Sexual Assault
Chiefs Issue Strategic Direction to Combat Sexual Assault
Source: U.S. Department of Defense (Joint Chiefs of Staff)
Despite years of concerted effort, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commandant of the Coast Guard are dissatisfied with progress made in reducing sexual assault in the military, and have released strategic direction to increase the emphasis on combatting the crime. (Strategic Direction to the Joint Force on Sexual Assault Prevention and Response)
The chiefs released a “32-star” letter to commanders and leaders, titled “Strategic Direction to the Joint Force on Sexual Assault Prevention and Response.” In the past two years, service members have reported 6,350 cases of sexual assault.
In what is mandatory reading for all commanders and leaders, the letter says the mission is to reduce and ultimately eliminate incidences of sexual assault, and establish an environment of mutual respect and trust, and a work place where the act is not tolerated.
Sexual assault is a crime that erodes the bonds of trust essential for military units to succeed and puts all members of the military team at risk. The chiefs stressed that prevention and response must be emphasized in all aspects of planning, training and mission execution — requiring actual leadership, not just a “checking-the-box” mentality.
The chiefs have been working diligently for months on the strategic direction, officials said.
+ Full Document (PDF)
Assessment of DoD Wounded Warrior Matters — Camp Lejeune
Assessment of DoD Wounded Warrior Matters — Camp Lejeune (PDF)
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General
We identified several initiatives implemented at both WWBn-East and the Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune that we believed to be noteworthy practices for supporting the comprehensive care, healing, and transition of Warriors. Further, we observed that the WWBn-East and Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune management and staff were fully dedicated to providing the best available care and services for helping Warriors heal and transition.
We also identified a number of significant challenges that we recommend the WWBn-East and Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune management address, which if resolved, we believe will increase program effectiveness in providing quality and timely care and services in support of the Warriors healing and transition.
Finally, we recognized as a result of this assessment, that it was important to give a voice to the Warriors themselves. We suggest that the WWBn-East and Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune management and staff consider Warrior comments, as discussed in this report, so they are cognizant of the Warriors’ views and concerns and can take appropriate action.
Once Again, the Challenge to the U.S. Army During a Defense Reduction: To Remain a Military Profession
As with the post-Cold War downsizing during the Clinton administration in the late 1990s, one critical challenge for the U.S. Army centers on the qualitative, institutional character of the Army after the reductions—will the U.S. Army manifest the essential characteristics and behavior of a military profession with Soldiers and civilians who see themselves sacrificially called to a vocation of service to country within a motivating professional culture that sustains a meritocratic ethic, or will the Army’s character be more like any other government occupation in which its members view themselves as filing a job, motivated mostly by the extrinsic factors of pay, location, and work hours? In mid-2010, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff directed the Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command, then General Martin Dempsey, to undertake a broad campaign of learning, involving the entire Department. The intent was to think through what it means for the Army to be a profession of arms and for its Soldiers and civilians to be professionals as the Army largely returns stateside after a decade of war and then quickly transitions to the new era of Defense reductions. Several new conceptions of the Army as a military profession have been produced, along with numerous initiatives that are currently being staffed to strengthen the professional character of the Army as it simultaneously recovers from a decade of war and transitions through reductions in force. They form the descriptive content of this monograph.
+ Full Paper (PDF)
DOD Releases Annual Sexual Assault Response and Prevention Report
DOD Releases Annual Sexual Assault Response and Prevention Report
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
The Department of Defense today released the fiscal 2011 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2011. To date, this is the eighth report DoD has released.
The report finds that in fiscal 2011, there were a total of 3,192 reports of sexual assault involving service members as either victims or subjects. This represents a one percent increase in reports of sexual assault compared to fiscal 2010.
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The report also details actions taken against the subjects investigated as a result of these reports. In fiscal 2011, the department had jurisdiction and sufficient evidence to take disciplinary action against 791 subjects for a sexual assault offense. Of these subjects, 489, or 62 percent had courts-martial charges preferred against them. That represents a 10 percentage point increase in the rate of courts-martial charges preferred compared to fiscal 2010. The proportion of military subjects against whom commanders decided to take disciplinary action for sexual assault offenses by preferring court-martial charges has increased steadily since fiscal 2007, when only 30 percent of subjects had charges initiated against them.
Legal Support to the Operational Army
Legal Support to the Operational Army (PDF)
Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army (via Federation of American Scientists)
FM 1-04, Legal Support to the Operational Army, is the Army’s manual for operational legal doctrine. This manual provides authoritative doctrine and practical guidance for commanders, judge advocates, legal administrators, and paralegal Soldiers across the spectrum of conflict. It outlines how The Judge Advocate General’s Corps (JAGC) will be organized in accordance with the Army’s modular force design. It also discusses the delivery of legal support to the modular force.
This manual does not address the law of armed conflict, The Hague Conventions, or the Geneva Conventions in detail. For a more comprehensive treatment of those areas, refer to FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare. FM 1-04 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.
Categorical Confusion? The Strategic Implications of Recognizing Challenges Either as Irregular or Traditional
Strategic theory should educate to enable effective strategic practice, but much of contemporary theory promotes confusion, not clarity, of suitable understanding. A little strategic theory goes a long way, at least it does if it is austere and focused on essentials. Unfortunately, contemporary strategic conceptualization in the U.S. defense community is prolix, over-elaborate, and it confuses rather than clarifies. Recent debate about irregular, as contrasted allegedly with traditional, challenges to U.S. national security have done more harm than good. Conceptualization of and for an operational level of war can imperil the truly vital nexus between strategy and tactics. In much the same way, the invention of purportedly distinctive categories of challenge endangers the relationship between general theory for statecraft, war, and strategy, and strategic and tactical practice for particular historical cases. It is not helpful to sort challenges into supposedly distinctive categories. But, if such categorization proves politically or bureaucratically unavoidable, its potential for harm can be reduced by firm insistence upon the authority of the general theory of strategy.
+ Full Paper (PDF)
Dover Port Mortuary Independent Review Subcommittee Final Report – February 2012
Dover Port Mortuary Independent Review Subcommittee Final Report – February 2012
Source: Defense Health Board (DoD)
The United States has a long and proud tradition of honoring its war dead. Consistent with the supreme sacrifice of the Fallen, our Nation must sustain the trust of its Service Members and their families by ensuring that the Fallen are accorded the highest degree of honor, dignity, and reverence, now and in the future.
In 2009, employees of the Dover Port Mortuary (DPM) alleged wrongdoing at the facility involving handling and disposition of human remains returning from Afghanistan and Iraq. Specifically, these individuals described improper preparation of remains of a deceased Marine; improper handling and transport of remains with possible contagious disease; improper handling and transport of fetal remains of military dependents; and improper handling of cases of missing portions of remains.
Several Service-level investigations ensued as did a review of those investigations by the Office of Special Counsel, resulting in numerous corrective actions and personnel changes at the facility. In fall 2011, senior Department of Defense (DoD) leadership asked the Defense Health Board (DHB) to conduct an independent assessment of the current overall operations of DPM, the effectiveness of changes identified or taken to date, and the means by which those changes are examined for continued effectiveness. Specifically, the DHB subcommittee was asked to focus on the policies, procedures, and processes currently in place at DPM. The subcommittee did not focus its review on disciplinary or retaliatory personnel actions that followed these investigations, which were the subject of another review.
DSB — Basic Research
A significant handicap for conducting the study was the difficulty of getting data on the DOD basic research program. What should have been easily retrievable data required huge time-consuming, labor-intensive efforts to collect and assemble due to the lack of a modern management information system that would enable answering questions posed by DOD leadership. It is difficult to have management without management information.Relative to the organizational structure of the DOD basic research program, over the years a number of alternatives have been considered for the conduct of basic research, in order to improve funding efficiency, coordination, or planning. Combining all basic research from across the Services into one organization is one such variant. The task force concludes that any potential savings, or other supposed benefits, that might accrue from such a restructuring would be far outweighed by distancing basic research from applied research and from the military operators. Furthermore, centralization would eliminate the diversity of views so important for the conduct of basic research.In sum, the task force found the current DOD basic research program to be a very good one, comparable to others in the federal gove rnment and well-suited to DOD’s needs. While nothing is ever so good it cannot be improved, the only are a found where improvement would make a significant difference would be to reduce the unnecessary bureaucratic burden imposed at all levels of the basic research organization.
Strategic Communication in the New Media Sphere
The U.S. Government continues to seek a comprehensive, effective communication strategy through which it may project and promote American interests, policies, and objectives abroad. Many believe that the government and military have been outcommunicated since 9/11. A primary cause of this alleged deficiency is failure to recognize that strategic communication through traditional media and through the new media are not the same thing. There are fundamental differences between traditional and new media spheres. Hence, using conventional methods for new media strategic communication is decidedly less productive than developing a communication strategy appropriate for the new media universe.Pentagon press secretary briefs media on Secretary of Defense’s scheduleSuccessful strategic communication in the new media sphere cannot remain the exclusive domain of professional strategic communicators insulated from most aspects of mission execution. To compete for attention with the proliferation of messages exchanged in today’s “attention economy,” military and civilian agencies must co-opt the skills of nearly all personnel charged with carrying out disparate aspects of a mission or specific policy, critically those in theater such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), District Support Teams (DSTs), and others.
DOD Releases Fiscal 2013 Budget Proposal
DOD Releases Fiscal 2013 Budget Proposal
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
President Barack Obama today sent to Congress a proposed defense budget of $613.9 billion for fiscal 2013. The request for the Department of Defense (DoD) includes $525.4 billion in discretionary budget authority to fund base defense programs and $88.5 billion to support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), primarily in Afghanistan.
The proposed FY 2013 budget will ensure U.S. forces will remain capable across the spectrum of missions, fully prepared to deter and defeat aggression and to defend the homeland and our allies in the world’s complex security environment. It results from an intensive strategic review conducted by DoD’s senior military and civilian leaders under the leadership and guidance of the president. The defense strategic guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” was published in January 2012. The proposed budget makes more disciplined use of defense dollars to maintain the world’s finest military and sustain U.S. global leadership. It applies strategic guidance to force structure and investment. It preserves the All-Volunteer Force as the foundation of the U.S. military. And it fully supports deployed warfighters.
Air Force announces force structure overview for FY 13 and beyond
Air Force officials announced proposed force structure changes which support the new DoD strategic guidance retiring 286 aircraft over the next five years, including 227 in fiscal year 13.According to Secretary of the Air Force, Michael Donley, the Air Force is shaping itself for future challenges by realigning Air Force assets with the Defense Department’s new strategic guidance.“We’ve had to adjust our force structure based on our strategic objectives and to balance capability and capacity with constrained budgets,” Donley said. “We must have the right tools and enough of them to credibly deter potential adversaries and to deliver on our objectives.”The new strategic guidance requires the joint force to be capable of fighting one large scale, combined arms campaign with sufficient combat power to also deny a second adversary, and de-emphasized large-scale, prolonged stability operations. The Air Force’s approach to this new strategy is to retire fighter, mobility, and ISR that are beyond those needed to meet the capacity requirements of the new defense strategic guidance.
